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ABSTRACT 
Disputes over the “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives took place in countries with 
sophisticated financial market such as the US and the UK from 1990s, but the recent global 
financial crisis revealed the problem of “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives wide-
spread in many jurisdictions.  In the UK, “mis-selling” of interest rate hedging products was 
a social scandal aftermath of the crisis.  In pursuit of effective regulation of “mis-selling” 
of over-the-counter derivatives, this thesis addresses three research questions.   
The first research question is why transactions of over-the-counter derivatives are prone 
to “mis-selling” practices.  The thesis explains that the vulnerability of over-the-counter 
derivatives to “mis-selling” is caused by dependence of consumers on financial institutions 
due to asymmetric information and knowledge, high profitability of selling over-the-
counter derivatives and the expanding products and consumer base of over-the-counter 
derivatives.       
The second question is how social institutions such as statutory regulation and private law 
have dealt with “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives.  The thesis shows that 
statutory regulation demands that financial institutions assume fiduciary duties which 
cannot be denied or modified by contracts while private law sees an over-the-counter 
derivative transaction between a consumer and a financial institution as just one of the 
commercial contracts between equal counterparties.  It also explains the difference of the 
two institutions in testing causality between breach of standards and loss.  
The third research question is how to achieve harmonized interplay between private law 
and statutory regulation in regulating “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives.  The 
thesis proposes two legal reforms; the statutory “right of action” for breach of regulatory 
requirements, which is now entitled only to private persons, should be extended to all 
consumers except for financial institutions; the causation test in private law should be 
relaxed to the ‘significance’ test.  
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I. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
The global financial crisis, which is considered to have been the worst crisis since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s, had a huge impact not only on the financial market but also on 
the whole global economy.1  Derivatives, more specifically over-the-counter derivatives, 
are believed by many commentators to have transformed what was a bubble in part of 
the US housing market into global catastrophic shock.2  Considering the role played by 
over-the-counter derivatives in the global financial crisis, it is not surprising that there have 
been so much research about the systemic risk caused by over-the-counter derivatives.3   
Another aspect of over-the-counter derivatives revealed by the global financial crisis was 
abusive sales practice by dealer financial institutions.  Macro-economic indicators such as 
currency exchange rates and interest rates, which are main underlying references of over-
the-counter derivatives, experienced great volatility during and in the aftermath of the 
crisis, and this resulted in unexpected and huge losses in over-the-counter derivatives that 
end-users had entered into.  Many of those end-users have argued that they were misled 
by financial institutions into entering into the over-the-counter derivatives.  In the UK, 
interest rate hedging products (“IRHPs”) which are one type of over-the-counter derivatives, 
resulted in extensive financial losses of many SMEs that had entered into these products.4  
                                                          
1 See eg European Commission International Market and Services, ‘Towards more responsibility and 
competitiveness in the European financial sector’ (European Union, 2010), 
<http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/finances/docs/leaflet/financial_services_en.pdf> accessed 10 June 
2016 
2 Colleen M Baker, ‘Regulating the invisible: the case of over-the-counter derivatives’ (2009) 85 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 1287, 1349; Christopher Whalen, ‘Yield to Commission: Is an OTC Market Model to Blame for Growing 
Systemic Risk?’ (2008) 14.2 Journal of Structured Finance 8, 11 
3 See eg U.S. Treasury, Financial regulatory reform: a new foundation (2009) 
4 Financial Services Authority, ‘Interest Rate Hedging Products Pilot Findings’ (2013) 
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Some brought their cases to the courts to be compensated for their losses from IRHPs.5  
At the same time, the financial regulator reviewed the sales practice of IRHPs and arranged 
for compensation to be paid to some eligible end-users.6  However, despite some land-
mark rulings from the courts and a regulator-led programme of compensation, still some 
SMEs brought or appealed their cases to the courts and applied for judicial review7 of the 
regulatory compensation process.8   
Disputes over “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives have taken place in many 
jurisdictions other than the UK.  The International Monetary Fund reported that 50,000 
non-financial firms from 12 different countries including Japan, South Korea, Hong Kong, 
China, Brazil, etc. suffered significant losses from currency-based over-the-counter 
derivatives during the global financial crisis.9  And these disputes are not new.  During the 
1990s in the US, “mis-selling” disputes on over-the-counter derivatives started to become 
a matter of public concern, which involved the Californian District Government of Orange 
County, Procter & Gamble and many other private and public entities.10  In the UK, from 
the 1990s, disputes over “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives continued to occur 
and were brought to the courts even though they did not attract public attention like in 
the US.11  Such continued and wide-spread occurrence of disputes over “mis-selling” of 
over-the-counter derivatives show that they are not just one-off issues in particular 
                                                          
5 See n482, n484, n485, n486 and n487 
6 Financial Services Authority, ‘INTEREST RATE HEDGEING PRODUCT REVIEW’ (2012) 
7 R (Holmcroft Properties Ltd) v KPMG [2016] EWHC 323 (Admin) 
8 See <http://www.bully-banks.co.uk/news/> accessed 15 May 2015 
9 Randall Dodd, ‘IMF Working Paper: Exotic derivatives losses in emerging markets: questions of suitability, 
concerns for stability’ (2009) 3, <http://financialpolicy. org/kiko. pdf> accessed 17 November 2014 
10 United Sates Congress Committee on Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs, H.R. 4503, ‘The Derivatives Safety 
and Soundness Supervision Act of 1994 : hearing before the Committee on Banking, Finance, and Urban 
Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Third Congress second session’ (1994),  
<https://archive.org/details/hr4503derivative00unit> accessed on 10th June 2015 
11 See Table 2 at 107 
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geographic areas or periods of time but that there can be structural causes in the markets 
and in the social institutions that are often assumed counter and regulate “mis-selling”.      
1.2 Research questions 
The thesis addresses three research questions.  The first question is why transactions of 
over-the-counter derivatives between financial institutions and end-users are vulnerable to 
“mis-selling”.  To answer this question, some understanding about the products transacted, 
participants of the markets and the practice of transactions is required.  Hence the thesis 
begins by taking a look at basic derivative products such as options and forwards and 
then examines in the nature of some of more complicated products.  Then the thesis 
analyses the nature and characteristics of different groups of participants in the over-the-
counter markets.  This analysis of the products and the participants shows how some end-
users are dependent on the sellers, i.e. financial institutions.  Then, an examination of 
transaction practices explains the conflicts of interest between the financial institution, its 
sales representatives and end-users.  This question and the answer to it will be discussed 
in Chapter II. 
The second research question is how current social institutions have dealt with the disputes 
over “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives.  Here, the social institutions mean 
private law and financial regulation.  Aside from these two institutions, private arbitration12 
also provides practical solutions to disputes of “mis-selling” but this private apparatus will 
                                                          
12 International Swaps and Derivatives Association, ‘Memorandum for Members of The International Swaps 
and Derivatives Association, Inc: The use of arbitration under an ISDA Master Agreement’ (2011) 2, 
<http://www2.isda.org/search?keyword=arbitration> accessed 11th June 2016  
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not be discussed separately in this thesis because it is usually dependent on the standards 
and precedents of the two institutions.13   
Financial regulation, by which is meant the statutory framework defining operational 
parameters for the financial services sector and statutory regulation empowered by these 
statutes, sets the mandatory requirements that financial institutions should comply with in 
transactions of financial instruments including over-the-counter derivatives, and the 
sanctions applicable to any breach of the requirements.  Private law gets involved in 
disputes of “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives through the courts’ rulings on 
cases brought to them by one of the counterparties.  Its role is to correct wrongdoing in 
the transaction of over-the-counter derivatives by awarding redress for the loss from the 
derivative contract.14     
In answering this second research question, the thesis will, firstly examine how financial 
regulation has dealt with “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives.  The thesis will look 
at the path of evolution by examining the impetus and results of the legislative changes.  
Doing so will provide an opportunity to understand the goals of financial regulation.  And 
then, the sanctioned cases related with “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives will 
be reviewed.  This review will consider the strategy and approach taken by the regulator, 
as enforcer of financial regulation, and affords an opportunity to understand how 
regulation has dealt with “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives in the real world.  
Chapter III will consider the financial regulation in relation to the second research question. 
                                                          
13 Eilis Ferran, ‘Dispute resolution mechanisms in the UK financial sector’ (2002) SSRN 298176; Jonathan R. Hay 
and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Private Enforcement of Public Laws: A Theory of Legal Reform’ (1998) 88 The American 
Economic Review 398, 401 
14 Alastair Hudson, The Law of Financial Derivatives (3rd Edition, THOMSON 2002) para 7-01 
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The thesis, then, will examine private law by analysing the litigation ruled by the courts in 
relation to “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives.  The examination of those cases 
will help to draw out major legal issues of private law in handling claims of “mis-selling” 
of over-the-counter derivatives and to deduce the standards of private law.  Chapter IV 
will look into private law in relation to the second research question. 
In order to completely answer the second research question, after examining the way that 
each of the two social institutions regulates “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives, 
it is necessary to compare the standards of the two institutions.  In fact, despite the two 
institutions dealing with the same issue of “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives, 
they have diverging standards about what constitutes wrongdoing in transactions.   For 
the same behaviour in transactions of over-the-counter derivatives, private law rules that 
it is not a misbehaviour to be redressed but financial regulation sees it as a breach of its 
requirements and sanctions the wrongdoer.  The thesis addresses the origin of why the 
two institutions have sometimes conflicting standards in handling “mis-selling” disputes.  
Chapter V will discuss this issue of diverging criteria between the two institutions, in 
relation to answering the second research question.     
The third research question is how to achieve harmonized interplay between the two 
institutions with different standards in regulating “mis-selling” of over-the-counter 
derivatives.  Firstly, it needs examination of whether the two institutions have 
complementarity in the context of regulating financial instruments transactions, including 
over-the-counter derivatives.  For this, the thesis will analyse the strengths and weaknesses 
of both institutions to identify complementarity, if any.  Then, it will ask what hinders the 
complementary interplay between the two institutions in the context of the financial 
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services sector.  After discussion of the causes hampering the interplay, the thesis suggests 
proposals to correct these causes.  Chapter VI will discuss this third question.  
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II. THE OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES MARKETS 
Introduction 
The aim of the Chapter is to develop understanding of over-the-counter derivatives and 
the markets where they are transacted.  In doing so, it can answer why “mis-sellng” has 
been a persistent feature of these markets.  Among many different aspects of over-the-
counter derivatives, the Chapter will concentrate on those of most relevance to subsequent 
discussion of the regulation of  “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives. 
Firstly, the Chapter contains the conceptual analysis on what derivative products are.  This 
analysis includes not only the basic components of derivatives such as options and 
forwards but also structured products which have gained popularity among investors.  Then 
the market of derivatives will be examined.  After taking a brief look at the exchange 
market, the Chapter will analyse in more depth the over-the-counter market.  The analysis 
will consider the nature of products transacted and participants involved in the markets 
well as the strategy of financial institutions’ marketing of over-the-counter derivatives.  
Based on the analysis of the products and the market of over-the-counter derivatives, the 
Chapter will draw out the characteristics of the market and its implications in relation to 
the following discussions in the thesis.   
Secondly, the Chapter will consider over-the-counter derivatives through the lens of law.  
This part will examine the perspectives of both private law and financial regulation to 
transactions of over-the-counter derivatives.       
2.1 Derivative products 
2.1.1 Concept of derivatives 
8 
 
A common definition of derivative is ‘a financial instrument, whose values derive from 
underlying variables.’15  Underlying variables can be the values of other assets or the 
occurrence of events.  Derivatives in simple forms have been used for thousands of years.16  
In modern times, derivatives started being used explosively from the early 1970s when the 
Bretton Woods system, which fixed currency rates, was abandoned.17  
There are two basic categories of derivatives: options and forwards.18  All derivatives consist 
of more than one of these two basic components.19  Options are the right to buy (a call 
option) or sell (a put option) a certain underlying asset at a certain price (the strike price).  
Other additional conditions such as a cap, floor or collar can be added to the basic options.  
A cap places a ceiling on the price of the underlying asset and so protects, for instance, 
float rate borrowers from interest rate increase.  A floor sets a minimum price at which to 
sell an underlying asset and so protects a seller from a price decline.  A collar holds a cap 
and a floor and so fixes the price movement within a certain band.   
A forward is an agreement where a buyer agrees to buy and a seller agrees to sell a certain 
underlying asset on a specified date at a specified price.   Forwards that are traded on the 
exchange are called “futures”.  A swap is an agreement to exchange future cash flows and 
so can be described as a series of forwards.  A large variety of derivatives can be created 
                                                          
15 John C Hull, Options, futures, and other derivatives (Pearson Education India 2006) 1 
16 Rasiah Gengatharen, Derivatives law and regulation (Vol. 20. Kluwer Law International 2001) 8-12; Roberta 
Romano, ‘Thumbnail Sketch of Derivative Securities and Their Regulation’ (1996) 55 Md. L. Rev. 7, 40-41 
17 Willa E Gibson, ‘Inverstors, Look before You Leap: The Suitability Doctrine Is Not Suitable for OTC Derivatives 
Dealers’ (1997) 29 Loy. U. Chi. LJ 527, 532; Henry TC Hu, ‘Hedging Expectations: Derivative Reality and the Law 
and Finance of the Corporate Objective’ (1994) 73 Tex. L. Rev. 985, 1011 
18 GROUP OF THIRTY, ‘GLOBAL DERIVATIVES STUDY GROUP, DERIVATIVES: PRACTICES AND PRINCIPLES 29’ 
(1993) 27 
19 Ibid 
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using the above basic components with different underlying variables such as assets, rates 
and indices. 
The term of ‘structured products’ describes cash assets such as bonds and deposits, 
combined with derivatives to provide a pay-off not otherwise available.20  These products 
were created to satisfy investors’ diverse ‘risk-return objectives’ decades ago but have 
become popular as an alternative investment from 2000s.21  Structured products include 
structured notes which are debt securities embedded with a derivative22: structured capital-
at-risk investment products (“SCARPs”) whose return is based on a pre-set formula 
connected to the movement of other variables such as an equity index but where the 
principal of the investment can be lost; non-SCARPs which have the same pay-off structure 
as the SCARPs but where its investment principal is protected so long as the issuer of the 
non-SCARPs is solvent; and the structured deposit which is a deposit whose interest is 
linked with the performance of other indices or assets.23  The question of who might use 
such products and why is addressed in due course.24 
2.2 Derivative markets 
Derivatives can be transacted in two different markets: exchanges and over-the-counter 
markets.  Exchange markets list standardized derivatives such as futures and options, which 
have pre-set terms and conditions such as maturity and strike price.  In over-the-counter 
                                                          
20 Robert W Kolb and Overdahl James A, Financial derivatives: pricing and risk management (Vol. 5, John Wiley 
& Sons 2010) 6 
21 Timoth A.Day, ‘Structured products’ in Tanya S.Beder and Cara M.Marshall, Financial Engineering: The 
Evolution of Profession (1 edition, John Wiley & Sons 2011) 260-261 
22 See Carolyn H Jackson, ‘Have You Hedged Today--The Inevitable Advent of Consumer Derivatives’ (1998) 67 
Fordham L. Rev. 3205, 3224-3225, which described the first advent of structured products. 
23 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Structured Products: Thematic Review of Product Development and 
Governance’ (2015) 25-26 
24 See n61 
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derivative markets, customized derivatives are bilaterally negotiated and transacted 
between two counterparties.            
2.2.1 Exchange markets 
The organised exchange markets for derivatives transactions appeared in the mid-1800s 
in Chicago;25 exchange markets were free from credit risks of counterparties because of 
their clearinghouse function26; they were cost-effective in searching counterparties for 
transactions27; they had better price transparency28.  However, exchange markets have a 
critical limitation of inflexibility in structures of products and contract terms.29  While 
standardization of derivatives can reduce transaction costs, this makes it difficult for 
hedgers or investors to tailor the derivatives for their specific hedge or investment needs.30   
For instance, suppose a British company which has receivables of $1.5 million from its 
foreign importer at the end of February needs to hedge its foreign exchange rate risk.  
Exchange-traded derivatives such as futures and options may only have a maturity of end 
of January and $1 million of the amount of a contract unit.  With such standardized 
derivatives, this company cannot fully hedge its foreign exchange rate risk due to the 
mismatch of maturity and amounts.  This is a very simple example of mismatch between 
the business needs and derivative products available in exchange markets; in the real 
business world there would be much more complicated cases of mismatch. 31   This 
                                                          
25 Robert W. Kolb and James A. Overdahl, Financial Derivatives (3rd edition, Wiley 2003) 4  
26 Ibid 17  
27 Ibid 
28 Michael Chui, ‘Derivatives markets, products and participants: an overview’ (2010) China and the Irving 
Fisher Committee in Zhengzhou on 27–29 September 2010, 9 
29 Robert W. Kolb and James (n 25) 18 
30 Aaron L. Philip, ‘1995 Derivatives Practices and Instruments Survey’ (1995) 24.2 Financial Management 
115,123 
31 Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, ‘Understanding Derivatives-Markets and Infrastructures’ (2014) 27-28 
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mismatch problem is a critical issue particularly for those using derivatives to hedge against 
a particular risk, whose main purpose of using derivatives is to ameliorate the volatility of 
their business performance.  Generally accepted accounting principles such as the 
International Accounting Standards32 and U.S. GAAP33 require hedging products to have 
sufficient offsetting effect on the value movement of the hedged assets in order for hedge 
accounting to be applied.  This means that a derivative product which does not have a 
sufficient offsetting effect, for example 80~125% in International Accounting Standards34, 
against the hedged asset cannot be recognized as a hedge in their financial statements.              
2.2.2 Over-the-counter markets 
There is less risk of disputes arising in the transaction of derivatives in the standardized 
market because it is tightly regulated35, the structure and features of the products are 
comparatively simple and transparent and end-users are familiar with the standardized 
products from repeated uses.  Therefore this thesis will focus on the over-the-counter 
markets.   
One of the distinguishing characteristics of over-the-counter markets are their flexibility.36  
In these markets, two counterparties can agree to trade any types of derivatives through 
an almost limitless range of contractual structures.  The flexibility of over-the-counter 
derivatives is the most prominent strength for hedging against risks in the real business 
world.  Companies can more robustly manage their own specific business risks by using 
over-the-counter derivatives in a way which is simply not possible with exchange-traded 
                                                          
32 International Accounting Standards 39 
33 Financial Accounting Standard 133 
34 International Accounting Standards 39 
35 Aaron L. Philip (n 30)  123 
36 Ibid 
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standardized derivatives.37  Such flexibility has led to growth in scale of these markets and, 
as of June 2015, the global notional amount outstanding of over-the-counter derivatives 
is $553 trillion which is almost 9 times the exchange-traded derivatives markets volume of 
$63 trillion.38 
2.2.2.1 Products transacted 
Theoretically, anything quantifiable can be used as underlying assets of over-the-counter 
derivatives,39 but these markets can be classified into the following major sub-markets: 
interest rate products with $435 trillion of notional amounts as of June 2015 (same for 
below), foreign exchange products with $75 trillion, credit default swaps with $15 trillion, 
equity derivatives with $8 trillion, commodity derivatives with $2 trillion, and others with 
$20 trillion.40 
Most41 of the over-the-counter derivatives are effected through contracts which use the 
standard documentation created by the International Swaps Derivatives Association (“ISDA”) 
which was organized in 1985 by major financial institutions to facilitate over-the-counter 
derivatives transactions. 42   These documents include all the necessary provisions for 
                                                          
37 COMMITTEE ON FINANCIAL SERVICES U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, ‘The Effective Regulation of the 
Over-the-Counter Derivatives Market: Hearing Before the Sub comm. on Capital Markets, Insurance, and 
Government Sponsored Enterprises of the H.Comm. on Financial Services’, (111th Cong.164, 2009) 18, 
<https://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-111hhrg52397/pdf/CHRG-111hhrg52397.pdf > accessed 20 July 2016 
38 Bank For International Settlement, ‘Semiannual OTC derivatives statistics’ table D5, 
< http://www.bis.org/statistics/derstats.htm> accessed 15 March 2016 
39 Mark A Guinn and Harvey William L, ‘Taking OTC Derivative Contracts as Collateral’ [2002] The Business 
Lawyer 1127, 1129 
40 Bank For International Settlement (n 38)  
41 Joanne P Braithwaite, ‘OTC derivatives, the courts and regulatory reform’ (2012) 7.4 Capital Markets Law 
Journal 364, n10, which explained that “the ISDA Master Agreement which serves as the contractual 
foundation for more than 90% of derivatives transactions globally..” 
42 Frank Partnoy, ‘ISDA, NASD, CFMA, and SDNY: the four horsemen of derivatives regulation?’ (2002) 
Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services 2002, 213, 217-218 
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enhancing certainty of transactions, including the obligations and representations of each 
party.43     
Over-the-counter derivatives markets are sites of financial and legal innovation and have 
developed new products such as economic derivatives for entities whose income, for 
example tax revenue of the government, closely correlates with growth of economy and 
real estate derivatives for investors who want to hedge their investment in real estate.44  
2.2.2.2 Participants 
The participants in over-the-counter derivatives markets can be classified into two groups, 
dealers and end-users.  Dealers are major financial institutions which sell over-the-counter 
derivatives to end-users.45  Dealers become the counterparty of end-users and earn 
commission which is the gap between the bid and ask prices.46  The difference of bid and 
ask prices is decided by how much information the end-user has about prices of other 
transactions in the market.47  So opaqueness of price in the market can enhance the 
profitability of dealers.48 
Dealers themselves hedge the risk derived from the position of the derivatives transactions 
with end-users, in order to be insulated from market movements, by using highly 
sophisticated risk management methodologies.49  When conducting hedging transactions 
                                                          
43 Ibid 
44 Robert W Kolb and Overdahl James A, Financial derivatives: pricing and risk management (Vol. 5, John Wiley 
& Sons 2010) 221-230; Carolyn H Jackson (n 22) 3260 
45 J. Christopher Kojima, ‘Product-Based Solutions to Financial Innovation:  The Promise and Danger of 
Applying the Federal Securities Laws to OTC Derivatives’ (1995) 33 AM.Bus. L.J. 259, 266 
46 Willa E Gibson, ‘Inverstors, Look before You Leap: The Suitability Doctrine Is Not Suitable for OTC Derivatives 
Dealers’ (1997) 29 Loy. U. Chi. LJ 527,539 
47 Darrell Duffie, Dark Markets: Asset Pricing and Information Transmission in Over-theCounter Markets 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press 2012) 5 
48 Ibid 
49 Ibid 540; GROUP OF THIRTY (n 18) 39-40 
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of over-the-counter derivatives, dealers become end-users.50  So financial institutions can 
be dealers and end-users depending on the purpose of transaction.51  Dealers have 
substantial sized marketing and risk management functions for transacting over-the-
counter derivatives with end-users. 
End-users enter into over-the-counter derivatives contracts for hedge or investment 
purposes, not for commission.52  Majority of end-users are, based on outstanding volume, 
financial institutions.53  Financial institutions are exposed to various financial risks.54  Most 
of their assets and liabilities are sensitive to macroeconomic variables such as interest rates, 
exchange rates and equity markets and so risk management is their core business activity.55   
Non-financial companies also have many reasons to use over-the-counter derivatives.  
Firstly, they can reduce volatility of their business performance caused by macroeconomic 
variables by using over-the-counter derivatives: exporters or importers hedge foreign 
exchange rate risk; corporations protect the worth of assets and liability from interest rates 
risk; manufacturers stabilize the cost of raw materials for production.  Empirical research 
has shown that hedging enables corporations to have stable financial performance and 
enhance the firm value.56  A survey conducted by International Swaps and Derivatives 
Association has shown that 94% of the world’s 500 largest companies57 and 62% of UK 
                                                          
50 Darrell Duffie (n 47) 8  
51 Ibid 
52 GROUP OF THIRTY (n18) 32-36 
53 Bank For International Settlement (n 38) 
54 GROUP OF THIRTY (n18) 38-39 
55 See John Hull, Risk Management and Financial Institutions,+ Web Site, (Vol. 733, John Wiley & Sons 2012) 
56 See eg Söhnke M Bartram, Brown Gregory W, and Fehle Frank R, ‘International evidence on financial 
derivatives usage’ (2003) 27, 
<https://www.researchgate.net/profile/Soehnke_Bartram/publication/23743525_International_Evidence_on_
Financial_Derivatives_Usage/links/0fcfd50bad2b7da781000000.pdf> 
57 International Swaps and Derivatives Association, ‘Over 94% of the World's Largest Companies Use 
Derivatives to Help Manage Their Risks, According to ISDA Survey’ (2009) 1 
<www.isda.org/press/press042309der.pdf> accessed March 2016  
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non-financial listed companies58 use derivatives to hedge or manage the risk in their 
business. 
Many SMEs also enter into over-the-counter derivatives contracts.  While lack of expertise, 
resources and scale of economy are the obstacles for SMEs to use over-the-counter 
derivatives,59 they have the same reasons for using over-the-counter derivatives as the 
large corporations.  One piece of empirical research revealed that 24% of UK listed non-
financial SMEs used derivatives of which over 80% were over-the-counter derivatives.60   
It is an important trend that individual investors are increasingly investing in structured 
products embedded with over-the-counter derivatives.  Disappointed by low interest rates 
from ordinary saving products, individual investors seek better returns than are available 
from interest on savings but, at the same time, they want to protect their investment 
principal.61  Structured products which purport to protect against or reduce the risk of 
losing investment principal and provide higher income than ordinary savings have met this 
appetite of individual investors.  Retail investment in structured products has grown 
enough to attract the financial regulator’s attention.62 
                                                          
58 Mallin, Chris, Kean Ow-Yong, and Martin Reynolds, ‘Derivatives usage in UK non-financial listed companies’ 
(2001) 7.1 The European Journal of Finance 63,68 
59 Joost ME Pennings and Philip Garcia, ‘Hedging behavior in small and medium-sized enterprises: The role of 
unobserved heterogeneity’ (2004) 28.5 Journal of Banking & Finance 951,955-957 
60 Giulia Fantini, Financial Derivatives usage by UK & Italian SMEs. Empirical evidence from UK & Italian non-
financial firms (Diss. Università degli Studi di Ferrara, 2014) 52-53 
61 See eg Financial Services Authority, ‘Retail Conduct Risk Outlook’ (2011) 47-51 
<http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/rcro.pdf> accessed March 2016 
62 Financial Services Authority, ‘Retail Product Development and Governance-Structured Products Review’ 
(2011); Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Structured Products: Thematic Review of Product Development and 
Governance’ (2015); Alex Erskine, ‘Retail derivatives: What we know, what we don’t know, and regulatory 
challenges’ (2011) 4 JASSA, 55 
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Expanding the user base of over-the-counter derivatives into SMEs and individual investors 
has been in large part triggered by ‘supply-side’ innovation. 63   Risk management 
techniques have progressed dramatically since the 1990s and this enabled dealers to create 
derivatives transactions highly tailored to each end-user.64  This innovation has been 
accelerated by the race among financial institutions to be ‘one step ahead of the 
competition’.65    
Within the group of end-users, the level of knowledge and experience in over-the-counter 
derivatives markets diverges tremendously between financial institutions and other end-
users such as non-financial corporations and individuals.  Financial institutions, whether as 
a dealer or an end-user, have sufficient resources to deal expertly with over-the-counter 
derivatives transactions.  Prudential regulation also ensures that regulated financial 
institutions hold sufficient risk management capability to prevent their failures.66  Therefore, 
in over-the-counter derivatives transactions, financial institutions cannot be said consumers 
but counterparties.67 
On the contrary, even large non-financial corporations usually do not have designated 
departments for over-the-counter derivatives transactions, let alone SMEs.  They have no 
                                                          
63 Dan Awrey, ‘Toward a supply-side theory of financial innovation’ (2012) 23-39 < 
http://ineteconomics.org/uploads/papers/Awrey-Paper.pdf> accessed November 2015; Henry TC Hu, ‘Hedging 
Expectations: Derivative Reality and the Law and Finance of the Corporate Objective’ (1994) 73 Tex. L. Rev. 
985, n13 
64 Bruce G Carruthers, ‘Diverging derivatives: Law, governance and modern financial markets’ (2013), 13 
<http://blogs.law.columbia.edu/glawfin/files/2013/10/09-Diverging-Derivatives.-Law-Governance-and-
Modern-Financial-Markets-by-Bruce-G.-Carruthers.pdf> accessed November 2015; GROUP OF THIRTY (n18) 
39-40 
65 Peter Tufano, ‘Financial Innovation and First Mover Advantages’ (1989) 25 Journal of Financial  
Economics 213, 225-234; see also Morgan Stanley UK Group v Puglisi Cosentino [1998] C.L.C. 481-482 where 
the financial institution developed a new type of SCARP, so-called PEARLS, ahead of its rivals and could hold 
many clients. 
66 John Hull (n 55) 19 
67 FCA Handbook, Conduct of Business Sourcebook (“COBS”) 3.6.2R  
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other choice than to substantially depend, for transactions of over-the-counter derivatives, 
on dealers to understand the nature and risks of the products.68  A survey conducted on 
800 UK listed companies showed that the difficulty of evaluating the risks and the lack of 
knowledge of derivatives were their biggest concerns in transacting derivatives.69  In 
recognition of this clear difference in expertise, this thesis uses the term “consumers” to 
include non-financial corporations and individual investors in over-the-counter derivatives 
transactions hereinafter, a wider sense than with which it is commonly used but, it is argued, 
the complexity and nature of over-the-counter products justified such wider usage.      
2.2.2.3 Marketing 
In over-the-counter derivatives markets, financial institutions use ‘relationship’ marketing,70 
which aims to maximize long term profits by solidifying relationships with clients, rather 
than focusing on short term or individual transaction profits.71  Financial institutions 
designate an account manager who is responsible for developing relationship with 
consumers and facilitating the sales of a broad range of services and products including 
over-the-counter derivatives.72  Because over-the-counter derivatives contracts are usually 
long-term, complex and large scale, a good “relationship” with consumers is seen as a 
prerequisite for undertaking transactions.73  In order to obtain the “trust” from their clients, 
                                                          
68 Alessio M.Pacces, ‘Financial intermediation in the securities markets law and economics of conduct of 
business regulation’ (2000) 20.4 International Review of Law and Economics 479, 482 
69 Chris Mallin, Kean Ow-Yong, and Martin Reynolds, ‘Derivatives usage in UK non-financial listed companies’ 
(2001) 7.1 The European Journal of Finance 63,77 
70 Katherine Tyler and Edmund Stanley, ‘Marketing OTC equity derivatives: the role of relationships’ (2002) 
20.2 International Journal of Bank Marketing 67, 72-73 
71 Elizabeth Sheedy, ‘Marketing derivatives: a question of trust’ (1997) 15.1 International Journal of Bank 
Marketing 22, 22 
72 Ibid 
73 Ibid 26 
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account managers should make great efforts to demonstrate that they are interested in a 
long term relationship.74   
Financial institutions also try to enhance ‘internal marketing’ in their organizations.75  
Marketing people recognize their consumers’ needs and business opportunities, and “sell” 
their findings to derivatives engineers in their organizations.76  This internal marketing 
process enables financial institutions to develop over-the-counter derivatives products that 
better meet the needs of each consumer.  
2.2.3 Characteristics of over-the-counter derivatives markets 
The above sections analysed products and markets of over-the-counter derivatives.  Based 
on this analysis, this section will consider the characteristics of over-the-counter derivatives 
markets and implications for this thesis.  
2.2.3.1 Characteristics 
One of the most evident characteristics of over-the-counter derivatives markets is the 
asymmetry of information and knowledge between sellers and consumers.  While the 
financial services industry is notorious for information asymmetry,77 the over-the-counter 
derivatives markets is one of the worst areas even in the industry.  First of all, derivatives 
are unfamiliar products for consumers compared with other commonly transacted financial 
products like loans, equities and insurance.78  Consumers have very limited knowledge of 
and experience in derivatives markets.  On the other side, financial institutions have a 
dominant position in knowledge and experience.  They can easily obtain information about 
                                                          
74 Katherine Tyler (n 70) 71 
75 N. S. Nilakantan, ‘Marketing of Derivatives in the Aftermath of Lehman Crisis’ (2010) 8.2 Synergy 43, 47 
76 Ibid 
77 David Llewellyn, The economic rationale for financial regulation (Financial Services Authority, 1999) 25-26 
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market conditions including market participants, trends of pricing and the movement of 
underlying variables.  In particular, financial institutions of major dealer banks circulate 
market information only within their close-knit group of dealers.79  
The second characteristic is the consumers’ heavy reliance on the sales representatives of 
financial institutions for entering into over-the-counter derivatives contracts.  Consumers 
with insufficient information and knowledge tend to rely on the salespersons’ explanation 
and recommendation of over-the-counter derivatives.  It is practically impossible for 
consumers to compare the price and other terms of non-standardized over-the-counter 
derivatives among different financial institutions. 80   Asymmetry of knowledge and 
information forces consumers to rely on financial institutions for obtaining necessary 
knowledge and information in terms of the over-the-counter derivatives, even the price 
information.  On top of this, financial institutions can exploit the consumer’s reliance by 
“trust” obtained by ‘relationship marketing’.81 
On the supply side, over-the-counter derivatives markets are characterized as being highly 
profitable and so there is heavy pressure on sales performance.  The profits of financial 
institutions earned through over-the counter derivatives transactions are quite lucrative82 
partly, if not all, due to information asymmetry, consumers’ reliance on sellers and 
opaqueness83 of price of over-the-counter derivatives.  The attractive margins lead to 
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pressure on salespersons to achieve high sales performance.  The pressure is not only 
business-driven but also self-inflicted due to the compensation system based on personal 
sales performance84.  The lucrative profit and generous personal compensation can create 
blindness85 to the interest of consumers, if not opportunism86.  In addition, for salespersons 
who pursue their private interest, it is rational to exploit their consumers in the short run 
rather than building up reputation of their employer in the long run.87 
Lastly, over-the-counter derivatives markets has been expanding its territory in terms of 
products as well as the users.  This expanding trend can continue and so new innovative 
products can be introduced to the current and new class of consumers.88  
2.2.3.2 Implication 
When the above characteristics of over-the-counter derivatives markets are considered, 
these markets are deemed to create conditions where “mis-selling” disputes can easily 
occur.  The term “mis-selling” is used often now to mean that consumers have been 
somehow misled into buying products or services.89  Consumers, when they enter into 
over-the-counter derivatives contracts, rely on their account manager or sales 
representatives of financial institutions to help them achieve their objectives of hedging or 
investment.  Sales representatives have gained trust based on strategic relationship 
                                                          
84 See Zaki & Others v CSUK [2011] EWHC 2422 (COMM) where a sales person was compensated millions of 
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85 Christine Cuccia, ‘Informational Asymmetry and OTC Transactions: Understanding the Need to Regulate 
Derivatives’ (1997) 22 Del. J. Corp. L. 197, 205 
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marketing and provide tailored over-the-counter derivatives to consumers.  Self or 
hierarchical pressure for sales performance can give rise to opportunism or marketing 
practice blind to the real benefit of consumers.   
The market situation of underlying assets can move anytime in an adverse way, contrary 
to what may be the expectation and understanding of the consumers and even the sales 
representatives.  Sometimes markets even collapse.  When suffering loss from adverse and 
unexpected market movements, consumers who have relied on the sales representatives’ 
explanation and recommendation are likely to think that they were misled to enter into 
over-the-counter derivatives contracts.  This is the typical scenario of how “mis-selling” 
disputes in the over-the-counter derivatives markets arise.  The structure of the market 
and the nature of participants makes for the perfect environment for such disputes.    
2.3 Legal perspectives of derivatives transactions 
Previous sections have analysed derivatives products and markets from economic angles.  
The following sections will take a look at derivatives from legal perspectives and identify 
legal risks in transacting derivatives.   
2.3.1 Legal concepts of derivatives 
From the perspective of private law, a derivative transaction is a contract, which creates 
and allocates personal rights and duties between the contacting parties: setting in advance 
a method of calculating profit and loss, the amount of money to be paid on a specific 
date, etc.90  An enforceable contract does not require high formality in English law; a 
contract takes legal effect when there are offer, acceptance, consideration and intention 
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to create legal relations.91  A transaction of a derivative is treated by private law as one of 
many types of contracts.    
Among private law, particularly contract law and tort law have obvious relevance to 
disputes over “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives.92  Contract law provides the 
guidance and framework for settling disputes over transactions of financial products about 
formation, interpretation and termination of contracts.93  In particular, in many of the 
disputes of “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives, the performance from the 
products purchased by consumers are different from what they expected at the time of 
purchasing and contract law gives the answer as to the validity of the contracts in such 
cases.94  In the disputes of “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives, there are also 
claims of wrongdoings including fraud, breach of contract, negligence in duties and 
misrepresentation, etc.95  Tort law may be applied to provide compensation and other 
remedies when such wrongdoings are found.96    
In the sphere of public law financial regulation has been involved in “regulating” derivatives 
transactions since the Financial Services Act 1986 (“FSA 1986”) was enacted.97  FSA 1986 
stipulated that no one could carry on ‘regulated investment business’ in the UK unless he 
was an ‘authorized person’ or an ‘exempted person’.98  Schedule 1 to the Act, which defined 
the scope of the Act, included dealing in derivatives such as options and futures in the 
‘regulated investment business’.99  Thereafter, transactions of derivatives where at least one 
                                                          
91 Simon James, (n 90) 175 
92 Alastair Hudson, THE LAW OF FINANCE (n90) para 4.07-4.09 
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counterparty is an ‘authorized person’, i.e. a financial institution, have been the subject of 
financial regulation.100  Financial regulation has considered transacting derivatives as an 
activity to be regulated.101  The involvement of regulation has been further extended as 
EU legislation such as Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (“MiFID”) was implemented 
as statutory regulation in public law sphere.  MiFID will be explained in Chapter III.102  
The thesis will examine in depth how private law and financial regulation regulate “mis-
selling” of over-the-counter derivatives in the Chapter III and IV. 
2.3.2 Legal risk of derivatives 
Transacting an over-the-counter derivative, which is an apparatus used usually for 
managing risks, exposes the parties of the transaction to new kinds of risks, including 
credit risk of the counterparty, market and liquidity risk of the transacted product and legal 
risk.103  Among these risks, credit risk, market risk and liquidity risk are all economic risks.104  
Legal risk, in brief, is the risk that derivatives contracts are not enforceable by law.105  Legal 
risks can come from several different sources.  
The first source of legal risk in transacting over-the-counter derivatives is that a derivative 
contract can be void because of its nature.  For instance, a derivative contract can be 
unlawful if it is seen as gambling or an unlicensed insurance.106  Morgan Grenfell v. Welwyn 
Hatfield District Council107, where the interest rate swap transacted was argued as a 
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102 Alastair Hudson, THE LAW OF FINANCE (n90) para1.24; see n238 and n702 
103 Simon James, THE LAW OF DERIVATIVES (Routledge, 2014) 15 
104 Ibid 
105 Ibid 
106 Timothy E Lynch, (n 90) 47-49; Norman Menachem Feder, ‘Deconstructing Over-the-Counter Derivatives’ 
[2002] Colum. Bus. L. Rev 677, 728; see also George Walker, Robert Purves, and Michael Blair QC, Financial 
Services Law (OXFORD 2014) Para. 12.04 
107 [1995] 1 All ER1; see also City Index v Leslie [1992] 1 QB 98 
24 
 
wagering transaction, is an example case where legitimacy of a derivative contract is 
questioned.  The innovative characteristics of derivative contracts can easily create this 
risk.108  
Secondly, legal risk related to the actual counterparty to an over-the-counter derivative 
transaction can make the contract unenforceable.109  Some counterparties may not have 
the legal ability to enter into a derivative contract by the constitution of companies or 
public entities.  Even when the counterparty has legal capacity to enter into a derivative 
contract, the person purporting on behalf of the counterparty may not have the authority 
to represent the counterparty in the contract.110  Credit Suisse International v Stichting 
Vestia Groep111 is such a case.  Here a public entity, a Dutch social housing association, 
contended that it lacked capacity to enter into certain derivative contracts by its 
constitution and also that its managing director did not have authority to enter into them.  
Another example of the legal risk arising from a counterparty is that in a series of litigation 
about interest rate swaps by the UK local authorities in 1990s, the court ruled that 
contracting interest rate swaps was beyond the power entitled by the relevant statute to 
the local governments and so void.112  
Thirdly, legal risk of an over-the-counter derivative transaction can come from actions 
during pre-contractual or contractual stage, which may not be compliant with legal or 
regulatory requirements.113  The claims of “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives are 
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the representative example of the legal risk originating from this source.  Contract law and 
tort law in private law provide the principles of permissible behaviours during the 
negotiating and contracting process.114  Breach of these principles of private law may give 
the counterparty a right to rescind the contract or to obtain redress for their consequent 
loss.  Statutory regulation also defines mandatory duties of financial institutions in 
transacting financial instruments including over-the-counter derivatives.115  Breach of these 
regulatory requirements can lead to various sanctions and order of compensation for the 
loss of the consumer.   
Conclusion 
This Chapter has provided a more detailed understanding of over-the-counter derivatives 
markets.  It has explained that the combination of options and forwards can make a large 
variety of derivative products.  This flexibility of derivatives enables them to be tailored to 
meet the specific needs of each consumer.  
In terms of the derivatives market, the Chapter illustrated why there should be over-the-
counter markets for derivatives.  Without over-the-counter markets, users of derivatives 
cannot fully utilize derivatives and this can result in substantially reduced benefit of using 
derivatives.  Particularly for those hedging, standardized derivatives listed in exchange 
markets may not provide hedging effect in accounting because they often cannot offset 
the value movement of hedged assets sufficiently due to their inflexibility. 
The Chapter, then, has examined the particular characteristics of the over-the-counter 
market of derivatives.  It explained that participants of this market can be categorized into 
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two groups: dealers who sell proprietary products and end-users who transact these 
products.  It pointed out that financial institutions can be dealers and end-users depending 
on the purpose of the transaction and that they have sophisticated risk management 
system and expertise in dealing with over-the-counter derivatives.  On the other side, non-
financial corporations and individuals are end-users who enter into over-the-counter 
derivatives for the purpose of hedge or investment and not for earning commission, and 
they lack in expertise in over-the-counter derivatives.   
The Chapter examined the over-the-counter derivatives markets to “mis-selling” disputes.  
The first “ingredient” of “mis-selling” disputes is that there is asymmetry of information 
and knowledge between financial institutions and consumers, which results in consumers 
being dependent on the dealers.  The fact that the over-the-counter derivatives are 
commonly proprietary products which are designed by the seller exacerbates the 
imbalance of information and knowledge.  Secondly, the substantial commission income 
of the dealer financial institution and generous financial incentives for salespersons 
contribute to making a good environment for “mis-selling”.  Lastly, the volatility of the 
financial market can go against the expectations of the consumer and even the salesperson, 
resulting in the over-the-counter derivatives to fail to achieve the expected performance.       
The Chapter took a look at over-the-counter derivatives transactions from legal 
perspectives.  Private law sees the transactions of over-the-counter derivatives as a process 
of contracting, while financial regulation takes a view of these transactions as business 
activities of financial institutions to be regulated.  This showed that both private law and 
public law would try to deal with claims of “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives 
based on their own perspectives.  The following two Chapters now turn to the principles 
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and specific rules of financial regulation and private law in dealing with “mis-selling” of 
over-the-counter derivatives.    
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CHAPTER III. REGULATION ON OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES 
TRANSACTIONS 
 
Introduction 
There are two social institutions to regulate transactions of over-the-counter derivatives 
between financial institutions and consumers: regulation and private law.  Here, regulation 
means the statute specifically for financial services and products transactions, and the 
regulatory rules made by the competent authorities delegated by the statute.  The purpose 
of this Chapter is to understand how the regulation deals with over-the-counter derivatives 
transactions.   
For this purpose it is not enough just to take a look at current regulation.  It is necessary 
to consider why regulation in financial services sector emerged and how it has been 
evolved up to the current shape.  Reviewing the history will provide a wide view for better 
understanding of the nature and role of regulation, which will be necessary for the later 
discussion about origins of dissonance between financial regulation and private law in the 
Chapter V. 
Then this Chapter will take a close look at current regulation regime, particularly the 
regulator and its power to realize its objectives.  After this, the Conduct of Business 
Sourcebook (“COBS”) which stipulates specific requirements for investment services 
including over-the-counter derivatives transactions will be examined in detail.  Through 
the examination, it will be clear what duties the regulation requires in over-the-counter 
derivatives transactions. 
Lastly, the enforcement cases against regulatory contravention regarding “mis-selling” of 
over-the-counter derivatives will be examined.  This will illustrate how the regulatory 
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requirements in the rulebook are embodied “on the ground”.  Through the analysis of the 
enforcement cases, it will be possible to comprehend the regulation, enforcement 
approach and strategy of the regulator more completely.       
3.1 Evolvement of regulation 
3.1.1 History of regulation 
In the twentieth century, there have been three paradigm-shifting legislative changes in 
financial services sector, from Prevention Fraud (Investment) Act 1939/1958 to Financial 
Services Act 1986 (“FSA 1986”) to Financial Services Market Act 2000 (“FSMA 2000”).  As 
George Walker and others argued the evolvement of regulation was ‘event-led process’,116 
each of the enactments of those legislations has had impetus for transformation.  This 
section will explore why those paradigm-shifting legislations were pursued and what 
changes were made. 
3.1.1.1 Emergence of financial regulation 
It was in the seventeenth century that stock brokers’ dealings in bonds and shares first 
appeared.117  Even at that time records show that fraud and other false behaviours were 
prevalent in the market.118  According to a report by the commissioners appointed by the 
Parliament, it was said that ‘pernicious Art of Stock-Jobbing hath…so wholly perverted the 
End of Design of Companies’.119  It described various examples of promotional frauds, asset 
stripping operations, insider dealing and market manipulation.120   
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In 1697, the ‘Act to restrain the number and ill practice of Brokers and Stock-jobbers’ was 
enacted.121  This Act stipulated that stock brokers and jobbers could deal in financial 
instruments only with a license from the Lord Mayor and Court of Aldermen.122  When 
obtaining the license, the brokers and jobbers were required to take an oath to do business 
‘without fraud or collusion, to the best of my skill and knowledge’.123  In the 1720s, many 
institutions and individuals suffered losses from the ‘South Sea Bubble’124 and the ‘Act to 
Prevent the Infamous Practice of Stock-Jobbing’ was enacted to ban the dealing of all 
options and short-selling in order to inhibit excessive speculation.125   
3.1.1.2 Prevention of Fraud (Investment) Act 1939/1958 
In the early 1930s, with the boom of trusts, there were many reports of mis-leading 
advertisements of unit trusts to the public.126  There were also cases of fraud involving the 
sales of shares of worthless companies just for margin.127  However, the general law which 
mainly used criminal punishments for prominently fraudulent behaviours revealed its 
limitation to effectively deal with more sophisticated and abusive mal-practices in financial 
services sector. 128   In response, the government enacted the Prevention of Fraud 
(Investment) (“PFI”) Act 1939, which was later re-enacted as the PFI 1958 Act.  The PFI Act 
is considered the first modern statute to regulate investment services. 
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The PFI Act required a person to be licensed by the Department of Trade and Industry 
(“DTI”) in order to deal in securities as a principal or an agent,129 even though members of 
a self-regulatory organization (i.e., members of The Stock Exchange or other associations 
of dealers) were exempt.130  This system was to try to ensure that only fit and proper 
persons with a good character and relevant expertise were allowed to deal in securities.131 
The PFI Act also prohibited making a misleading, deceptive or false statement to induce 
consumers to invest in securities.132  This provision was the first explicit statutory provision 
to prevent fraudulent inducement of investment.133  Under the PFI Act, the Department of 
Trade and Industry created a conduct of business rule for licensed persons.134  This rule 
required, among others, a licensed person to provide a prospectus containing certain 
information on the securities offered.135  The conduct of business rule at the time was 
basically disclosure-based regulation. 
3.1.1.3 Financial Services Act 1986 
Background 
By the early 1980s, the shortcomings of the PFI Act were becoming increasingly apparent.  
The regulatory scope of the PFI Act excluded the members of a self-regulatory system, like 
members of The Stock Exchange and other recognized associations authorized by the 
DTI.136  The Act also provided exemption for financial institutions that dealt in transactions 
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of securities as their ancillary business.137  Over time, many financial institutions were able 
to establish that dealing in securities was ancillary to their main business and get exempted. 
138  As a result, the number of exempted firms increased so that the exemption became 
‘to be regarded as a prized status symbol’.139  
In addition, the scope of the PFI Act only covered licensed dealers and not investment 
advisors or investment managers.140  In terms of coverage of products, it did not cover 
sophisticated investment products such as futures and options, which were beginning to 
be developed from 1970s,141 nor mutual funds where increased investments were being 
made.142  Such a narrow scope of financial products and services which the Act covered 
was another apparent shortcoming. 
Thirdly, the regulatory system under the PFI Act was difficult to enforce.  Enforcement of 
statutory regulation relied on criminal punishment which demanded a high standard of 
proof and so had a low rate of success.143  Self-regulatory organizations (“SRO”) could use 
only non-legal sanctions, such as adverse publicity and suspension of listing, which were 
not perceived to be strong enough to make discipline among the market players.144  
In 1981, scandals occurred that highlighted the need for a comprehensive review of 
investor protection under the PFI Act.  One was where Norton Warburg, an investment 
management firm, became insolvent with a deficit of ￡2.5 million.  It had invested clients’ 
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money in companies of its own group, which went into default and caused many clients 
to suffer huge losses.145  Another scandal shocked the City, where a fund manager of a 
merchant bank was suspected of having obtained improper benefit from a stock broker.146  
Such scandals raised questions about whether the PFI Act provided proper protection to 
investors.147   
Gower report 
With a series of scandals and the recognition of shortcomings of the PFI Act, the Secretary 
of State for Trade asked Professor Gower to review the financial regulatory system for 
investor protection in the UK in 1981.  Professor Gower completed the report148 (“Gower 
Report”) in 1984 with a discussion document149 in 1982.  In the report, he asserted that 
financial regulation was not for ‘protecting fools from their own folly’ but for ‘protecting 
reasonable people from being made fools of’.  Under the philosophy, the report contained 
bold suggestions to reform the financial regulatory system in the UK, most of which were 
accepted and implemented as the Financial Services Act 1986.  
First of all, the Gower Report proposed a regulatory system based on self-regulation 
subject to governmental supervision.150  Self-regulation under governmental supervision, 
he believed, could maintain the strengths of self-regulation such as flexibility and expertise 
and at the same time complement its shortcomings such as ineffective enforcement and 
the danger of conflicts of interest between the public and the group members of SROs.151  
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He also suggested to enlarge the scope which the regulatory system could cover.152  He 
recommended that regulation should cover not only securities but also a much wider range 
of investment products such as financial derivatives.  He also stressed the importance of 
the enforcement of regulation.153  For this, he recommended that there be civil remedies 
for consumers suffering loss from regulatory breach.154    
Changes made by FSA 1986 
The FSA 1986 was the first legislation in the UK to formulate a comprehensive regulatory  
framework for the investment industry.155  Most of the important concepts for investor 
protection were developed by this Act.  Below are the changes created by the FSA 1986 
in relation to investor protection.   
The FSA 1986 created a ‘practitioner-based, statute-backed’ regulatory regime, which 
consisted of the Securities and Investments Board Ltd. (“SIB”) and certain recognized Self-
Regulatory Organizations.156 Compared to the PFI Act, the scope of the new regime had a 
wider coverage of investment instruments and businesses, including transacting in 
derivatives.157     
The legislation enhanced the enforcement power of the SIB.158  The SIB was given the 
power to ban individuals guilty of misconduct from being employed by financial 
institutions159 and to apply to the court for restitution orders to compensate consumers 
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against financial institutions that contravened the rules made by the SIB or SROs.160  The 
Act also afforded civil remedies to investors who suffered losses as a result of 
contraventions of rules by financial institutions.161  
Regulatory rules  
Under the FSA 1986, authorization for carrying on investment businesses could be given 
by both the SIB and the recognized SROs162 but the financial institutions authorized by a 
SRO was not subject to the conduct of business rule made by the SIB but subject to the 
rule made by the SRO.163  To avoid the incoherency and complexity between the rules of 
the SIB and the different SROs, some new provisions were added to the FSA 1986 by the 
Companies Act 1989.   
Firstly, the SIB was granted power to create Principles that applied to all authorized firms.164  
The SIB was also given power to make core rules which were required to be incorporated 
into SROs’ rulebooks.165  As a result of this amendment, the regulatory rules under the FSA 
1986 acquired a three-tier structure: 1) Principles by the SIB, 2) Core Conduct of Business 
Rules (“Core Rules”) made by the SIB and incorporated into the SROs’ rulebooks and 3) 
SROs’ rulebooks.166   
The Principle and the Core Rules promulgated by the SIB included most of the important 
modern concepts for investor protection.  The Principles required financial institutions to 
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sustain ‘integrity’ 167  and ‘skill, care and diligence’ 168 , to obtain ‘information about 
customers’169, to provide ‘information for customers’170 and to avoid ‘conflicts of interest’171, 
all the spirit of which still remains in the current ‘Principles of Businesses’172 in the FCA 
Handbook.   
The Core Rules also founded critical obligations of financial institutions, which the COBS, 
the current statutory conduct rule by FCA, promulgates: 1) ‘fair and clear communication’173, 
‘informing the risk of the investment’174, ‘prohibition to seek exclusion of obligations’175, 
‘suitability’176 and ‘disclosure of charges and remuneration’177.  The differences between 
the Core Rules and the COBS regarding the above rules is that in the COBS, most of these 
rules cover more consumers including ‘professional clients’ whereas the Core Rules 
confined most of these rules to ‘private customers’.  Another interesting difference is that 
the Core Rules had a specific provision for derivatives transactions, which allowed over-
the-counter derivatives transaction with a private client only for the purpose of hedge 
against his currency risk.178 
The Securities and Futures Authority (“SFA”) was one of the recognized SROs, which was 
entitled to regulate the investment business including the transactions of derivatives.  The 
SFA, in 1991, also promulgated its own rulebook179, as one of the third-tier rulebooks 
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under the FSA 1986.  The SFA rulebook, in general, did not contain many different concepts 
for investor protection from the Core Rules, but rather incorporated the provisions of the 
Core Rules in its rulebook.   
3.1.1.4 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 
FSMA 2000 was brought about as regulatory system designed under FSA 1986 becoming 
ineffective.  As boundaries between different financial services sectors blurred in 1990s, 
the regulatory system under the FSA 1986, which regulated different financial services 
sectors separately through sector-focused SROs, revealed ineffectiveness.180  One financial 
institutions with various businesses in different financial services sectors were regulated by 
different SROs.181  This system, thus, created regulatory overlaps and arbitrariness across 
different financial services sectors.182  A committee report to the House of Commons 
showed well the rational of the new legislation: 
The existing arrangements for financial regulation involve a large number of 
regulators…In recent years there has been a blurring of the distinction 
between different kinds of financial services… The Government believes the 
current system is costly, inefficient and confusing... It is not delivering the 
standard of supervision and investor protection.183 
With these reasons, the newly elected government in 1997 declared the reform of the 
financial services regulatory regime as one of its important commitments.184  
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Changes by FSMA 2000 
The first priority of the new financial services legislation, Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000 (“FSMA 2000”), was to create a single statutory regulator that was responsible 
for supervising and regulating the entire range of financial services areas including banking, 
insurance and investment services.185  As the key impetus of enacting the FSMA 2000 was 
the creation of a single regulator, the biggest change by the FSMA 2000 was the advent 
of the Financial Services Authority (“FSA”).  The FSA took over the responsibilities and roles 
of the then existing nine regulators.186  The most important powers, among others, entitled 
to the FSA were to make rules and to sanction or intervene in the breach of the rules it 
made.  Under the FSMA 2000, the FSA was able to make and amend statutory rules 
responding to market developments and to make different levels of rules from principles 
to detailed rules.187   The FSMA 2000 also ensured that the FSA could hold sufficient 
intervention and discipline power to the wrongdoers.188  The FSA could take actions to 
prevent problems caused by regulated firms from spreading further and remedy the 
problems.189  The FSA would also be able to impose direct sanctions on all authorized 
firms which failed to comply with the regulatory rules.190 
Another substantial change created by the FSMA 2000 was the creation of the Financial 
Ombudsman Scheme (“FOS”).  Under the FSA 1986, there were eight different dispute 
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resolution schemes.191  Under this plural dispute resolution schemes, financial institutions 
could choose to join a specific dispute scheme and some firms did not have any 
membership of the schemes.192  The FOS consolidated then existing eight dispute schemes 
and bound the regulated firms to it.193  The FOS can resolve financial disputes ‘quickly and 
with minimum formality’.194  Under the scheme, a complaint should be determined by what 
the ombudsman opines ‘fair and reasonable in all circumstances’.195  It means that the 
ombudsman doesn’t need to confine himself to breaches of any principles or rules, but 
rather, he can consider non-statutory obligations such as the firms’ voluntary code.196  The 
ombudsman may determine a money award compensating for financial loss of the 
consumer but the money award cannot exceed the limit of £150,000197. 
 
Regulatory rules: Conduct of Business Sourcebook 
The FSA made the Conduct of Business Sourcebook (“COB”) as a part of the FSA handbook 
of rules and guidance under the FSMA 2000.  The COB contained detailed requirements 
for the financial institutions regarding its business with consumers.  The COB replaced the 
precedent regulator’s Core Rules and the separate rulebooks made by different SROs.198  
The FSA’s basic approach to make the single conduct rule was to integrate then existing 
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standards in different rulebooks.199  In the integrating task of different rulebooks, the FSA 
put the first priority on ‘user-friendliness’.200  For this, the FSA tried to use terms as simple 
and easy as possible and make the requirements clear.201  The second principle was 
harmonization of regulation across the different investment areas.202  It did not, thus, create 
big changes in contents from the SIB’s Core Rules.   
3.1.1.5 FSA 2010 & FSA 2012 
The FSMA 2000 amended by the Financial Services Act 2010 (“FSA 2010”) and the Financial 
Services Act 2012 (“FSA 2012”) is the current statute regulating financial markets and 
services, including over-the-counter derivatives transactions.   
The enactment of the two Acts was the statutory response to the “failures” of both the 
market and regulation to prevent the global financial crisis.  The area the FSA 2010 focused 
mostly on was to maintain financial stability from the costly lessons learned from the crisis.  
But it also tried to improve overall protection of financial consumers.   
The ‘consumer redress scheme’ was introduced as one of the methods to enhance 
consumer protection.203  Under this scheme, the regulator can make regulatory rules 
requiring relevant financial institutions to establish and operate a consumer redress scheme 
under which they should provide redress to consumers who suffered loss from their failures 
of compliance with requirements of statutory duties.204  This massive power was had 
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originally been allowed only the Treasury to authorize the regulator to establish and 
operate the scheme.   
The ‘consumer redress scheme’ is different from other consumer redress tools205 in that 
this scheme is intended to be used for widespread consumer detriments from particular 
products or practices.  Restitution order had been rarely used because this action should 
be taken on the case-by-case basis and so not useful for the regulator with limited 
resources.206  The FOS, another regulatory redress scheme, was also not designed for 
dealing with large scaled consumer detriments but for dealing with an individual case.  The 
private law, HM Treasury presented, has been incapable of responding generic claims 
because of complicated processes for a group litigation and inconsistent ruling in different 
courts, etc.207  
This scheme was adopted for collective regulatory redress to make up for the failures of 
regulation and private law in dealing with large scaled consumer detriments.  However, 
the consumer detriments the scheme can address are limited to those that seem that the 
court would order remedy.208  Considering the difficulty to prove causality, in the court, 
between regulatory breach and detriment of consumers, the requisite of judiciary remedy 
seeming available is an obstacle for the regulator to exploit this scheme.209  As such, there 
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has been only one usage of this scheme by the regulator until now in relation to a fund 
named ‘Arch Cru’ in 2012,210 and it was not be deployed in dealing with IRHPs scandal. 
The FSA 2012 overhauled the regulatory system and created the Financial Conduct 
Authority (“FCA”) which is focused on the conduct of business of financial institutions.211  
The FSA 2012 moved away from a model of unified supervision towards a bifurcated twin 
peaks structure, with the formation of a conduct of business regulator (the Financial 
Conduct Authority, “FCA”) and the micro-prudential regulator (the Prudential Regulatory 
Authority, “PRA”).  This twin-peak212 regulatory model is based on the belief that the 
previous financial regulatory system had failed to cope effectively with the global financial 
crisis which commenced in 2007.213  HM Treasury in its White Paper described that the 
most significant regulatory failing in the turbulence of the crisis was poor and non-
responsible supervision for the entire financial system.214       
However, many stakeholders were also unsatisfied with the predecessor’s role as a conduct 
regulator.  The comment by the House of Commons in the appointment report for the 
first chairman of the FCA well exemplified the dissatisfaction: 
He [the first chairman of FCA] must restore the credibility of the 
conduct regulator. The FCA is the successor to a body which failed 
consumers. Although it devoted a great deal of time and effort to 
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conduct matters, it left consumers exposed to some of the worst 
scandals in UK financial history. It created a ‘box-ticking’ culture 
whose benefits were far from evident and which still failed to pick 
up major failures in the making.215 
 
The FSA 2012 gave three operational objectives to the FCA: 1) the consumer protection 
objective, 2) the integrity objective and 3) the competition objective.  The consumer 
protection objective is described as ‘securing an appropriate degree of protection for 
consumers’.216  The FSA 2012 provides the criteria that the FCA should refer to when 
deciding ‘an appropriate degree of protection’.  Firstly, the FCA should be aware of the 
general principle that ‘consumers should take responsibility for their decisions’ and at the 
same time of another general principle that financial institutions should ‘provide consumers 
with a level of care that is appropriate’.217  This criteria gives the FCA a difficult task to find 
a balanced position between consumer responsibility and provision of appropriate care to 
consumers.  The FSMA 2000, before being amended by the FSA 2012, did not describe 
the general principle that financial institutions should provide a level of care for consumers 
but described only the general principle of consumer’s responsibility for his investment 
decision.218  This illustrates that the amended Act makes it clear that financial institutions 
should have clear statutory obligations in a way that they provide proper level of care to 
consumers when undertaking transactions with them.  Secondly, the FCA should 
understand that there are differing degrees of risk depending on the transaction and that 
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consumers have differing degrees of experience and expertise.219  This can be the statutory 
ground of the client categorization in the COBS.220   
The competition objective is ‘promoting effective competition in the interests of 
consumers’.221  The competition objective was newly added by the FSA 2012.222  This was 
the result of the need for more competition to enhance consumer protection as the market 
share in the financial services industry concentrated in a few big financial institutions.223  
Healthy competition can enhance consumer protection through lower prices, innovation in 
products and more choices.224  With the possibility of conflicts between the consumer 
protection objective and the competition objective, the FSA 2012 clarifies that the FCA 
should pursue the competition objective so far as is compatible with the consumer 
protection objective.225     
As illustrated above, while the financial stability agenda was key in the regulatory reform 
process after the global crisis, the consumer protection agenda has also been one of the 
areas given attention.  It can be explained by two-fold why the two Acts for reforming 
financial regulatory system have included measures for enhancing consumer protection.  
Firstly, the global financial crisis and the following economic recession illustrated the 
connectedness of consumer protection with financial stability.226  Excessive mortgages were 
loaned to many sub-prime borrowers who could not afford the loans and those mortgages 
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were securitized and spread to the wholesale market.227  As the defaults of sub-prime 
mortgagees increased, the securitized products based on the mortgages suffered severe 
losses which resulted in the crisis of the global financial system.228  The failures to protect 
consumers both in retail and wholesale market can be said to have caused the systemic 
turbulence.229    
Secondly, the momentum of strengthening policy for consumer protection was triggered 
by the crisis in public confidence in the financial industry.  The global financial crisis made 
consumers lose trust and confidence in financial institutions.  Dried-up liquidity and 
squeezed profitability of financial institutions drove them to turn their backs to consumers’ 
needs, which directly impacted the confidence level.  Financial institutions, under the 
pressure of liquidity during the crisis, tightly reduced its lending to individuals and SMEs 
when the consumers really needed funding. 230   Tumbling profitability of financial 
institutions also affected the increase of complaints from consumers.231  In particular, 
publicly-funded bailout for failed financial institutions raged the public and raised antipathy 
to the financial industry.232  The public anger pushed people to voluntarily organize 
movements such as ‘Occupy Wall Street’233 and ‘Occupy London’234.  The organized angry 
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voice of the public put political pressure on policy makers to move for enhancing consumer 
protection.235 
3.1.2 Conduct of business rules in over-the-counter derivatives 
transactions 
The previous section has examined how statutory regulation in financial services sector has 
been evolved until now.  This section will take a close look at the current regulatory rules 
stipulating specific requirements in transactions of over-the-counter derivatives. 
Rule-making is one of the FCA’s overarching power to maintain discipline in financial 
services sector.  The regulator may make rules applying to financial institutions with respect 
to the carrying on of ‘regulated activities’ and take disciplinary actions against breach of 
the rules.236  Regulatory rules and disciplinary actions are pivotal instruments for the FCA 
to implement its objectives.237   
The COBS of the FCA Handbook is the current statutory rulebook, stipulating detailed 
requirements of financial institutions in carrying on business with their consumers.  While 
the FSMA 2000 sets the overall framework for the financial regulatory system, the COBS is 
concerned with proper ways of how financial institutions deal with consumers and 
stipulates all detailed requirements on financial institutions.  It is, thus, a critical part in 
understanding regulation to figure out how the COBS “regulates” over-the-counter 
derivatives transactions.   
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 3.1.2.1 Background 
The COBS took effect as of November 1, 2007, replacing the previous conduct of business 
sourcebook implemented in 2000.  The FSA, the competent regulator at that time, 
announced two purposes of implementing the COBS in 2007.  The first purpose was to 
adopt Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (“MiFID”) of the European Union by the 
‘intelligent copy’ approach, which meant to “copy-out” texts of the MiFID to avoid 
unnecessary mis-interpretation.238  The second purpose was to move towards principle-
based regulation.239  The COB contained many detailed rules which had proved ineffective 
in correcting market failures, and it was blamed for the regulated firms having in the ‘tick-
box’ approach to each rule without considering the purpose of the regulation.240   
The COBS defined the areas it would be applied to as ‘designated investment business’ 241 
and ‘MiFID business’242 .  Dealing in transactions of over-the-counter derivatives is a 
‘designated investment business’ and a ‘MiFID business’ and so regulated by the COBS.243   
Breach of rules of the COBS does not in itself constitute offence 244  nor make any 
transaction void or unenforceable.245  But it can trigger the regulator’s disciplinary actions.  
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Other than the regulator’s sanction, the contravention of the rules is actionable at a suit 
by ‘a private person’246 who suffers loss as a result of the contravention.247   
3.1.2.2 General obligation  
(1) Client’s best interest 
The process of distributing investment products is exposed to conflict of interest between 
the seller and the consumer.248  The commission-based incentives of financial institutions 
and insufficient capability of consumers of evaluating the features of the product and the 
incentive structures give rise to the conflict of interest.249 Consumers including corporate 
clients tend to rely on financial institutions when transacting financial products, and there 
is informational asymmetry between them.250   
Imposing fiduciary duty, according to economic analysis of law, can be an efficient way of 
solving the problem of asymmetric information between contracting parties. 251   The 
principal can minimize his cost to protect his interest by hiring a fiduciary with better 
information and by imposing duty of utmost faith on him.252  The COBS has adopted the 
fiduciary duty as the basic requirements on financial institutions in transacting financial 
products to protect interest of consumers.253  It has introduced a general clause requiring 
that ‘a firm must act honestly, fairly and professionally in accordance with the best of 
interests of its client’.254  This provision is called ‘the client’s best interest rule’.255  This rule 
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requires the financial institution to seek proactively its client’s best interest ahead of its 
own interest and this requirement is more than to avoid conflict of interest.   
In addition, the COBS prohibits, as one of general obligations, the financial institution from 
excluding any obligation set by the regulatory system,256 explaining that seeking to avoid 
the regulatory duties does not comply with the ‘client’s best interest rule’.257  This means 
that statutory regulation would be ‘mandatory’ rules to financial institutions, which cannot 
be modified by contracts at least in the “public sphere”, whereas in  
“private sphere” contract law is not mandatory but default rules.258 
(2) Client categorization 
The COBS has a structure to provide multi-layered level of protection to different groups 
of consumers with divergent levels of knowledge and expertise.  Consumers are 
heterogeneous ranging from an individual without experience of investment to 
sophisticated institutional investor.  Providing the same level of protection to the 
heterogeneous consumers puts burdens to the consumers with ability of self-protection, 
which can reduce the dynamic of the financial market.  Client categorization illustrates the 
characteristics of the COBS as ‘asymmetric paternalism’, in that it tried to ‘create large 
benefits for those people who are bounded rational while imposing little or no harm on 
those who are fully rational.’259 
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The COBS categorizes consumers into three groups: eligible counterparties, professional 
clients and retail clients.  An eligible counterparty is the most sophisticated and so is the 
least protected by the COBS.260  Eligible counterparties include financial institutions such 
as credit institutions, investment firms, insurance companies, collective investment firms 
and national governments.261  It should be noted that the eligible counterparty category 
is available only for ‘eligible counterparty business’ which are ‘dealing on own account’, 
‘execution of orders on behalf of clients’, etc.262  Thus, a credit institution, for example, 
cannot be categorized into ‘eligible counterparty’ if the financial service it is provided with 
is outside of the ‘eligible counterparty business’. 
The next sophisticated group is ‘professional clients’.  Financial institutions with 
transactions outside ‘eligible counterparty business’, other institutional investors, local 
authority are included in ‘professional clients’.263  In addition, large undertakings satisfying 
certain criteria on the size are also classified into ‘professional clients’.264  Retail clients are 
consumers who are not ‘eligible counterparties’ nor ‘professional clients’.265  Majority of 
individual persons and SMEs are ‘retail clients’ and they are the most protected consumer 
group under the COBS. 
3.1.2.3 Rules about transactions of over-the-counter derivatives 
Among many requirements in the COBS, the most relevant rules related with transactions 
of financial products including over-the-counter derivatives are what products should be 
recommended and how the communication for the recommendation should be done.  
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Following parts will examine the requirements on what and how transactions should be 
carried on. 
(1) What to recommend 
Behavioural studies have proven that disclosure of material facts is not enough to protect 
consumers because of their bounded rationality in processing information.266  Regulation, 
hence, has moved from ‘duty to disclose’ to more paternalistic duty of recommending 
suitable products to consumers.267  Suitability rule can be said one representative duty of 
paternalism in financial regulation for protecting consumers from their self-harming 
behaviour of choosing wrong products. 
The COBS demands financial institutions to recommend a suitable product to their 
consumers when they provide a personal recommendation.268  This rule has high relevance 
with over-the-counter derivatives transactions in that it is common that a financial 
institution provides a personal recommendation when an over-the-counter derivative is 
transacted, because the financial institution usually designs the product by itself and the 
consumer tend to lack knowledge of the recommended financial derivative.269  Retail clients 
and professional clients are covered by this suitability rule but the financial institution can 
assume that professional clients have sufficient knowledge and experience to understand 
the risk of the recommended product.270 
In order to help apply the somewhat abstract concept of suitability, the COBS divides 
suitability into three sub-parts: investment ‘objectives’, ‘financial capability’ and ‘knowledge 
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and experience’.271  The first step to ensure suitability is to obtain the necessary information 
from the consumer: 1) what the client’s investment objectives are, 2) what his financial 
capability (or financial situation) is and 3) what his knowledge and experience is in the 
specific investment field.272  Information on investment objectives should include the 
client’s risk profile and the purposes of the investment.273  Information about the client’s 
financial capability should include information on his regular source of income, his assets, 
investments and his financial commitments.274  After understanding the consumer, the 
financial institution should recommend a personal investment product which meets the 
three sub-parts of suitability.275   
The financial institution can be reliant on the information provided by the client when 
assessing suitability unless the information is manifestly out of date or inaccurate.276  When 
it cannot obtain the necessary information for assessing suitability, it must not make a 
personal recommendation.277  If the client keeps asking to proceed with a transaction 
despite the financial institution refusing to make a personal recommendation due to 
insufficient information about the client, it can arrange the transaction with the client’s 
written confirmation of the instructions.278  The suitability rule, thus, can be said ‘libertarian 
paternalism’ which respects autonomy of people with bounded rationality but tries to help 
them to avoid self-harming decisions.279  This is in line with the regulator’s consumer 
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protection objective which requires balance between consumers’ responsibility for their 
investment decisions and providing of appropriate level of care for consumers.280 
 (2) How to communicate  
Communication between financial institutions and consumers in the pre-contractual stage 
is the main source from which consumers obtain information about the financial product 
which will be transacted.  Particularly in transactions of over-the-counter derivatives which 
are usually proprietary products, consumers cannot help but rely on the explanation about 
the product features and risks given by representatives of financial institutions, the 
manufacturer of the product.281  In fact, among civil cases of “mis-selling” of over-the-
counter derivatives, many are related with claims of consumers being misled by 
communication with financial institutions.282   
The COBS sets out rules about how financial institutions should communicate with 
consumers while carrying on its investment business.  These rules of the COBS covers the 
contents as well as the method of communication.  Among these rules, ‘the fair, clear and 
not misleading rule’ provides the base of the communication rules of the COBS.283  This 
requires that ‘a firm must ensure that a communication is fair, clear and not misleading’.284  
This rule applies to all three categories of clients, but in a proportionate way which means 
that the method and contents of the communication can differ by different client groups.285    
This rule requires a financial institution to provide not only factually right information but 
also “fair” information.  Fair communication means it should contain suitable information 
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for the client and should provide a balanced view of the investment at issue.286  Fairness 
can be said to require fiduciary obligation because the firm should reason what information 
is suitable and balanced from the best interest of the client.287  Under this rule financial 
institutions should make clear the risk that the product has on the client’s capital.288  
Negligence of explaining a product’s risk on capital cannot be interpreted as fair and clear 
communication.  Using words in their promotion such as ‘guaranteed’, ‘protected’ or 
‘secure’ can be deemed as breach of this regulatory duty.289   
Financial institutions also should provide sufficient information about charge or fee when 
the charging structure is complex. 290   This guidance is especially important in the 
transactions of over-the-counter derivatives, because the commission of over-the-counter 
derivatives is usually included in the bid and ask price and so most consumers cannot 
easily estimate the amount of commission out of the bid and ask price.291   
3.2 Enforcement of regulation 
The previous section examined the evolvement of regulation and took a close look at the 
current regulatory rules particularly related with business conduct of over-the-counter 
derivatives transactions.  This section will examine how those regulatory rules have been 
enforced by the regulator.   
Regulation is not complete with just rules in the book but become complete with 
enforcement.292  Different approaches of enforcement will create different outcomes even 
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with the same rules.293  One of the reasons of such variance is the interpretation of the 
written rules.  Rules cannot prescribe in advance all the situations of the future and so 
depend on the enforcer’s interpretation of rules. 294   Another reason is the different 
strategies of how to utilize the limited regulatory resources for enforcing.295  Therefore, in 
order to understand regulation, it is critical to examine how the rules are interpreted and 
what enforcement strategy is adopted.      
This section will first take a look at individual sanctioned cases related with “mis-selling” 
of over-the-counter derivatives.  This will illustrate how the regulator interprets the rules 
in the rulebook and what the regulator actually requires financial institutions to do in the 
market place.  The next part in the section will examine the regulator’s consumer redress 
cases and understand the regulator’s compensation policy.    
3.2.1 Regulator’s disciplinary actions 
One of the tools for enforcement of regulation is disciplinary actions against financial 
institutions which contravened regulatory requirements.  Since 2000, when the single 
regulator was created, there have been 8 cases where the regulator took disciplinary 
actions against “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives.  The rules breached were, in 
most cases, the ‘fair, clear and not misleading communication’296 rule and suitability297 rule. 
Before getting into the detailed disciplinary cases, taking a look at FSA’s Treating 
Customers Fairly (“TCF”) initiative will be helpful to understand the regulator’s stance 
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towards enforcement actions.  TCF initiative was launched in 2004 and since then it has 
been the centre of its consumer protection policy.298  It was not a production of new rules 
but a clear expression of required outcomes from the existing rules.  The FSA suggested 
six outcomes from TCF: 1) consumer’s confidence of financial institutions’ culture of 
treating consumers fairly; 2) products and services which meet the needs of consumers; 3) 
provision of clear information to consumers before and after sale; 4) suitable advice to 
consumers; 5) products which perform as expectation; 6) No post-sale barriers to change 
purchase decisions.299  These six outcomes of TCF is reflected on the regulator’s goal in 
supervision and enforcement actions.300 
3.2.1.1 Fair, clear and not misleading communication rule 
(1) Unbalanced Prospect 
All investments in financial instruments including the over-the-counter derivatives involve 
uncertainty about the future.  Because of this, in the sales process, the financial institution 
is expected to deliver to consumers its own opinions about future market movement.  
However, highlighting only the bright side of the prospective investment without 
appropriate warnings about the risk is a breach of the ‘fair, clear and not misleading’ 
communication rule.301   
In 2003, Chase de Vere Financial Solutions promoted a derivative product connected with 
the performance of the FTSE 100.302  The investor of this product was offered double the 
growth of the FTSE 100 and a loss when the index fell.  The firm advertised this product 
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throughout the national newspapers as ‘fantastic’ and ‘excellent’ with the warnings about 
the risk in fine print on another page; emphasized a rosy forecast about the equity market 
without a balanced warning of the risk of the downturn of the market. 303   This 
advertisement was sanctioned by the FSA as a breach of ‘fair, clear and not misleading’ 
communication rule.304  It is noteworthy that risk warnings in fine print on another page 
could not protect the financial institution from being sanctioned by the regulator.   In fact, 
many researches in behavioural economics show that majority of consumers don’t read 
fine printed disclosures in their purchases305 and even reading the disclosures cannot 
change their decision due to heuristic biases306.  
Santander also had a penalty imposed due to its statements of opinion stating only the 
up-side market direction.  From 2010 to 2012, it sold investment products through its sales 
representative’s advice, which included a structured investment with capital protection and 
additional returns linked to the FTSE 100.  The advisers of the firm presented to consumers 
their personal forecast that ‘the investment will likely double’ and stated ‘in ten years it 
will beat cash by 87%’.307  In addition, the FSA found the firm using its investment forecast 
tool in a misleading way:  in order to make the investment look more attractive, the firm 
used the Bank of England’s base rate which was not thought to be an actual money market 
return for comparison with the expected return of the investment.308  
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Promoting a feature of an investment product which has a very slim chance to be realized 
was also decided as an unfair and misleading communication, although it was not a 
completely false statement.  In 2014 Credit Suisse International (“CSI”) developed a 
derivative product which guaranteed a minimum return but with a cap of maximum 
earnings.  This product was embedded with an option based on the FTSE 100 and so it 
could generate additional profit if the index performed well.  The product that the firm 
distributed through its branches and other suppliers displayed the guaranteed minimum 
return and potential maximum return with an equal prominence (see below). 
 309 
But CSI’s internal analysis showed that the probability that the maximum return would be 
realized was near zero such that the maximum return would not happen in the simulation 
based on historical data since the FTSE 100 was launched in 1984.  The FSA judged that 
                                                          
309 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘FINAL NOTICE to Credit Suisse International’ (2014) 
59 
 
highlighting the potential maximum return which was not realistically expected to be 
achieved, even though the probability was not exactly 0%, was misleading and not fair, 
and imposed a financial penalty on CSI.310   
(2) Unfair and misleading disclosure  
False statements about the features or conditions of a derivative product are representative 
examples of unfair and misleading disclosures.  This malpractice is usually related to the 
concealment of costs, product structures and other risky features of an investment.  Chase 
de Vere had penalties imposed on it because of its advertisement material asserting that 
there was no charge for a consumer to pay where that was not the case. Charges were 
designed to be deducted from the return of the investment at maturity and this fact was 
in fine print on another page.311  Santander was also sanctioned on the false statement 
that no commissions were charged for a structured investment product when in fact there 
was a 7.75% charge.312  In the sales process of interest rate hedging products (“IRHPs”), 
banks sold the products to consumers by stating falsely that the IRHP was a pre-condition 
of providing a loan, and ultimately the banks were required to compensate for the 
consumers’ detriment.313 
No disclosure or insufficiently detailed disclosure of important aspects of a financial 
derivative product was also seen as unfair and misleading communication.  Banks agreed 
with the regulator to compensate the loss from a non-cap IRHP, where the detailed 
information about the cost of non-cap products such as swaps or collars was not delivered 
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to consumers when they did not want to buy the cap due to its up-front premium314 or 
where break cost which would occur with early termination of the IRHP was not explained 
fully and clearly.315  Explanation on only the existence of the break cost could not give 
protection to the firms.  Credit Suisse International was disciplined for not providing 
detailed information about an early exit fee which was posed on the termination of the 
investment before maturity even though the existence of the fee was explained.316 
3.2.1.2 Suitability rule 
(1) Unsuitable advice 
Recommendation of investments incompatible with the consumer’s circumstances was 
sanctioned as unsuitable advice.  In 2012, the FSA announced, as a result of its mystery 
shop, that Santander failed to gather sufficient and necessary information about its clients 
before recommending investment products.  The firm’s online tools and training 
programmes for the advisers were not deemed adequate for the firm to obtain sufficient 
and necessary information about the consumers’ knowledge and experience, investment 
objectives, risk profiles, and the ability to bear the risk of investment.317  As a result, 42% 
of recommendations in mystery shops by the FSA were found to be unsuitable or unclear 
in suitability including examples such as where an adviser recommended a high risk 
investment without considering the consumer’s payment of credit card debt or where an 
adviser recommended a 71 year old consumer to invest in a 6 year maturity product with 
a high early exit fee.318 
                                                          
314 Ibid annex2. 25 
315 Ibid annex2. 22(ii) 
316 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘FINAL NOTICE to Credit Suisse International’ (2014) paras 5.1-5.9 
317 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Final Notice to Santander UK plc’ (2014) paras 4.31-37 
318 Ibid 4.59~61 
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The regulator also viewed overly concentrated investment in a risky asset as an evidence 
of unsuitable advice.  Lloyds TSB Bank (“LSTB”) sold from 2000 an investment product of 
which return was dependent on the performance of 30 shares selected from the FTSE 100.  
This product sought a high annual return of around 10% but would put the principal of 
the investment at risk when the price of selected shares fell below a certain level.  The FSA 
found that the firm did not consider the concentration risk in consumers’ portfolio: 84% 
of the consumers with no experience of stock investment had invested over 20% of their 
total financial assets in the product; 18% of the consumers with experience of stock 
investment had invested over 35% of their total financial assets in the product.  The FSA 
also recognized that the firm did not provide any guidance on concentration risk to its 
sales persons.  The FSA sanctioned the firm as breach of suitability rule.319 
Over-hedging IRHPs with a longer term or larger value than those of the hedged loans 
were also seen as an unsuitable advice and non-compliant sales. 320   The regulator 
requested the bank to demonstrate that the consumer understood the risk of over-hedging 
in order to prove the legitimacy of the over-hedging.321   
(2) Failure to gather information about consumers 
The failure to collect information about consumers before providing advices is a breach of 
regulation, whether or not the advice provided is suitable.  JP Morgan International Bank 
(“JPMIB”) provided advice on investments to high-wealth individuals and some of its advice 
from 2010 to 2012 was reviewed by the FCA.  The review revealed that in many advices 
given the firm did not collect the necessary information about consumers, including 
                                                          
319 Financial Services Authority, ‘FINAL NOTICE to Lloyds TSB Bank plc’ (2003)  
320 Financial Services Authority, ‘INTEREST RATE HEDGEING PRODUCT REVIEW’ (A letter to relevant banks) 
(2012) annex2.30 
321 Ibid annex2.31 
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financial circumstances, knowledge and experience about the investment, risk profile and 
ability to bear the investment risk, and so could not decide the suitability of the 
recommendation because of the lack of information of the consumers.  This led to the 
review of the whole range of 1,416 instances of advices during this period, but only one 
case was detected as unsuitable because its advisers could prove the suitability of their 
advices through their personal memory and evidence.  Even though almost all investment 
advices were proved to be suitable, the FCA decided on a sanction322 on JPMIB for 
breaching the Principle323 that a firm should organize and control its affairs with an 
adequate system of risk management and the rule of Senior Management Arrangement, 
Systems and Controls Sourcebook which requires the firm to record its business and all 
transactions to enable the regulator to review the firm’s compliance of the regulatory 
requirements.324  
Credit Suisse UK Limited (“CSUK”) was also sanctioned on the failure to gather necessary 
consumer information.  CSUK sold structured capital at risk products (“SCARPs”) of which 
return was tied with FTSE 100 or other individual equities.  The FSA investigated CSUK’s 
sales practice of SCARPs during the period from 2007 to 2009 and found the following 
failings325: unclear risk indicators in the internal form for gathering client information; 
increase of some consumers’ risk profiles without sufficient documentary evidence just 
before SCARP transactions; inconsistencies between the consumer’s risk profile and 
investment objectives; insufficient evidence of consideration of the consumer’s overall 
portfolio when determining whether or not the transaction was suitable; inadequate 
                                                          
322 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘FINAL NOTICE to J.P. Morgan International Bank Limited’ (2013) 
323 FCA Handbook, Principles of Business 3 
324 FCA Handbook, SYSC 9.1.1R 
325 Financial Supervisory Authority, ‘FINAL NOTICE to Credit Suisse (UK) Limited’ (2011) 
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systems and controls in recommending leverage to consumers such that there was no 
documentation to evidence that CSUK considered whether the use of leverage was 
appropriate in light of the consumer’s attitudes to risk and no documentation showing 
that the risk associated with use of leverage had been explained; inadequate systems and 
controls surrounding levels of investment concentration in consumers’ portfolios; and 
failure to effectively monitor its staff to take reasonable care to make suitable advice such 
as the team leader who was responsible for the sales part having so many people to 
monitor that effective oversight was not possible.   
3.2.2 Regulatory redress actions 
In the sanctioned cases described in the previous sections, the regulator has sought redress 
for consumers’ losses from financial institutions’ regulatory breach.326  The compensations 
were paid not by the regulator’s statutory apparatus such as restitution order 327  or 
consumer redress scheme328 but by the voluntary agreements with the financial institutions.  
Except for IRHPs compensation agreements, the contents of voluntary compensation were 
not publicized.  So below will examine how redress for the consumer loss from “mis-selling” 
of the IRHP was provided. 
3.2.2.1 Subject for redress 
The regulator decided to seek redress for consumers’ detriment from “mis-selling” IRHPs 
through “voluntary” agreement with the relevant banks.  But the FSA limited the consumers 
for redress to ‘non-sophisticated’; for the definition of non-sophisticated, the regulator did 
                                                          
326 The regulator sought to redress consumers in 6 cases out of 8 sanction cases but the other 2 cases were the 
ones where loss did not occur to consumers. 
327 FSMA 2000, s 384 
328 FSMA 2000, s 404 
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not use the existing regulatory concept such as ‘retail client’329 but developed a new 
‘sophistication test’.  The sophistication test deemed as ‘sophisticated’ a consumer who 
meets at least two of the following criteria: a) an annual turnover of more than ￡6.5 
million; b) a balance sheet total of more than ￡3.26 million; c) more than 50 employees.330  
In addition, if the value of IRHP was over ￡10 million at the time of transaction, the 
consumer was deemed as sophisticated notwithstanding the result of the ‘sophistication 
test’.  In comparison with the ‘retail client’ of the COBS, the ‘non-sophisticated’ consumers 
were much narrowly defined.331  The consumers classified as ‘sophisticated’ in the test 
would have to seek compensation through litigation.  The FSA explained that the criteria 
of the sophistication test came from the Companies Act 2006, which was used to determine 
whether a company can take advantage of the lighter reporting requirements for small 
companies.332 
This narrow definition for non-sophisticated consumers who are eligible for the IRHP loss 
compensation triggered severe complaints and criticism.333  It does not make sense to 
adopt a remote rule of the Companies Act for defining ‘non-sophisticated’ consumers, 
instead of the clear concept of ‘retail client’ in the COBS.  However, a close look at the 
powers granted by the statute to the regulator shows that the narrow definition of non-
sophisticated consumers seems to be the result of the limited enforcement options for 
regulatory redress. 
                                                          
329 FCA Handbook, COBS, 3.4.1R 
330  Financial Services Authority, ‘Interest Rate Hedging Products Pilot Findings’ (2013) 10. However, the 
sophistication test was amended based on the original version in order to consider the member of a group 
company and Special Purpose Vehicle company, etc. 
331 COBS defines a professional client in relation to MiFID business as a company meeting two of the following 
criteria: a) balance sheet total of €20 million, b) net turnover of €40 million, c) own funds of €2 million (See 
COBS 3.5.2(2)) 
332 Financial Services Authority, ‘Interest Rate Hedging Products Pilot Findings’ (2013) 
333 See eg House of Commons Treasury Committee, ‘Conduct and competition in SME lending’ (2015) 40-47  
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The tools the regulator can use to seek redress for the loss suffered by consumers are a 
restitution order334, a consumer redress scheme335 and the FOS336.   However, in terms of 
the IRHP “mis-selling”, there was practically little tool the regulator could use.  A restitution 
order necessitates the regulator to apply to the court, which requires tremendous 
administrative work.  A restitution order by the regulator itself also needs the regulator to 
specify all the breaches and compensation amount for each of the 29,568 IRHP cases, 
which is theoretically possible but practically impossible considering the time and resource 
constraints of the regulator.   
The FOS cannot be used as the major redress tool due to its narrow coverage: consumers 
with annual turnover less than €2million, fewer than 10 employees; and ￡150,000 award 
limit.337  The most probable tool for the regulator was the ‘consumer redress scheme’338 
which was newly adopted by the FSA 2010.  But for this scheme, FSA 2010 requires that 
the case should appear to succeed securing a remedy when it is brought to the court.339  
The majority of consumers of IRHPs consisted of SMEs which are not ‘private persons’ and 
so the COBS cannot be applied these cases because only private persons have the statutory 
“right of action” from regulatory breach by the Section 138D of FSMA 2000. 340  This means 
that the IRHP cases of SMEs don’t seem to easily succeed in securing a remedy in the 
court because the SMEs should rely on the common law which put much more importance 
of arm’s length principle of contract.341  As such, a ‘consumer redress scheme’ was also 
                                                          
334 FSMA 2000, s 384 
335 FSMA 2000, s 404 
336 FSMA 2000, s 225 
337 Financial Conduct Authority, FCA Handbook, Glossary Definition micro-enterprise; Financial Ombudsman 
Service, ‘The Ombudsman and Smaller Businesses’ (2014) 
338 See p41 
339 FSMA 2000 s.404(b); see n208 
340 Financial Services Authority, ‘Guidance note Consumer Redress Scheme’ (2010) 10.2 
341 See Chapter IV section 4.2 and 4.3 
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not available to the regulator.  Without efficient legitimate tool for redress, it is expected 
that the regulator could not have enough leverage in negotiation with banks.  Considering 
the regulator’s constraints above, it can be believed that the dissatisfactory coverage of 
eligible consumers for voluntary compensation might not come from the regulator’s 
incapability or a surrender to the lobby of the banks. 
3.2.2.2 Causation 
The FSA announced that IRHP loss of the non-sophisticated consumers caused by 
regulatory breaches of financial institutions was to be compensated.342  But it made it clear 
that the non-compliant sales would not be the subject of compensation when it was 
reasonable that the consumer would have followed the same course of action, 
notwithstanding the breach.343  This shows that causation was an important factor for the 
regulator to consider in the redress for consumers’ loss.  However, the causation test by 
the regulator has its own characteristics which will be explained below. 
The regulator’s causation test started with the usual question in the causation test in private 
law, ‘would the consumer have taken the same course of action but for the firm’s 
breach?’344  According to the FSA, for example, if the firm misled a consumer to buy the 
IRHP by the false explanation of IRHP being the mandatory condition of providing the 
loan, the answer of the test is “no”, and the bank would have to compensate all the 
losses.345   
                                                          
342 Financial Services Authority, ‘INTEREST RATE HEDGEING PRODUCT REVIEW’ (n 6) 9 
343 Ibid 
344 Financial Services Authority, ‘INTEREST RATE HEDGEING PRODUCT REVIEW’ (n 6) 10 
345 Ibid 16 
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A difficult situation for answering the test is when a consumer, who made an ‘express 
wish’346 to hedge the interest rate risk, had not been told by the bank about the risk of 
the IRHP or the massive break cost.  The regulator set out the answer to this question 
based on its own expectation of the reasonable reaction of a consumer.  It assumed and 
required the bank to assume that the consumer would have selected a simpler IRHP 
product such as a cap or a plain swap with the break cost less than 7.5% of the nominal 
amount of IRHP if there was no evidence to the contrary.  And the bank had to compensate 
to the consumer the difference between the purchased one and the simpler IRHP 
embedded with a 7.5% break cost.347  One of the characteristics of the above causation 
test by the regulator is that the regulator assumed its own prospective result (7.5% break 
cost and a simple product), not sticking only to the ‘but for’ test.  
3.3 Approach by the regulator to enforcement 
The previous sections has analysed the disciplinary and redress actions of the regulator 
against “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives.  The analysis of the sanctioned cases 
provides a snapshot of the approach that the regulator adopts to intervene failures of 
financial institutions complying with regulatory duties.  Following sections will examine the 
strategy the regulator takes in its intervention. 
3.3.1 Focused on group failures 
One characteristic of the regulator’s disciplinary actions related with “mis-selling” of over-
the-counter derivatives is that it has used its powers on large scaled cases.  Each of the 8 
                                                          
346 Ibid 48-51 
347 Ibid 
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disciplinary actions by the regulator since 2000 involved at least 259 consumers348 with a 
maximum of 295,000 consumers349 (see the Table 1 below).  The amount of invested money 
related with each case ranged from ￡720 million350 to ￡7 billion351.  The focus on the 
large scaled cases can be viewed as the regulator’s pursuit for maximizing the efficiency 
of using its resources.  It is practically impossible for the regulator with its limited resources 
to take actions against all breaches in the market place.  FSMA 2000 also requires the 
regulator to ‘use its resources in the most efficient and economic way’ as one of its 
regulatory principles.352   
Table 1: Regulator’s sanction against “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives 
Financial 
institutions 
Product Contravention 
Year of 
sanction 
Fine (A) 
(£) 
Number of 
related 
consumers 
Invested 
amount 
(million £) 
(B) 
Ratio 
(A/B) 
(%) 
Chase de Vere 
Financial 
Solutions 
structured 
capital at risk 
products 
misleading 
communication 
2003 165,000 259 
No 
information 
 
Lloyds TSB Bank 
structured 
capital at risk 
products 
unsuitable 
products 
2003 1,900,000 51,000 720 0.26 
Credit Suisse UK 
structured 
capital at risk 
products 
unsuitable 
products 
2011 5,950,000 623 1,099 0.54 
Savoy 
Investment 
Management 
investment 
advice 
suitability 
procedures 
breach 
2012 412,000 4,000 
No 
information 
 
Santander UK 
structured 
capital at risk 
products 
misleading 
communication 
2012 1,500,000 178,000 2,700 0.06 
J.P. Morgan 
investment 
advice 
suitability 
procedures 
breach 
2013 3,076,200 3,000 
No 
information 
 
                                                          
348 Financial Services Authority, ‘Final Notice to Chase de Vere Financial Solutions plc’ (2003) 
349 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Final Notice to Santander UK plc’ (2014) 
350 Financial Services Authority, ‘Final Notice to Lloyds TSB Bank plc’ (2003) 
351 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Final Notice to Santander UK plc’ (2014) 
352 FSMA 2000, s.3B(1)(a) 
69 
 
Financial 
institutions 
Product Contravention 
Year of 
sanction 
Fine (A) 
(£) 
Number of 
related 
consumers 
Invested 
amount 
(million £) 
(B) 
Ratio 
(A/B) 
(%) 
Santander UK 
structured 
capital at risk 
products 
unsuitable 
products 
2014 12,377,800 295,000 7,000 0.18 
Credit Suisse 
International 
structured 
deposit 
misleading 
communication 
2014 2,398,100 83,777 797 0.30 
(Source: FSA/FCA final notices since 2000 related with sales of over-the-counter derivatives) 
 
3.3.2 Financial penalty as a major coercive tool 
The regulator has various coercive tools for enforcement including public censure, financial 
penalties, suspending permission, restitution order and cancelling a permission, but Table 
1 shows that it has used financial penalties as its major regulatory arms for wrongdoers. 
However, the effectiveness of financial penalty as a deterrent tool raises a question.  The 
Table 1 shows the financial penalty imposed on financial institutions which “mis-sold” over-
the-counter derivatives.  It was maximum 0.54% and minimum 0.06% compared with the 
volume sold.  Even though the exact margin of financial institutions cannot be obtained, 
this amount of fine below 1% of the transacted volume would be short of the commission 
financial institutions earned through the penalized behaviour.  For instance, the margin a 
bank earned from selling an IRHP to a retail client was 4.48%.353   
In fact, the insufficient deterrent effect of imposed fines had led the regulator to adopt a 
new framework to calculate fines in 2009.354  However, the Table 1 above shows that the 
new framework may still not be enough for full deterrence.  This can be, at least partly, 
                                                          
353 Nextia Properties Limited v National Westminster Bank plc and The Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2013] EWHC 
3167.  The bank sold interest rate swap worth £2 million and earned £89,500 (4.48%) as commission without 
disclosure. 
354 Financial Supervisory Authority, ‘FSA proposes bigger fines to achieve credible deterrence’ (2009) 
<http://www.fsac.org.uk/library/communication/pr/2009/091.html> accessed 17 February 2016 
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because of various ‘mitigating factors’355 and ‘settlement discount’356 in settling the amount 
of financial penalty, even though those discounting factors are believed to be necessary 
to facilitate cooperation from the penalized financial institutions during the investigation 
and enforcement process.  Actually, in 7 cases out of 8 sanctioned cases above (the 
exception was the Santander 2012 sanction case), the penalized firm received 30% discount 
of fines based on the ‘settlement discount’.  Sanctions by the regulator also cause 
reputational loss to the penalized firms.  However, reputation loss may not be substantial 
enough for salespersons who pursue their personal interest and even the management 
who are attracted more to the short term performance.357    
3.3.3 Voluntary compensation scheme 
Disciplinary actions and redress are both important for the regulator to meet ‘the consumer 
protection objective’.  Disciplinary action deters future similar bad behaviours.  Redress can 
be the imminent method of protecting consumers by providing compensation for the loss 
the consumers suffer.  Especially, considering the burdensome expenses of the litigation 
for redress358, the regulator’s action for compensation has more important meaning to 
suffered consumers.  FSMA 2000 provided the regulator with the power to seek redress 
for the loss suffered by consumers through ‘restitution order’, which can be executed by 
the court359 or the regulator itself,360 or ‘consumer redress schemes’361.   
                                                          
355 Financial Conduct Authority, FCA Handbook, DEPP 6.5A.3 
356 Financial Conduct Authority, FCA Handbook, DEPP 6.5A.5 
357 Alessio M.Pacces (n68) 484 
358 See House of Commons Treasury Committee, ‘Conduct and competition in SME lending’ (n333) 163 
359 FSMA 2000, s 382 
360 FSMA 2000, s 384 
361 FSMA 2000, s 404 
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However, the regulator has never used this official redress power in the “mis-selling” cases 
of over-the-counter derivatives; instead, they depended on the penalized financial 
institutions’ “voluntary compensation” agreement, which means that the firms who 
contravened regulatory duties agreed with the regulator to compensate on their own the 
loss of consumers from their breach.  The biggest reason for adopting this unofficial 
measure can be its swift and less complicated procedures.  The chairman of FCA explained 
the rational of voluntary compensation in dealing with the IRHP “mis-selling” scandal: 
I think that if we, as a regulator, are to do mass redress schemes, of which this 
is classically one, we have two ways of doing it. Either we go through the law 
courts, which takes a very great length of time and costs a very great deal of 
money, or, as a proactive regulator, we go out on the front foot and say, “This 
is how we are going to do it”, and the necessary part of “this is how we are 
going to do it” is coming to an arrangement with the banks that is “voluntary”, 
or at least contractually voluntary, to do it that way. If they refuse, we end up 
in the law court and we get into a PPI-type situation. 362  
It can be admitted that the voluntary compensation scheme is an effective and pragmatic 
method to relieve consumers’ detriment in a swift and economic way on both sides.  But 
before the IRHP scandals, the process the regulators took lacked transparency.  In all the 
voluntary compensation cases of over-the-counter derivatives “mis-selling”, there were 
only short comments in the final decision documents by the regulator saying that the 
financial institutions sanctioned agreed to compensate the consumers who suffered loss 
from their wrongdoing.  No information about the voluntary compensation criteria and 
                                                          
362 House of Commons Treasury Committee (n 358) 37 
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process was publicized nor provided to consumers, such as the criteria for selecting eligible 
consumers for compensation and calculating the compensation amount.363 
Recently, the opaqueness of the voluntary compensation agreements became the social 
and political hot issue in dealing with IRHPs.  With the parliament’s continuous critics364 
and consumers’ structured resistance365, the FCA had to make public the contents of the 
voluntary compensation agreements with the banks regarding the IRHPs.366   
Information on the detailed criteria and process of voluntary compensation should 
continue to be publicized “voluntarily” in the future for other “mis-selling” cases.  Without 
the information on compensation criteria and process, the consumer who claims loss as a 
consequence of “mis-selling” by a financial institution cannot determine whether he has 
been compensated fairly and so has no choice but to accept the compensation offer by 
the firm.  This could lead to another failure of consumer protection. With the information 
about the compensation agreement, the consumers can monitor the financial institution’s 
compensation activity.   
Conclusion 
This Chapter, firstly, answered the question how regulation in financial services sector has 
been evolved.  It examined the drivers and major changes in each legislation from the 
advent of financial regulation in 17th century to the recent FSA 2012.  This examination 
illustrated that “failures” for both the market and regulation to deal with the changed 
                                                          
363 The opaqueness of voluntary compensation is also in other financial services areas than over-the-counter 
derivatives. See Christopher Hodges, Law and Corporate Behaviour: Integrating Theories of Regulation, 
Enforcement, Compliance and Ethics (Bloomsbury Publishing 2015) n 92 
364 House of Commons Treasury Committee (n 358) 47 
365 See eg Bully-Banks was created in December 2011 by business owners each of whom had been mis-sold 
Interest Rate Hedging Products. <http://www.bully-banks.co.uk/site/> accessed 15 May 2015 
366 Financial Services Authority, ‘INTEREST RATE HEDGEING PRODUCT REVIEW’ (A letter to relevant banks) 
(2012) 
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financial environments have been the impetus to bring about the paradigm-shifting 
legislative transformation.   
In the modern era, The PFI Act was enacted to tackle the increasing fraudulent promotions 
of unit trusts and shares as the general public started investing in financial products from 
1930s.  The FSA 1986 was the legislative response to the expansion of financial services 
industry.  From 1970s, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system of fixed currency rates 
and the advent of Black-Scholes option pricing model which could estimate the fair price 
of financial derivatives made the financial services market expand dramatically in types of 
products and services provided.  FSA 1986 replaced PFI Act which was literally aiming just 
prevention of fraud, in order to effectively cope with the expanded and complex financial 
services market.   
FSMA 2000 was legislated to keep the pace with the trend of integration of different 
financial services sectors.  As one financial institution could do business in many different 
financial services sectors, the regulatory framework of the FSA 1986 which separately 
regulated different financial services sectors became more and more obsolete and 
inefficient.  The global financial crisis revealed, again, the weaknesses of the FSMA 2000 of 
neglecting financial stability and consumer protection and resulted in enactments of FSA 
2010 and FSA 2012, both of which attempted to remediate the failures.  In briefly 
summarizing the above history, financial regulation is the product of evolution, the result 
of financial regulation facing challenges from changes of financial environments and 
adapting itself to the new environments.   
Secondly, this Chapter examined the current regulatory requirements particularly related 
with transactions of over-the-counter derivatives.  This illustrated that current regulatory 
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duties on financial institutions are not only fair disclosure in order to help consumers make 
informed decision but also provision of suitable advice in order to protect consumers from 
self-harming behaviours.  This part of the Chapter illustrated that financial regulation has 
evolved from “duty to disclosure” to “duty to act” to “duty to protect consumers from 
themselves”.  It showed that the direction of evolution of financial regulation has been 
from consumer self-protection to paternalistic protection.  This evolutionary direction has 
been supported by behavioural science and continuous occurrence of consumer detriments 
in the financial services sector. 
This Chapter, lastly, examined the regulator’s actual disciplinary actions related with “mis-
selling” of over-the-counter derivatives.  Doing so has provided opportunities to 
understand what approach the regulator takes when taking disciplinary actions.  This 
showed that the regulator, for using its resources efficiently and economically, tends to 
focus on financial institutions’ large-scaled failures for consumer protection in terms of the 
number of related consumers and the volume of amount invested.  And it was also found 
that financial penalties, the disciplinary tool most commonly used, are not enough to 
remove all the profits the financial institutions might earn through the penalized “mis-
selling” and have questionable effect of deterrence.  In the area of regulatory compensation, 
this Chapter showed that the regulator prefers “voluntary redress scheme” for its swift and 
economic process.  However, it was pointed out that the opaqueness of the voluntary 
scheme should be corrected. 
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CHAPTER IV. PRIVATE LAW ON OVER-THE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES 
TRANSACTIONS 
 
Introduction 
The previous Chapter examined how regulation has been developed and enforced to 
regulate the “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives.  The aim of this Chapter is to 
understand the approach of private law in dealing with claims of “mis-selling” of over-the-
counter derivatives.   
The court intervenes in over-the-counter derivatives transactions when the counterparties 
of a contract litigate to seek to recover damages from the transaction.  In such a litigation, 
the focus of the court is on allocation of rights and liabilities between parties and is not 
extended to any inherent policy such as needs to be advanced by any attendant regulatory 
regime or ‘instrumental values’. 367   But financial institutions incorporate the court’s 
decisions in their over-the-counter derivatives sales practice to avoid judicial liability and 
so the court can be said to contribute in shaping the business standard of financial 
institutions.368  This ex-ante function of private law to set standards of acceptable conduct 
to shape behaviour in private relations is an important one and constitutive of a market 
place.  
This Chapter identifies and discusses four major issues in relation to litigation of claiming 
“mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives.  One representative case is chosen to provide 
the vivid picture in which disputes arise between financial institutions and consumers.  Then 
for each issue picked up, relevant cases will be further examined to deduce the principles 
                                                          
367 Julia Black, ‘Law and Regulation: The Case of Finance in Regulating Law’ in Christine Parker, Regulating Law  
(OXFORD 2005) 41 
368 Péter Cserne (n 258) 89 
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on which private law ordering is made.  The summary of relevant decided cases is provided 
in a concise form in the Table 2.369 
4.1 Major issues in private law 
The “mis-selling” cases, where consumers alleged that they were misled to enter into over-
the-counter derivatives contracts, were brought to the court from the 1990s in the UK.  
Although each case has its own different circumstances in which the disputes arose, there 
were four main issues that were common in those cases: 1) a duty of care imposed on 
financial institutions, 2) misrepresentation by financial institutions, 3) application of 
regulatory rules to financial institutions and 4) causation.  Before examining these four 
issues, by looking at an example case in detail, the nature of each issue can be better 
understood.  The example is the Titan Steel Wheels Ltd v The Royal Bank of Scotland plc.370 
4.1.1 An example case 
The claimant was Titan Steel Wheel (“Titan”) which was a manufacturer of steel wheels for 
vehicles.  Its income was earned predominantly in euro because the majority of its products 
were sold in the European continent, while its costs were incurred in sterling.  So it was 
exposed to significant exchange rate risk.  In order to cope with the risk, it purchased 
structured over-the-counter derivatives from the Royal Bank of Scotland (“RBS”) in 2007.  
In February 2007, Titan purchased three structured products of euro/sterling swaps from 
the RBS to hedge its exchange rate risk.  The basic structures of all three products were 
the same.  If the actual currency rate at the end of a month is above “the upper rate” 
(1.478 euro/pound), Titan could sell a certain amount (1.65 million) of Euro at “the upper 
                                                          
369 See p107 
370 [2010] EWHC 211 
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rate” (profit situation).  If the actual rate at the month end went down below the lower 
rate (1.45 euro/pound), Titan should sell twice the amount (3.3million) of euro at “the 
upper rate” (loss situation).  If the spot currency rate was between the upper and lower 
rate, Titan had no obligation or right to sell Euro.  In other words, Titan protected itself 
against the risk of the Sterling strengthening above “the upper rate” but for the price of 
protection, it had to hold the risk of loss when the exchange rate went down below the 
lower rate.   
As the euro/sterling currency rate happened to go down below the lower rate slightly after 
the purchase of the February currency swaps, both parties started to have discussions 
about restructuring the deals from mid-April.  Discussion was mainly done between the 
financial controller of Titan and the RBS’s corporate treasury manager.  After a couple of 
months of discussions, in June 2007 they restructured the February deals into a single 
contract with changes to the upper and lower rates and other minor conditions.  In the 
restructured deal, “the upper rate” was changed from 1.478 to 1.467 and “the lower rate” 
from 1.4500 to 1.4285, and the contracted amount increased from €1.65 million to €2 
million.  Although the closing out of the previous deals cost about €180,000 to Titan, this 
fact was not raised or reported to Titan by RBS before the restructured deal was executed.  
This cost was carried forward into the restructured deal.   
In September 2007, RBS sent an e-mail containing a proposal for a new swap product 
which was more speculative.  This product had a condition of an ‘accrual rate’, which was 
such that when the spot currency rate went over the accrual rate, Titan could sell 0.5 
million euro at the accrual rate, while when the currency rate went below the accrual rate, 
it should sell 1 million euro at the accrual rate.  In addition, there was a ‘knock-out’ 
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condition under which the deal would be terminated when the profit Titan earned on the 
deal became more than 10 cent per euro.   
The key differences between the September deal and the June deal were two things.  Firstly, 
the probability of loss to Titan increased dramatically because it had to bear loss just when 
the spot rate goes down below the ‘accrual rate’ not the “lower rate”.  Secondly, with the 
profit cap, the profit Titan might earn from this swap deal was limited while the loss it 
could have to bear was unlimited. 
After a couple of discussions with RBS, Titan decided to purchase the September product 
when the spot rate of euro/sterling was 1.44 in September 2007.  However, the 
euro/sterling rate started tumbling down from November 2007 and reached the historical 
low point of almost 1.0 at the end of 2008.371  As a result, Titan suffered a huge loss. 
4.1.2 Major issues 
Over-the-counter derivatives are one of the financial products which have manifest 
imbalance of knowledge and expertise between financial institutions and consumers.372  So 
selling over-the-counter derivatives usually involves a series of explanations and 
discussions between the financial institution and the consumer in terms of the needs of 
the consumer and the characteristics of the product.  The Titan case exemplifies very well 
the complex structures that over-the-counter derivatives have, how those products are 
marketed and how communication between the two parties proceeds.  
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372 See Chapter II 2.2.3  
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In general, when an alleged “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives case is brought 
to the court, the consumer usually claims that he was “advised” to enter into the contract 
and the financial institution breached the duty of care as an adviser.  Here the first issue 
arises: what is the duty of care imposed on the financial institution which sells over-the-
counter derivatives? 
The consumer also usually contends that the financial institution misrepresented on the 
risk or the material characteristics of the over-the-counter derivatives and they were misled 
to enter into the contract.  Here arises the second issue: what kind of communication can 
be seen as misrepresentation in the transaction of over-the-counter derivatives? 
Thirdly, consumers allege that they have a statutory “right of action” for breach of 
regulatory duty of financial institutions, the right granted by the FSMA 2000373.  The third 
issue is about the application of this “right of action”: who are entitled with this statutory 
“right of action” and how is this right applied to the civil cases?   
Lastly, if breach of private law standards or regulatory rules is found, the consumer should 
prove that his loss in over-the-counter derivatives transactions is caused by the breach in 
order to obtain compensation.  The dispute in this issue is what is required for the claimant 
to prove the causation.  The discussion below explores these issues through relevant 
decided cases and thus helps develop understanding of the approach of private law 
towards these issues. 
 4.2 Duty of care 
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In claiming negligence of financial institutions in over-the-counter derivatives transactions, 
the first dispute is the question about the extent of any “duty of care” that is owed by the 
seller of the over-the-counter derivatives; more specifically whether the financial institution 
has a duty of care as an advisor.  The court’s view about the duty of care of an advisor is 
wide ranging and onerous; an advisor’s duties include knowing the consumer’s investment 
objectives and attitudes to risks, presenting investment opportunities in accordance with 
such objectives and risk attitudes, informing the consumer of accurate prices of the 
investment and taking care of the consumer’s investment diversity.374  Whether the seller 
of over-the-counter derivatives is an advisor or not is decisive in defining the duty of care 
of the seller in private law.  So this is one of the fiercest battle fields in disputes of “mis-
selling” of over-the-counter derivatives between financial institutions and consumers.  
4.2.1 Existence of advisory relationship 
Case law of the “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives shows that the court 
consistently uses contractual terms as the prime criteria for deciding the existence of an 
advisory relationship.  This is in line with the principle in common law that if the parties 
have contractually agreed on how to transact, then the agreement will establish the scope 
of responsibility and duty of the parties.375  
Decisions of courts regarding the existence of advisory service are based on the following 
propositions.  Firstly, the court differentiated the “legal” advisory relationship from the 
“factual” one.376  It proposed that the legal relationship between the financial institution 
and the consumer was dependent on contractual terms and it could not be affected by 
                                                          
374 Alastair Hudson, THE LAW OF FINANCE (n 90) para 25-35; See eg  JP Morgan Chase Bank and Others v 
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the factual relationship. 377   Secondly, the contract of providing advisory service is a 
significant factor indicating there is an advisory relationship.378  On the contrary, the 
absence of the contract for advisory service can mean that there is no advisory obligation 
on financial institutions.379  Thirdly, financial institutions and consumers can make contracts 
defining their relationship so that they can optimize allocation of transaction-related risks 
between the two parties.380  So contractual terms can define the obligation and right of 
each party in the transaction.381  Lastly, the contractual terms allocating the obligation and 
right of the two parties prevent one party from asserting a claim based on an actual reality 
which is different from the contractual terms agreed.382  This means that the consumer 
who agreed a contractual term stipulating that the financial institution does not provide 
advisory service cannot assert that he was provided with advisory service and relied on 
that.383  The contract provides contractual estoppel. 
In the example case of Titan Steel Wheels Ltd v The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc, all of the 
contractual documents described that the bank would not provide advisory services and 
any opinions expressed by the bank should not be treated as advice.384  The court declared 
that it had no reason to interpret the contractual terms in other ways.  The court’s position 
was that ‘a person who signs a document knowing it is intended to have a legal effect is 
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generally bound by its terms there.’385  The court also supported its decision by showing 
that there was no fee paid to the bank for advice and no request for advice by Titan.386 
In the case of Bankers Trust International plc v Dharmala Sakti Sejahtera, the court also 
rejected the bank’s duty as an advisor in that: Dharmala did not ask the financial institution 
to be an advisor; Dharmala held itself out as having substantial capability to understand 
and evaluate investment proposals for itself. 387 
Contractual terms of disclaiming advisory service estopped an unsophisticated individual 
person from asserting advisory relationship as well.  Green & Rowley v The Royal Bank of 
Scotland Plc 388, one of the recent interest rate hedge product cases, showed that this 
disclaimer can prohibit individual consumers from claiming on a negligent advice.  The 
consumer, the owner of a small hotel, claimed that he had been recommended and pushed 
by the bank to enter into the swap, while the bank denied any recommendation and 
insisted that it provided only information about some different interest rate hedge 
products.  The court referred to the disclaimer provision in the contractual documents 
stating that the bank would provide the consumer with an execution-only service and that 
the bank would not provide the consumer with advice.    
The Crestsign Ltd v National Westminster Bank plc and Royal Bank of Scotland plc 389 
illustrates very well the importance of the clause defining the scope of the contract.  The 
court accepted that the bank, in reality, provided advice about interest rate hedge products, 
and stated that the advice given was a negligent one; however, it adjudicated that it was 
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not breach of a duty of care and so not actionable because of the disclaimer clause denying 
to provide advisory service.  
Where a financial institution did make a contract of providing an advisory service, it was 
free from the liability of negligent advice by an exclusion of liability clause.  In Camerata 
Property Inc v Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Ltd,390 the advisory service agreement 
included a provision stipulating that the financial institution would be liable only for 
‘grossly negligent’ advice.  The court held, accepting the effect of this disclaimer, that the 
financial institution would be liable only under the condition of ‘gross negligence’ which 
the court defined as a higher level of negligence.    
4.2.2 Low level duty of care 
Then under the non-advisory service relationship, what kind of a duty of care would be 
held by financial institutions selling over-the-counter derivatives?  The court, in JP Morgan 
Chase Bank and Others v Springwell Navigation Corporation,391 analysed that the service 
the financial institution had proffered was not advice nor mere execution-only service.  
Even though there was no contractual clause of “advice” being provided, the court 
accepted that personal recommendations or advice was given in reality.  In such 
circumstances, the court stated that the financial institution held a ‘low level duty of care’ 
which required ‘not to make a negligent misstatement’ or ‘to use reasonable care not to 
recommend a highly risky investment’ without warning risks.392  This concept of low level 
of a duty of care was in line with the duty, acknowledged earlier in Bankers Trust 
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International plc v PT Dharmala Sakti Sejahtera,393 not to carelessly mistake facts and has 
been adopted in other descendent cases.394   
4.3 Negligent misrepresentation 
Negligent misrepresentation is another major issue in claims of “mis-selling” of over-the-
counter derivatives.  Before delving into the individual cases, it is necessary to understand 
the legal concept of misrepresentation, which forms the baseline in decisions of the court 
in disputes of over-the-counter derivatives.  There are some necessary components 
constituting misrepresentation.  Firstly, it should be a representation about a fact rather 
than an opinion.395  Secondly, it should be false.396  Mere lack of clarity or ambiguity in 
representation does not make it a misrepresentation.397 Thirdly, an omission of explanation 
is not usually deemed a misrepresentation.398  Lastly, the representation must have induced 
the consumer to do the transaction.399   
There are two legal grounds for alleging negligent misrepresentation: misrepresentation in 
tort and misrepresentation under the Misrepresentation Act 1967.  In common law, Hedley 
Byrne v Heller400 introduced, for the first time, negligent misrepresentation and with other 
following cases set up the principles for negligent misrepresentation.401  The claim based 
on The Misrepresentation Act 1967 is not largely different from what is required in tort 
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except for in two aspects: 1) it has no need for the existence of a duty of care which is 
necessary in the tort misrepresentation; 2) the burden of proof, once misrepresentation is 
accepted, is shifted to the defendant who should prove that ‘he had reasonable ground 
to believe and did believe up to the time the contract was made the facts represented 
were true’.402      
The allegations of misrepresentation in the “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives 
whether based on the tort or Misrepresentation Act 1967 can be classified mainly into 
three areas: market prediction; explanation of risks; and disclosure of fees.  Below will 
examine each area in over-the-counter derivatives transactions. 
4.3.1 Market prediction 
One of the major causes for claims of misrepresentation in the transaction of over-the-
counter derivatives is the mis-prediction of underlying asset price or index by the financial 
institutions.  On this point, the court’s position has been that it does not recognize any 
liability from wrong market prediction in hindsight.  
Firstly, the contractual term stating “no representation” and “no reliance” made the court 
to adjudicate no misrepresentation.  In JP Morgan Chase Bank and Others v Springwell 
Navigation Corporation, 403 the claimant bought from JP Morgan notes referenced to the 
bonds issued by the Russian Federation and the notes were embedded with currency 
forward contracts.  But the referenced Russian bonds were defaulted upon and the claimant 
suffered a huge loss.  According to the claimant, JP Morgan made misrepresentations that 
the Russian economy was strong and there would be no default on Russia’s debt 
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obligations.  By the way, the contract between the two parties stipulated that ‘no 
representation or warranty express or implied was made by CMB [the bank], and conversely, 
that by signing the letters, Springwell “By placing an order” with CMB expressly represented 
that…it had independently, without reliance on CMB made a decision…’404 
The court also explained that the statement about the Russian economy was not a factual 
comment but the sales person’s opinion which did not constitute “misrepresentation”.  It 
adjudicated that whether this was an opinion or a factual statement, the contract denying 
the consumer’s receiving any representation and relying on that barred the consumer to 
pursue allegations of misrepresentation.  In addition, the court added, through analysing 
the record of the conversations between the two parties, that the claimant was not 
influenced by the alleged misrepresentation because the claimant still believed that the 
fundamentals of Russian economy was not strong and so the “misrepresentation” was not 
actionable anyway.  In other cases such as Grant Estates Limited v The Royal Bank of 
Scotland Plc 405  where the claimant alleged the bank’s “misrepresentation” about the 
interest rates rise to the contrary of the dramatic fall later and Standard Chartered Bank v 
Ceylon Petroleum Corporation406 where the consumer alleged to be misled by the bank’s 
“misrepresentation” that the oil-related over-the-counter derivatives were for hedge when 
they were actually very speculative, the contractual terms stating non-representation and 
non-reliance estopped the consumers from arguing misrepresentation.    
Secondly, the court concluded that a financial institution did not hold any duty to explain 
or brief all the available market expectations, especially when the consumer did not ask to 
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do so.    In Bankers Trust International plc v PT Dharmala Sakti Sejahtera,407 the salesperson 
relayed to the customer a forecast on US six-month LIBOR made by one of the financial 
institution’s economists.  This forecast was one of the lowest among many other market 
experts’ opinions.  A lower US LIBOR meant that the swap recommended by the financial 
institution would be more profitable to the customer at maturity.  The court ruled that the 
provision of the lowest forecast of US LIBOR could not be a cause for complaints; the 
forecast presented did not purport to represent the forecasts of economists as a whole 
and the fact that the forecast by the economist was low compared with the majority of 
other economists did not mean that the forecast was unreasonable.  It also added that the 
financial institution was not asked to give the general market forecast by the claimant and 
had no duty to do so.   
4.3.2 Explanation of risks 
Another claim of misrepresentation in the over-the-counter derivatives transactions is that 
financial institutions did not explain or even hid critical risk factors.  One of the private law 
principles related with this issue is again contractual estoppel.  The court’s primary position 
is to respect the contractual provisions excluding any liability of representation.  Peekay 
Intermark Ltd and another v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd is an obvious 
example for this.408  The consumer was misled by oral explanation saying that the product 
recommended would be Russian government bonds while not saying that the product was 
a financial derivative and the investor would not have any control of the way in which the 
investment was liquidated.  The claimant decided to invest in this product relying on the 
wrong oral explanation, but the bank sent a contractual document where the true 
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characteristics of the product was written.  The consumer did not read the document and 
returned it with his signature to the bank, which included: 
You should also ensure that you fully understand the nature of the transaction and 
contractual relationship into which you are entering… The issuer assumes that the 
customer is aware of the risks and practices described herein, and that prior to each 
transaction the customer has determined that such transaction is suitable for him.409 
While the trial court upheld the claim of misrepresentation, the court of appeal rejected it.  
It emphasized that the contractual document the party signed, whether he read it or not, 
bound him and estopped from asserting that he was induced to enter into the contract 
by pre-contractual statements.   
When an incorrect factual explanation about over-the-counter derivatives is provided to 
the consumer, it is an actionable misrepresentation only when it does influence the 
consumer’s decision of entering into the contract.  In JP Morgan Chase Bank and Others 
v Springwell Navigation Corporation, the court accepted that in terms of Ukraine bonds, 
JP Morgan made a factually wrong representation that Ukraine had no foreign debt at that 
time when this was not the case, but did not hold that that misrepresentation was 
actionable because it judged that the claimant was not induced to enter into the 
transaction by the misrepresentation.410  The analysis of telephone conversations between 
the parties convinced the court that the consumer was attracted to the Ukraine bond 
because of its potential high yield and decent price and so he would have still invested in 
the bond even if he had been informed of the exact amount of Ukraine foreign debt.   
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The decision that an actionable misrepresentation needs actual inducement is also found 
in Bankers Trust International plc v PT Dharmala Sakti Sejahtera411.  The consumer entered 
into an interest rate swap with the financial institution which did not explain the condition 
that unlimited loss would occur if the US LIBOR became higher than a certain level, while 
it highlighted the advantages and profits when US LIBOR stayed at relatively lower levels.  
The court distinguished the question of whether there was misrepresentation from whether 
the client was misled by the misrepresentation, and it judged that only when the consumer 
was misled by the misrepresentation could he demand for damages from the over-the-
counter derivatives contract. 
In recent litigation of interest rate hedge products, the “inducement” ingredient of the 
“misrepresentation” about the break cost that would occur when terminating the swap 
contract before maturity was raised.  In John Green and Paul Rowley v The Royal Bank of 
Scotland Plc,412  the bank had explained to the consumer, before entering into the 10 year 
matured interest rate swap contract in 2005, about the break cost that ‘there could be a 
cost or a benefit to the customer depending on market conditions’.  When realizing the 
break cost was ￡138,650 (27.7% of the debt principal) in 2009, the consumer claimed that 
the bank’s explanation on the break cost was a negligent mis-statement.  But the court 
rejected this claim in that: the bank’s explanation that there could be a cost or benefit 
depending on the market condition was not unfair nor misleading and the consumer could 
have sought more explanation about the break cost from the bank but did not; most 
importantly, it was not likely to the court that even detailed information about the break 
cost would have prevented the consumer from entering into the swap. 
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The court also expressed that the financial institutions did not have any duty to make sure 
that the consumer did understand the meaning of its representation.  In another case 
related with interest rate hedge products, Crestsign Ltd v National Westminster Bank plc 
and Royal Bank of Scotland plc,413 over-hedge became the issue of the dispute.  The bank 
sold a 10-year matured swap to a small family-operated company for hedging a 5-year 
matured loan with no renewal guarantee.  The bank sent an e-mail which mentioned that 
the swap had ‘a 10-year commitment and the bank only has a financing commitment for 
5 years.’414  The court stated that the bank’s explanation of over-hedge in maturity was 
‘brief but not inaccurate or misleading’.  It reasoned that the bank did not have a duty to 
‘take adequate steps to ensure the consumer had an adequate understanding of the full 
range’ of product characteristics.415   
4.3.3 Disclosure of costs 
Undisclosed costs in over-the-counter derivatives are another frequently raised claims of 
misrepresentation.  It has been market practice for financial institutions to earn their 
commission through the bid-ask spread which is negative (to end-users) mark-to-market 
value of over-the-counter derivatives rather than to charge its commission separately.416  
When consumers are not informed of the charged commission by bid-ask spread and 
happen to find out about it later, they are likely to allege that the non-disclosed 
commission is misrepresentation.  However, private law does not recognize the seller’s 
legal obligation to disclose negative mark-to-market value to the other counterparty in 
over-the-counter derivatives contracts.  
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The first litigation in which a claim against non-disclosed negative value of over-the-
counter derivatives was Bankers Trust International plc v PT Dharmala Sakti Sejahtera,417 
and the decision in this case has been referred by other cases afterwards.  In relation to 
two interest rate swaps worth $50 million transacted with Dharmala, the financial institution 
charged $10 million through the uninformed negative mark-to-market value.  On this issue, 
the court concluded that the financial institution was not obliged to disclose the mark-to-
market value without any positive representation or undertakings to inform.418  
The issue of the non-disclosed negative mark-to-market occurred again in the recent 
interest rate swap scandals.  Nextia Properties, which was a small company in the property 
development business, entered into an interest rate swap with National Westerminster 
Bank in March 2008.419  The bank’s salesperson suggested to Nextia three alternatives for 
hedging, which were a swap, a cap and a collar; from the side of the consumer, the swap 
was a fixed interest rate in exchange for a floating base rate, the cap setting the maximum 
interest rate and the collar providing a band of interest rate.  The cap and the collar 
provided benefits to the consumer in that the consumer would enjoy the low interest rate 
when the interest rate goes down while providing protection against rising interest rate.  
The salesperson explained that there was an upfront payment premium for the cap and 
the collar which were respectively ￡50,330 and ￡5,062, but that the swap had no cost or 
fee.  The consumer selected the swap, attracted to the “no cost” condition.  However, the 
mark-to-market value of the swap on the day of execution was negative ￡89,500 to the 
consumer and the same amount positive to the bank.  The consumer bought the swap 
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without knowing the negative mark-to-market value.  The court referred to the above 
Bankers Trust International v Dharmala and ruled that there was no obligation to disclose 
mark-to-market value.  It added that the contract between the consumer and the bank 
made it clear that the contract was agreed at arm’s length of each counterparty. 
4.4 Regulation in private law 
4.4.1 Reference to statutory regulation 
In general, the private law has an approach that statutory regulation can be a criteria in 
deciding whether a financial institution exercises appropriate ‘skill and care’ when doing 
business.420  In Shore v Sedgwick Financial Services Ltd, the court stated that regulatory 
requirements could be the start in determining the extent of duty of financial institutions.421  
The non-compliance by a financial institution of relevant regulatory rules can be seen as a 
failure of exercising proper ‘skill and care’.422  But the court does not allow the regulation 
to override the private law when the requirements of both collides. 
In Green & Rowley v Royal Bank of Scotland plc, the court stated that regulatory rules 
related with providing advisory service such as the suitability rule could be applied to the 
advisory relationship between a financial institution and a consumer,423 but that those rules 
could not be applied to outside of an advisory relationship.424   
In terms of representation, the regulatory rule, COBS, requires financial institutions to take 
reasonable steps to communicate fairly and clearly.425  However, the court, in Green & 
Rowley v Royal Bank of Scotland plc, stated expressly that this fair and clear communication 
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duty in regulation was beyond the common law duty of representation, which was ‘not to 
mis-state’ and thus rejected the claim that this regulatory communication rule was 
encompassed in the common law duty.426  
4.4.2 Right of action of private person 
FSMA 2000 expressly entitles a ‘private person’ with a “right of action” for his loss from 
financial institutions’ breach of regulation, describing that ‘A contravention of a rule by an 
authorized person is actionable by a private person who suffers loss as a result of the 
contravention…’ 427   The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Right of Action) 
Regulations 2001 defines, by the power delegated by FSMA 2000428, the ‘private person’ 
as ‘any individual’ and ‘any person who is not an individual, unless he suffers the loss in 
question in the course of carrying on business of any kind’.429  A “rule” here means the 
regulation created by financial authorities such as the FCA, so the COBS is one kind of this 
“rule”.  This means that a private person who suffered loss from breach of the COBS by 
financial institutions can show in the court that the financial institution did breach the 
COBS430 rather than having to rely on the breach of common law duty,431 even though it 
does not mean being automatically capable of giving rise to obligations or 
compensation432.   
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Titan Steel Wheels Ltd v The Royal Bank of Scotland plc 433 was the first case among over-
the-counter derivatives disputes, where a non-individual consumer claimed the “right of 
action” that FSMA 2000 provided.  In the interpretation of the phrase of ‘in the course of 
carrying on business of any kind’, Titan claimed that the currency swaps it entered into 
were ‘merely sporadic and intermittent activity fully outside the course of its business’.434  
However, the court ruled that Titan entered into the currency swap in the course of 
business, and so was not a ‘private person’.  It explained that the word ‘any kind’ itself 
expressly showed the broad meaning of business and even without the broad meaning of 
business the currency swaps were contracted in the course of Titan’s business where it had 
to hedge the currency rate risk regularly.  The court also pointed out that Titan entered 
into the currency swap, if partly, in expecting speculative profit and this speculative motive 
showed the swap deals were done in the course of business.    
After the Titan case, some other non-individual consumers claimed their status as a ‘private 
person’ but all failed.  While this negative result to consumers is not surprising because of 
the clear definition of a ‘private person’, it is helpful to take a look at some other cases.  
In Camerata Property Inc v Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Ltd, the plaintiff was a paper 
investment company with a sole individual beneficiary.435  The communication with the 
financial institution and the investment decision was done by the beneficiary who was an 
“individual person” but the contractor was the paper company and so excluded from 
‘private person’.  Related with interest rate hedge products, some small and 
unsophisticated companies also claimed the status of ‘private person’ but were rejected 
                                                          
433 [2010] EWHC 211 
434 Ibid [44]-[76] 
435 [2011] EWHC 479 (Comm) 
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because their legal entity was non-individual.436  Based on the above cases, the Section 
138D of FSMA 2000 is difficult to avoid the criticism that the definition of private person 
is too cursory because paper companies and small SMEs which are in reality as 
unsophisticated as individual persons are classified as non-private persons just by the types 
of legal entities.      
4.4.3 Application of regulatory rules for private person 
The above section shows who is entitled with the statutory “right of action” from breach 
of regulatory duties.  This section will see how private law deals with alleged “mis-selling” 
of over-the-counter derivatives related with a private person that has the “right of action”. 
4.4.3.1 Meaning of a right of action 
Even though the “right of action” itself does not automatically give rise to compensation,437 
a contravention, brought to the court by the statutory right of action, which caused a loss 
is likely to be led to a compensation order even without breach of common law duties.  In 
Morgan Stanley UK Group v Puglisi Cosentino,438 the court found the contravention of 
then regulatory rules including breach of suitability rule and risk warning rule and accepted 
that the breach had caused the consumer’s loss.  Though the court expressed that the 
consumer’s claim for misrepresentation of the financial institution by common law was not 
successful,439 it held for the consumer only based on the contravention of regulatory rules.  
                                                          
436 Grant Estates Limited v The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc [2012] CSOH 133; Nextia Properties Limited v 
National Westminster Bank plc and The Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2013] EWHC 3167 (QB); Thornbridge 
Limited v Barclays Bank Plc [2015] EWHC 3430 
437 See n432 
438 [1998] C.L.C. 481 
439 Ibid p500 
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In two other cases, Zaki & others v Credit Suisse (UK) Limited 440 and Basma Al Sulaiman 
v Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Limited, Plurimi Capital LLP 441, where the consumers as 
private persons claimed for compensation based on the statutory “right of action” 
contained in FSMA 2000, the court showed the will to make decisions based on regulatory 
rules without relying on private law.        
4.4.3.2 The court’s proactive approach  
In applying regulatory rules to the case of a private person, the court has developed its 
own approach to the rules.  Zaki & others v Credit Suisse (UK) Limited  is a good example 
of the court’s proactive approach in interpreting regulatory rules.  In this case, the 
consumer bought 10 structured notes from Credit Suisse (UK) Limited  (“CS”) from 2007 
to 2008.  All of these notes were linked with performance of market indices or individual 
stocks, and if the linked stock market benchmark is above a “strike price” at the maturity 
of a note, the note can make an enhanced return to the holder, but if the benchmark has 
ever touched the barrier level (e.g. 55% of strike price), the note will be redeemed at the 
final level of the worst performing benchmark.  After suffering a huge loss from these 
derivative-embedded products due to the global financial crisis in 2008, the claimant 
argued that CS breached the suitability rule of COBS during the process of the notes sales.  
There was no dispute about the status of the consumer as a “private person” because he 
was an individual person.  The court judged whether or not there was breach of COBS and 
made its final ruling based on COBS and not on common law standards.  The discussion 
below will highlight the court’s proactive approach in interpreting and enforcing regulatory 
rules. 
                                                          
440 [2011] EWHC 2422 (COMM); [2012] EWCA Civ 583 
441 [2013] EWHC 400 (Comm) 
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The court’s own approach to the suitability rule 
CS’s account manager failed to gather necessary information about the consumer for 
recommending suitable products.  In the recorded form, investment objectives of the 
consumer were different from product to product sold and his net worth varied from ￡100 
million to ￡250 million.  The court acknowledged that CS lacked the rigor and care in 
obtaining information about the consumer and so breached the suitability rule of COBS.   
In respect of suitability, COBS describes that ‘A firm must take reasonable steps to ensure 
that a personal recommendation, or a decision to trade, is suitable for its client.’,442 and 
provided detailed rules of the ‘reasonable steps’.443  The suitability rule of COBS requires 
that financial institutions should recommend suitable products and for ensuring suitability 
they should follow the specified ‘reasonable steps’.  In other words, COBS requires certain 
procedures in order to make sure that suitable advice is recommended.  So precisely 
speaking, whether or not a personal recommendation was suitable, it is a breach of COBS 
that a financial institution does not follow the reasonable steps stipulated in the COBS.444   
However, the court stated that the regulatory failure in securing the client’s information 
for suitable recommendation did not prove that the recommendation was not suitable.  In 
its reasoning in the litigation, the court was focused on the suitability itself rather than the 
obedience of the procedural rules ensuring suitability.  The court explained that: 
The important point, it seems to me, is whether the recommendations 
made by Mr. Zaki [salesperson] were suitable for Mr. Zeid [consumer]. If 
they were not suitable then it adds nothing to enquire whether Mr. Zaki’s 
                                                          
442 FCA Handbook, COBS 9.2.1R(1) 
443 Ibid 9.2 
444 See n324 
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approach to obtaining and recording information and classifying the 
Claimants lacked the required rigour and care. If they were suitable, then 
again it cannot matter whether his approach to obtaining and recording 
information and classification was adequate or not…  In that sense 
regulatory failures in the information gathering exercise may evidence a 
breach of the duty to take reasonable steps to ensure that the 
recommendations were suitable but they do not, it seems to me, assist in 
showing that the recommendations were not suitable.445 
The court’s focus on the substance rather than procedures in suitability was well revealed 
in its investigation on the consumer’s risk appetite.  The internal record of CS described 
the consumer’s risk tolerance was “moderate”, which was, as the compliance department 
of CS had stated internally, not compatible with the risk profile of the recommended 
products.  However, the court put more weight on the consumer’s prior investment 
experience in similar non-capital protected products and concluded that ‘it does not follow 
that the 10 structured products which form the basis of this claim should be regarded as 
carrying a risk greater than that which Mr. Zeid [consumer] had been prepared to accept 
and which Mr. Zaki [salesperson] described in the suitability forms as “moderate”’. 
The court’s interpretation of suitability 
Zaki & others v Credit Suisse (UK) Limited  446 also showed the court’s proactivity in 
interpreting regulatory rules.  The COBS subdivides suitability into three components: 
‘investment objectives’, ‘capability of bearing risk’ and ‘experience and knowledge’ of the 
                                                          
445 Zaki & others v Credit Suisse (UK) Limited [2011] EWHC 2422 (COMM) [99] 
446 Ibid 
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consumer.447  In checking suitability of CS’s recommendation, the court investigated not 
only those three components expressed in COBS but also investment diversity448 and 
market conditions449.  The court stated that the diversity in investments should be one of 
the elements when assessing the suitability of the recommendation, even though the COBS 
did not contain any explicit requirements about diversity.  The court also took the turbulent 
market condition in 2008 into account for adjudication on suitability, even though the 
COBS did not require a financial institution to consider market conditions when 
recommending financial products.   
The court adjudicated that the structured notes bought in 2008 were not suitable to the 
consumer, considering ominous market conditions where there were some harbingers of 
a dreadful global financial crisis such as the Northern Rock nationalization, acquisition of 
Bear Sterns, etc.  The court stated that ‘notwithstanding Mr.Zeid’s [the consumer] 
appreciation of the risks and his ability to bear the consequences of them materializing, 
the line had been crossed in May/June 2008.’450 
4.5 Causation 
It is one of the tort law principles that in order to get compensated the claimant should 
prove that the wrongdoing of the defendant caused him the damage: ‘no proof of 
causation, no compensation’.451  In brief, causation in tort requires two types of causation: 
factual and legal causation.452  Factual causation needs that the wrongdoing should be the 
necessary condition for the harm to the claimant to occur and requires to prove that 
                                                          
447 FCA Handbook, COBS 9.2 
448 EWHC 2422 (COMM) [120] 
449 Ibid [126] 
450 Ibid [129] 
451 Sandy Steel, Proof of Causation in Tort Law (Cambridge University Press 2015) 1  
452 Kirsty Horsey and Erika Rackley (n 401) 224-255 
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without the wrongdoing the harm would not have occurred, so called the ‘but for’ test.453  
Legal causation means that the harm should be foreseeable at the time of the action.454  
Though the wrongdoing satisfies the ‘but for’ test, i.e. factual causation, if it is remote to 
the harm, causation is not proved.   
This legal concept of causation is applied not only to the tort of “mis-selling” of the over-
the-counter derivatives but also cases brought by the statutory “right of action” from 
regulatory breaches.  Section 138D of FSMA 2000 provides a private person who suffers 
loss as a result of the contravention of the COBS with the “right of action” in damages.  
The phrase of ‘as a result’ is the requirement of causation and the above causation 
principles in tort is applied as well.455 
4.5.1 Factual causation  
In order to investigate factual causation, the court checks the consumer’s reliance on the 
unsuitable advice (or misrepresentation) provided by the financial institution.  The fact that 
the consumer relied on the unsuitable advice when making a decision of entering into an 
over-the-counter derivatives contract can prove that he would not have made the contract 
“but for” the advice.    
In Zaki & others v Credit Suisse (UK) Limited 456 where the court found some unsuitable 
recommendation of derivatives-embedded notes as breach of the COBS, the court 
recognized that the consumer followed the salesperson’s advice in some cases such as 
when he was first introduced to non-capital protected notes, but denied the reliance by 
                                                          
453 Ibid p225 
454 Ibid p247 
455 Adrian Rubenstein v HSBC Bank [2012] EWCA Civ 1184 [45]; George Walker, Robert Purves and Michael 
Blair (n 116)  para 7-30  
456 [2011] EWHC 2422 (COMM) 
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the consumer in some other purchases on advices, stating that he started making his own 
decisions in investments once he became familiar with non-capital protected notes.  The 
court concluded that even if he had not been advised to buy the unsuitable notes, he 
would still have bought them and suffered loss because he made the investment decision 
based on his own view of the markets although unsuitable advice was given, and so there 
was no causal link between the unsuitable recommendation and the loss.  The testimony 
of the salesperson that the consumer relied on his advice in making investment decisions 
was not sufficient evidence for the factual causation. 
Then arises a subsequent question, under what circumstances is the factual causation 
between the breach and the loss able to be achieved?  It is Adrian Rubenstein v HSBC 
Bank 457 that provides a clue to that question, where the factual causation between COBS 
breach and loss was accepted by the court (but it was not related with over-the-counter 
derivatives).  In this case, the claimant, an individual person, asked HSBC for a safe 
investment without any risk of capital loss and the bank recommended a fund explaining 
that it was as safe as a bank deposit.  His simple investment objective was putting 
temporarily his proceedings from his home sale in a safe account until the purchase of a 
new home.  He double-checked with the bank whether the fund was safe and with a 
positive answer from the bank he invested in the fund in 2005.  Even though the bank 
confirmed as such, the fund was not as safe as a bank deposit.  The global financial crisis 
in 2008 caused the consumer a substantial loss.  The trial court admitted that HSBC 
breached the COBS in that it recommended an unsuitable product and accepted the 
plaintiff’s reliance on the bank’s recommendation.  The court explained that the consumer 
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‘was willing to invest his money in whatever Mr.Marsden [the salesperson] 
recommended’458 and admitted that if the bank had not recommended as such, he would 
not have invested in the fund. 
In summarizing the requirements of factual causation from above cases, entire reliance on 
advice, i.e. the attitude of following whatever advice, can pass the “but for” test whereas 
partial reliance, where the consumer with his own view makes an investment decision 
informed by the advice, cannot pass the test.      
4.5.2 Legal causation  
When unsuitable advice or misrepresentation is found to be a necessary condition of the 
consumer’s loss (factual causation), the next step of proving causation is to determine if 
the unsuitable advice was remote to the loss (legal causation).  
In Adrian Rubenstein v HSBC Bank above, the trial court investigated the legal causation 
after accepting the factual causation.  It reasoned that the consumer’s loss was not caused 
by the structure of the recommended investment product but by the evaporated market 
liquidity amid 2008 global financial crisis.459  Based on this reasoning, the court concluded 
that the loss was not foreseeable at the time of recommendation, and so the legal 
causation was not accepted.  However, this denial of legal causation was repealed at the 
court of appeal.460  The appeal court explained that what the claimant tried to avoid was 
market risk but the bank recommended a product with market risk which was foreseeable, 
and so ruled that the bank’s unsuitable recommendation caused the loss. 
                                                          
458 Ibid [108] 
459 Ibid [113]-[115] 
460 Adrian Rubenstein v HSBC Bank [2012] EWCA Civ 1184 
103 
 
Two points can be picked up from the above decisions of the trial and appeal court on 
legal causation.  Firstly, unless the consumer expresses that he wants to avoid market risk, 
the consumer may not be able to prove legal causation of the unsuitable advice to loss 
partly resulted from market turmoil, considering the fact that the court of appeal accepted 
the legal causation because of the consumer’s expressed intolerance of market risk. 
Secondly, these two cases with different results about legal causation show causal 
uncertainty due to ‘multiplicity of possible causes’.461  When there are two possible causes 
for a loss of a consumer, such as unsuitable advice and unexpected market movements, 
there is uncertainty in finding the “true” cause.462  Uncertainty of how the courts will reason 
in causation test should be also pointed out.  Unlike the above cases such as Adrian 
Rubenstein v HSBC Bank  and Zaki & others v Credit Suisse (UK) Limited  where the courts 
imposed tight criteria of proof of causation on the claimants, in Morgan Stanley UK Group 
v Puglisi Cosentino, for example, where the court ruled that the financial institution 
breached the suitability rule of then statutory regulation, it accepted the causality, without 
strict reasoning, just by explaining:  
It seems to me that the onus of proof of breach of statutory duty is on Mr Puglisi 
[consumer] and in relation to r. 730 he must also show that he relied on the advice 
given. In my judgment he did rely on that advice — indeed it would be absurd to 
suppose otherwise since without the recommendation of PERLS by Mr Revelli [sales 
person] he would never have entered the PERLS transactions or, indeed, heard of 
PERLS at all. I do not think he has to go further and show what he would have 
done if he had received the correct advice, but, if he had received proper advice, 
he would in fact not have invested in PERLS. 463  
 
                                                          
461 Sandy Steel (n 451) 8 
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Conclusion 
This Chapter has explored how private law deal with disputes of “mis-selling” of over-the-
counter derivatives.  The first conclusion the Chapter has reached was that the court puts 
first priority on the contractual terms when imposing duties on parties of the transaction.  
When the reality of the transaction is different from what the contract describes, the court 
follows the right and duty defined by the contract.  The decisions of the courts support 
the contract-first principle that the relationship defining clauses such as ‘execution-only’, 
‘no advisory service’ and disclaimer clauses such as ‘no representation’, ‘no reliance’ and 
‘no liability’ have full legal power regardless of the reality of the transactions.   
The second conclusion is that the court has a stance that the regulatory rules can inform 
private law but cannot override it.  For example, once advisory relationship is accepted in 
private law, the regulatory rules stipulating the duty of financial advisors can be embraced 
in private law standards but these rules cannot be referred to in the ‘execution-only’ 
relationship; the regulatory requirement of fair and clear communication on financial 
institutions is rejected in private law because the requirement is beyond the ‘duty not to 
mis-state’ of private law. 
Thirdly, the court showed proactive approach in applying regulatory rules to civil cases 
brought by the “right of action” under the FSMA 2000.  Strictly speaking, the “right of 
action” does not bind the court in its decision, but the court seems to be willing to make 
adjudication only based on the regulatory rules without considering private law principles.  
In interpreting regulatory rules, it also showed its capability and willingness to develop its 
own interpretation and standards related with regulatory rules.  Even though some of the 
court’s interpretations of the COBS such as adding “market condition” to factors considered 
105 
 
for suitability is controversial, the court’s proactive attempt to interpret regulatory rules is 
desirable for the progressive development of private law. 
Lastly, this Chapter has considered the causation test in private law, which consists of 
factual and legal causation.  The cases investigated showed that it is quite a high obstacle 
to prove causation from the side of consumers; for factual causation, the hypothetical 
assertion that he would have acted differently without the breach of the financial institution 
is difficult to prove in the court; for legal causation, as there are usually at least two causes 
for the loss such as breach of the financial institution and unexpected market turmoil, it is 
not easy for the consumer to single out the breach as the real cause for his loss. 
Integrating all of these aspects and modalities of reasoning contained within private law 
shows that consumers are likely to have very little prospect of succeeding in obtaining 
compensation under private law.  18 cases 464  of “mis-selling” of over-the-counter 
derivatives verify the low prospect for consumers; only one consumer 465  out of 15 
consumers (18 cases) succeeded in obtaining redress order in the court (See below Table 
2).  The first reason of this low “success” ratio on the side of consumers is that it is not 
probable for negligent advice or misrepresentation to be accepted in private law, 
considering the standard forms of over-the-counter derivatives contracts which include 
various ‘exclusion clauses’.466  Among 13 cases467 where consumers alleged negligent 
                                                          
464 The 18 cases were chosen through Westlaw as following criteria: 1) cases including the words of 
“derivatives”, “advice” and “duty of care” or “misrepresentation”; and 2) cases where consumers alleged 
“negligent advice” or “misrepresentation” or regulatory breach of financial institutions; and 3) cases 
adjudicated before 31st December 2015 
465 Morgan Stanley UK Group v Puglisi Cosentino [1998] C.L.C. 481 
466 Iain G Mitchell QC, ‘Written evidence from Iain G Mitchell QC’ (Parliamentary business, 2012) 
<http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/jt201314/jtselect/jtpcbs/27/27v_we17.htm> accessed 18 March 
2016 
467 Cases which have “Y” or “N” in the column of “Applied by private law” in the Table 2 at 107 
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advice or misrepresentation in tort, there was no case where breach of private law 
standards was accepted.   
The FSMA 2000 “right of action” for breach of regulatory duty gives better chance to 
consumers but this right is limited to only “private persons”.  Five corporate consumers468 
were denied the status of “private persons” and so had no statutory “right of action”.  Two 
consumers469 out of three “private persons”470 succeeded to obtain the court’s ruling that 
there were statutory breaches by the financial institutions.  Then, there is the last obstacle 
for consumers, which is the causation test.  Only one consumer471 out of two consumers 
who obtained the ruling of regulatory breach succeeded in proving causation and securing 
compensation order.   
In Chapter III and IV, it has been discussed how financial regulation and private law 
approach to “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives.  As the next steop, the following 
Chapter will make analytical comparison of the two institutions in their approaches to the 
issue. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
468 Cases which have “N” in the column of “Private person” in the Table 2 at 107 
469 Cases which have “Y” in the column of “Breach of suitability” or “Breach of communication rule” in the 
Table 2 at 107 
470 Cases which have “Y” in the column of “Private person” in the Table 2 at 107 
471 The case which has “Y” in the column of “Causation” in the Table 2 at 107 
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Table 2: Summary of cases472 related with “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives 
between financial institutions and consumers 
Cases 
(Name of 
consumer
) 
Adjudic
ation 
Year 
Applied by private law Applied by regulatory 
rules 
(by the statutory “right 
of action”) 
Causa
tion 
Existe
nce of 
advic
e 
Negli
gent 
advice 
Misreprese
ntation 
Priv
ate 
pers
on 
Breac
h of 
suitab
ility 
Breach of  
communi
cation 
rule 
Dharmala
473 
1995 N 1) N N - - - N 
Puglisi474 1998 - - N Y Y Y Y 
Peekay475 2006 - - N - - - - 
Springwel
l476 
2008 N N N - -  N 
Titan477 2010 N N - N - - - 
Wachner
478 
2011 N N N - - - N 
Ceylon479 2011 N N N - - - - 
Zaki480 2011, 
2012 
- - - Y Y - N 
                                                          
472 See n464 
473 Bankers Trust International plc v PT Dharmala Sakti Sejahtera [1996] C.L.C. 518 
474 Morgan Stanley UK Group v Puglisi Cosentino [1998] C.L.C. 481 
475 Peekay Intermark Ltd and another v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd [2006] EWCA 386 
476 JP Morgan Chase Bank and Others v Springwell Navigation Corporation [2008] EWHC 1186 
477 Titan Steel Wheels Ltd v The Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2010] EWHC 211 
478 Bank Leumi (UK) plc v Wachner [2011] EWHC 656 (Comm) 
479 Standard Chartered Bank v Ceylon Petroleum Corporation [2011] EWHC 1785 (Comm) 
480 Zaki & others v Credit Suisse (UK) Limited [2011] EWHC 2422 (COMM); [2012] EWCA Civ 583  
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Cases 
(Name of 
consumer
) 
Adjudic
ation 
Year 
Applied by private law Applied by regulatory 
rules 
(by the statutory “right 
of action”) 
Causa
tion 
Existe
nce of 
advic
e 
Negli
gent 
advice 
Misreprese
ntation 
Priv
ate 
pers
on 
Breac
h of 
suitab
ility 
Breach of  
communi
cation 
rule 
Camerata
481 
2011, 
2012 
Y N - N - - - 
Grant482 2012 N N N N - - - 
BAS483 2013 - - - Y N N N 
Nextia484 2013 - - N N - - - 
Green485 2012, 
2013 
N N N - - - N 
Crestsign
486 
2014 N Y 2) N - - - - 
Thornbrid
ge487 
2015 N N N N - - N 
1) Court adjudication: Y (held), N (not held), - (not dicussed) 
2) Negligent advice but not actionable due to the disclaimer of providing advice  
                                                          
481 Camerata Property Inc. v Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Ltd [2011] EWHC 479 (Comm) 2011 WL 674989 
(for ‘Appplied by private law’ in the Table 2); [2012] EWHC 7 (Comm) 2012 WL 14689 (for ‘Applied by 
regulatory rules’ in the Table 2) 
482 Grant Estates Limited v The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc [2012] CSOH 133 
483 Basma Al Sulaiman v Credit Suisse Securities (Europe) Limited, Plurimi Capital LLP [2013] EWHC 400 (Comm) 
484 Nextia Properties Limited v National Westminster Bank plc and The Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2013] EWHC 
3167 (QB) 
485 John Green and Paul Rowley v The Royal Bank of Scotland Plc [2012] EWHC 3661; [2013] EWCA Civ 1197 
486 Crestsign Ltd v National Westminster Bank plc and Royal Bank of Scotland plc [2014] EWHC 3043 (Ch) 
487 Thornbridge Limited v Barclays Bank Plc [2015] EWHC 3430 
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CHAPTER V. DISSONANCE BETWEEN PRIVATE LAW AND 
REGULATION 
 
Introduction 
There are two social institutions, private law and regulation, both of which “regulate” 
transactions of financial products including over-the-counter derivatives.  The previous two 
Chapters have analysed how regulation and private law regulate over-the-counter 
derivatives transactions between financial institutions and consumers.  The analysis of the 
previous Chapters provided a chance to understand the principles and rules of each social 
institution and at the same time provided clues of dissonance between them.  The aim of 
this Chapter is to examine with the focus on the dissonance between private law and 
regulation in dealing with claims of “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives. 
The Chapter, firstly, will compare different duties put on financial institutions in the pre-
contractual and contractual stages by the two institutions and identify the dissonance in 
more detail.  This will be done by re-examining specific cases discussed in the previous 
two Chapters.  It will then examine regulatory requirements through the lens of the 
fiduciary duty of private law.  This will help to provide a better understanding of the nature 
of the dissonance between the two institutions.  It will also examine the different 
approaches to causation test employed by each of the two institutions when determining 
whether compensation is due. 
After developing a fuller understanding of the dissonance itself, the Chapter will consider 
its origins.  It will look at the different functions which the two institutions are expected to 
undertake in society.  This involves consideration of an economic analysis of law and 
regulation.  Then, the Chapter will illustrate the trend whereby the two institutions are 
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overlapping more and more, and try to explain why the two collide at times to produce 
some discordance of approach.  
5.1 Dissonance between the two institutions 
This section will try to find diverging principles and rules of private law and regulation in 
dealing with “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives.  This will need to compare duties 
put on the same activities of financial institutions in over-the-counter derivatives 
transactions by private law and regulation.  It will be illustrated how differently the two 
institutions have dealt with the same activities and issues.   
5.1.1 Different duties of the same activities 
Of the activities in over-the-counter derivatives transactions, the most disputed two are: 
what product is recommended and how the recommendation is communicated.  Private 
law and regulation have their own principles and rules in these activities.  In terms of the 
product recommendation, first of all, criteria for defining an advisory relationship diverges 
between them.  Secondly, in the activity of recommending a product, private law usually 
places a ‘low level duty of care’ on financial institutions, while regulation demands 
standards such as ‘suitability’ or ‘appropriateness’ which are judged against more 
demanding criteria.  In regard to communication, principles of misrepresentation are 
applied in private law while ‘fair, clear and not misleading communication’ rule is applied 
in regulation.  The below sections will compare the principles and rules of the two 
institutions on those two activities. 
5.1.1.1 Duties on recommending a product 
Both in private law and regulation, the question of whether the financial institution selling 
an over-the-counter derivative product has an advisory relationship with the consumer is 
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critical to define its obligations in recommending a product.  In private law, an advisor has 
more onerous obligations488 than an execution-only service provider and in regulation an 
advisor is required to ensure “suitability” of the advice, which is not a duty demanded on 
an execution-only service provider.  However, the ways in which the two institutions define 
advisory relationship are quite different.  Before comparing duties in recommending, the 
difference in how the two institutions define advisory relationship needs to be looked at 
first. 
Existence of advice 
As seen Chapter IV, the court puts first priority on the contractual terms when deciding 
whether or not there is “advice”.489  Absence of contractual terms about providing advisory 
service can be the evidence of no advisory relationship and the disclaimer of providing 
advisory service leads to no advisory relationship regardless of the factual relationship.490  
In contrast, the regulation focuses on the actual relationship and communication between 
the financial institution and the consumer rather than contractual terms.   
The precedent European Union financial regulator, Committee of European Securities 
Regulators491 (“CESR”) provided the criteria for deciding the existence of an advisory service 
based on the actual relationship.492  This criteria is a practical convergence tool used to 
promote common supervisory approaches in member states and, therefore competent 
                                                          
488 See n374 
489 See n375 
490 See n376-n383 
491 The CESR is the predecessor of the current European Union financial regulatory institution, the European 
Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA), which has replaced the CESR in 2011   
492 Committee of European Securities Regulators, ‘Questions and Answers: Understanding the definition of 
advice under MiFID’ (2010, Ref. CESR/10-293). This Q&A is a practical convergence tool used to promote 
common supervisory approaches and practices under Article 29(2) of the ESMA Regulation, therefore 
competent authorities in member states are to follow this Q&A. 
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authorities in member states are to follow this.493  A close look at this criteria helps to 
understand the regulatory approach on this issue.  The CESR suggested ‘the five key tests 
for investment advice’ to determine whether services of a financial institution constitute 
investment advice.494  All the five key tests should be met for a service offered to be 
recognized as advice.  The first test among the five key tests is whether the service offered 
constitutes a recommendation.495  A recommendation is a course of action such as buying, 
selling and holding a financial instrument whereas giving information is statements of fact 
or figures.496  Therefore, simply giving information without suggesting a specific action of 
the client is not advice.497   
The second test is whether the recommendation is in relation to one or more transactions 
in financial instruments. 498   Investment advice should relate to a particular financial 
instrument, so generic advice about a type of financial instrument such as investment in a 
geographical zone or a manufacturing industry in a stock market does not constitute 
investment advice.499  A general recommendation which is a recommendation intended for 
distribution channel or the public is also not investment advice.500   
The third test has two questions.  When only one is met, the third test is qualified.  One 
of the two questions is ‘whether the recommendation is presented as suitable’.501  A 
recommendation stating a financial instrument as suitable explicitly or implicitly for the 
                                                          
493 Regulation (EU) No 1095/2010, article 29(2); see European Securities and Markets Authority, ‘MiFID 
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investor constitutes advice.  It should be noted that an implicit statement like ‘people like 
you tend to buy this product’ as well as an explicit promotion like ‘this product is the best 
option for you’ are all seen as advice.502  The CESR also describes that even a clear 
disclaimer by a financial institution stating that no advice is being given cannot change 
the nature of the communication as investment advice.503  The other question in the third 
test is whether ‘the recommendation is based on a consideration of a person’s 
circumstances’504.  Circumstances here means the information about the client’s financial 
status, long-term and short-term financial objectives and risk appetite, for example.505  
Whether or not a financial institution considers its client’s circumstances when 
recommending, the client’s perception is the decisive point here.506  This means that a 
financial institution is held responsible if it gives the impression that its product 
recommendation is based on the client’s circumstances.  In summary, the third test is met 
if the recommendation is presented as being suitable to the client or is promoted with the 
impression that it is given on the basis of the client’s financial circumstances. 
The fourth test is whether ‘the recommendation is issued otherwise than exclusively 
through distributional channels or to the public’.507  The relevant consultation paper 
specifies newspaper, radio and TV as distributional channels or medium to the public in 
general.508  The point here is whether the client given the recommendation is a particular 
person or group or unknown people.  Investment advice should be a personal 
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recommendation targeted to a particular person or group.  The fifth test is whether ‘the 
recommendation is made to a person in his capacity as a (potential) investor or as an 
agent of a (potential) investor’.509  This test means that a recommendation given to a 
person without any capacity of (potential) investor does not constitute investment advice. 
The above criteria expressly states that advisory relationship is decided by the actual 
communication between financial institutions and consumers, not by contractual terms.  
This approach was confirmed by the FSA which said that terms excluding advice from the 
remit of services provided continued to be possible but they could not operate to exclude 
the application of the FSA rules where investment advice was actually given.510  This 
response clarifies that the FSA looks at the content of communication when deciding the 
existence of advice.   
By way of example of application of the above tests, Titan Steel Wheels Ltd v The Royal 
Bank of Scotland plc,511 clearly reveals the diverging criteria between private law and 
regulation in determining the existence of advisory relationship.  In this case, the court 
rejected the existence of advice based on contractual terms expressing that no advisory 
service had been provided.512  The following discussion will examine the existence of advice 
based on the regulatory perspective by applying above criteria of CESR to the case.   
The Bank’s corporate treasury manager sent the Titan financial controller an e-mail, which 
said as follows: 
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The idea below gives you the opportunity to outperform the spot and 
forward rates for your expected EUR requirement. Importantly, it is not 
a hedge. However, this additional trade does give you the opportunity 
to achieve rates better than what is available in the market by 
conventional spot or forward contracts. The numbers below are based 
on a minimum of €0.5m per month and a maximum of €1m per month. 
The basis for the trade is to provide an enhancement to your existing 
hedge and to run in conjunction with it.513 
 
1. Test 1: Does the service offered constitute recommendation?  In this e-mail, sentences 
like  ‘The idea below gives you the opportunity to outperform the spot and forward rates 
for your expected EUR requirement.’ and ‘The basis for the trade is to provide an 
enhancement to your existing hedge and to run in conjunction with it.’ are 
recommendations to buy the product whether it was explicit or implicit.   
2. Test 2: Is the recommendation in relation to one or more transactions in financial 
instruments?  She explained the specific condition and terms of the September product 
such as “a minimum of €0.5m per month and a maximum of €1m per month”.  This shows 
her recommendation was related with a particular transaction of a financial instrument.   
3. Test 3: Is the recommendation as least one of a) presented as suitable or b) based on a 
consideration of the person’s circumstances?  She pointed out that ‘The basis for the trade 
is to provide an enhancement to your existing hedge and to run in conjunction with it.’  
This statement expressed that the new product was “suitable” to Titan’s ‘existing hedge’ 
products.  She also said that ‘The idea below gives you the opportunity to outperform the 
spot and forward rates for your expected EUR requirement.’  This shows that her 
recommendation was based on her knowledge on Titan’s ‘expected EUR requirement’, the 
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client’s circumstances.  In addition, Titan had had a business relationship with the Bank for 
ten years already at that time.  From the view of business practice, it can be expected that 
a bank with a business relationship of 10 years with a consumer514 would suggest a 
financial product based on good knowledge and consideration of its client’s financial 
circumstances and objectives.515   
4. Test 4: Is the recommendation issued otherwise than exclusively through distribution 
channels or to the public?  This e-mail was sent to the Titan’s financial controller’s personal 
e-mail account, so the recommendations meets this test.   
5. Test 5: Is the recommendation made to a person in his capacity as one of an (potential) 
investor or an agent for an (potential) investor?  She recommended the product to the 
Titan’s financial controller who is an agent of an investor. 
The result of the application of these tests is that the Bank’s recommendation of the over-
the-counter derivative to Titan was “advice” from the regulatory perspectives.  This is a 
contrary result to the court’s adjudication that there was no advisory relationship.516  In 
essence, private law recognizes contract-based advisory relationship while regulation seeks 
‘de-facto’ reality-based advisory relationship.   
Duties in transacting a product  
                                                          
514 Titan started currency transactions with the Bank since 1997. 
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The above part has compared different criteria in determining whether there is advisory 
relationship.  This part will take a look at the different duties of financial institutions when 
transacting over-the-counter derivatives with consumers.  Private law puts as heavy duties 
on a financial advisor as regulation does.517  But as standard contract forms disclaim 
advisory service, it is rare for a financial institution to have the status of advisor in over-
the-counter derivatives transactions as seen Chapter IV.518  When there is no advisory 
relationship, private law acknowledges a ‘low level duty of care’ of financial institutions in 
transactions of over-the-counter derivatives with consumers.519  Considering the effect of 
contractual terms disclaiming advisory service, a ‘low level duty of care’ is the “usual” 
requirement in private law.  This duty includes ‘not to make a negligent misstatement’ and 
‘to use reasonable care not to recommend a highly risky investment’ without warning 
about the risks.520 
On the other hand, regulation requires ‘suitability’521 within provision of advisory service 
and ‘appropriateness’522 during an execution-only service.  Under the suitability rule of the 
COBS, an investment advice should 1)meet the client’s investment objectives, 2) be such 
that the client is able to financially bear the investment risk, and 3) be such that the client 
has the necessary experience and knowledge in order to understand the investment risk.523  
The suitability rule demands the financial institution to ‘know your clients’ first and then 
to provide proper advice in line with its knowledge of the client, and this rule is absolutely 
beyond the ‘low level duty of care’ in private law.  Even with the execution-only service, 
                                                          
517 See n374 
518 See table1 
519 See n392  
520 See n392 
521 FCA Handbook, COBS Chapter 9 
522 FCA Handbook, COBS Chapter 10 
523 FCA Handbook, COBS 9.2.2R 
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regulation requires financial institutions to assess ‘appropriateness’ of the transaction 
requested by consumers, by assessing whether the consumer has necessary experience 
and knowledge to understand the risks associated with the transactions.524  Assessing the 
consumer’s experience and knowledge against the risks of the financial product is also out 
with the obligation ‘not to make a negligent misstatement’ or ‘or ‘to use reasonable care 
not to recommend a highly risky investment without warning about the risks’. 
InTitan v The Royal Bank of Scotland,525  the court ruled that there was no breach of a 
duty of care by the Bank.  The next part of the discussion will assess the “suitability” of the 
one of the over-the-counter derivatives recommended to Titan.  Titan was classified as a 
“professional client” under the COBS.  Under the COBS, for a professional client, only the 
objectives of the transaction should be assessed for suitability because the professional 
client’s capability of bearing the risk from the transaction and sufficient experience and 
knowledge about the transaction can be assumed.526  The objectives of Titan to enter into 
the currency swap was to hedge the euro/sterling currency rate risk when it had to sell 
euros earned through sales in continental Europe to buy sterling for the expenses in the 
UK.527  During the telephone conversation in June 2007, Titan’s financial controller made it 
clear to the Bank’s corporate treasury manager that its objective of currency derivatives 
deals was hedge, by saying ‘And, and the one thing I’ve done is to actually protect it, if it 
screws, and I think that’s the main thing really… I know I’m not going to make a load of 
money, but I’m trying to save us from losing a lot of money. I don’t know if you see what 
I mean.’528  The June currency swaps provided Titan with protection from the weakness of 
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euro above the “upper level” currency rate.  Even though the amount (€2.0 million per 
month) it should sell when the euro strengthened below “lower level” was twice to the 
amount (€4.0 million per month) it was protected above the “upper level”, this condition 
was to provide Titan with better terms for protection.  Therefore, the structure of the June 
currency swap was suitable to Titan’s financial objectives, which was to hedge.  The volume 
of the deal was also not beyond the hedge objective.  The amount it should sell was €2~4 
million per month, annually €24~48 million, which was reasonable from the perspective of 
hedging, considering Titan’s annual turnover, €36.5 million.529  It means that even when 
the currency rate moved adversely to Titan in the currency swap (i.e. strengthened euro), 
the euros that Titan earned from its business could offset most of the losses from this 
currency swap.  This was a hedge. 
The September currency swap contained more speculative structures compared with the 
June product.  It would cause loss to Titan when the spot currency rate went down below 
the “upper level” (called “accrual rate” in the September product), whereas the June product 
would cause loss to Titan only when the spot rate went down below the “lower level” 
which was set quite lower than the accrual rate.  Additionally, even when the spot rate 
went up above the “upper level”, the profit of Titan was limited by 10 cents per euro.  In 
essence, the September product was a betting on expectation about the narrow movement 
range of the euro/sterling currency rate.  In spite of this speculative product structure, any 
possible loss from this product could be offset by the strengthened euro that Titan had, 
but only if Titan had enough euro cash flow.  However, Titan already held an exposure of 
24~48 million euros in the June product and its annual euro earning was €36 million, so 
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additional exposure to currency swaps on top of the June product would mean an over-
hedge.530  The Bank’s account manager should have given attention to this over-hedge 
because the consumer’s objective was to hedge.531  Titan’s financial controller also stated 
to the Bank’s manager that he was ‘clearly concerned at the scale of the product’ during 
the telephone conversation before entering into the September product.532  This comment 
shows that he was concerned about the over-hedge created by the September product.  
Considering the speculative feature and over-hedge533, under regulation, the September 
currency swap can be seen unsuitable to Titan whereas the June product seems to be 
suitable. 
In summary, in the case of Titan Steel Wheels Ltd v The Royal Bank of Scotland, private 
law did not accept advisory relationship nor breach of a duty of care of the financial 
institution, whereas under regulation the financial institution provided advisory service and 
breached the “suitability” rule.   
5.1.1.2 Duties in communication 
In terms of communication in the process of over-the-counter derivatives transactions, 
private law and regulation have different standards as well: misrepresentation in private 
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law and ‘fair, clear and not misleading communication’ rule534 in regulation.  The below 
part will compare the two different duties.  
Private law does not see “opinions” as misrepresentations.535  In JP Morgan Chase Bank v 
Springwell Navigation, the claim that the bank misrepresented the state of the Russian 
economy as being strong when it was just before the country’s moratorium was rejected 
by the court because the comment on the Russian economy was just an “opinion” and 
could not constitute misrepresentation. 536   On the contrary, too rosy or unbalanced 
predictions on the market, which were kind of “opinions” of the financial institutions, have 
been penalized by the regulator.  For instance, Chase de Vere Financial Solutions was 
sanctioned because the regulator decided that the promotional materials on its FTSE 100-
connected derivative products asserting that FTSE 100 would perform well without proper 
risk warnings were breach of ‘fair, clear and not misleading communication’ rule. 537  
Santander was also penalized due to its rosy opinions on the equity market related with 
its derivatives-embedded investment product.538    
Factually wrong explanations are also rarely seen as a misrepresentation in private law.  
This is, firstly, because of contractual estoppel from the clauses disclaiming of 
representation such as “no representation” and “no reliance on representation”.539  In 
Peekay Intermark v Australia & New Zealand Banking Group, even though the bank 
explained factually wrong characteristics of the investment product, the contract stating 
that the consumer ‘fully understands the nature of the transaction’ estopped him from 
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asserting misrepresentation.540  Secondly, misrepresentation which actually doesn’t induce 
the claimant to enter into the contract is not actionable.541  In recent litigation related to 
interest rate hedge products, a financial institution’s failure of full explanation about “break 
cost” was not accepted as a misrepresentation in that the court believed that even detailed 
explanation about the break cost would not have changed the consumer’s decision of 
entering into the over-the-counter derivative contract.542    
On the contrary, regulation has much stricter rules on representation.  It does not 
acknowledge the effect of disclaimers in contracts.  The COBS prescribes that financial 
institutions must not ‘exclude or restrict’ or ‘rely on any exclusion or restriction of’ any 
duty or liability it may have to a consumer under the regulatory system.543  Therefore, 
disclaimers excluding liabilities of misrepresentation cannot prevent the regulator from 
sanctioning misleading communications. Secondly, the breach of ‘fair, clear and not 
misleading communication’ rule does not depend on whether the consumer is actually 
induced by the communication.  Even though this communication rule demands 
communication not to mislead but the actual consequence of consumers being misled is 
not a necessary factor for sanction.  For instance, where a financial institution wrongly 
explained that the investment principal of a fund was protected by the Financial Services 
Compensation Scheme, the regulator sanctioned the financial institution without evidence 
that consumers were actually induced to buy the product with that false communication.544  
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Thirdly, the ‘fair, clear and not misleading communication’ rule requires not only to provide 
non-false facts but to provide “suitable” information in a “suitable” way for the consumer.545  
This means that the financial institution should consider what information and what 
communication method is suitable for the consumer.546  The sanction case of Credit Suisse 
International is a good example.  This financial institution promoted that its investment 
product could gain a maximum 50% return, which was theoretically possible and so 
factually not false, but was penalized by the regulator which decided that the highlighting 
of a maximum return, which had a very low probability to be realized, was a misleading 
communication.547  
There is another difference in obligations in checking consumers’ understanding of 
explanations given by financial institutions.  Private law does not impose an obligation on 
the financial institution to ensure that the consumer understands its explanation.548  In 
Crestsign Ltd v National Westminster Bank plc and Royal Bank of Scotland plc, the court 
ruled that the financial institution which transacted a 10 year-maturity interest rate swap 
for a 5 year-maturity loan with a brief factual explanation did not have a duty to ‘take 
adequate steps to ensure the consumer had an adequate understanding of the full 
range’.549  On the contrary, regulation expressly states that financial institutions should 
‘take reasonable steps’ to ensure that their communication is ‘fair, clear and not 
misleading’.550  In terms of interest rate hedge products with the longer maturity than the 
one of the hedged loan, the regulator expressed that financial institutions must ‘determine 
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whether it is reasonable to conclude that the customer could have understood the features 
and risks of the product’ and if otherwise, it was non-compliance of regulation.551  
Another difference between misrepresentation in private law and ‘fair, clear and not 
misleading communication’ rule in regulation is the stance towards omission of explanation.  
In private law, ‘caveat emptor’ is the basic and informing principle and omission of 
explanation, in general, does not constitute misrepresentation.552  For example, in Nextia 
Properties Limited v National Westminster Bank plc and The Royal Bank of Scotland plc, 
the failure to explain about negative mark-to-market value in an interest rate swap was 
not ruled as a misrepresentation in private law.553  On the contrary, the regulator required 
compensation on the loss from an interest rate swap, where the information about its 
negative mark-to-market value was not explained to the consumers.554 
In summary of the above analysis of duties of financial institutions in communication, 
private law imposes the level of obligations of merely not to state false facts, while 
regulation demands financial institutions to try to ensure that consumers understand every 
material features and risks of the transacted product. 
5.1.2 Conduct of business rule v fiduciary duty 
The previous section has shown the different requirements of private law and regulation 
on financial institutions in transactions of over-the-counter derivatives.  It was found that 
obligations on financial institutions in regulation are much more demanding and onerous 
than ones in private law.  While private law puts obligations as a counterparty of an “arm’s 
                                                          
551 Financial Services Authority, ‘Interest Rate Hedging Products Pilot Findings’ (2013) 12-13 
552 See n398 
553 [2013] EWHC 3167; see n418 
554 See n314 
125 
 
length” contract on financial institutions, the regulation demands high level care and loyalty 
to consumers which has similarity to fiduciary duties in private law.  The sections below 
will take a look at the concept of fiduciary duties in private law and then compare it with 
the conduct of business rule in regulation.  This analysis will help to understand the 
dissonance of requirements of private law and regulation.  
5.1.2.1 Fiduciary duty in private law 
Private law defines a fiduciary as ‘someone who has undertaken to act for and on behalf 
of another in a particular matter in circumstances which give rise to a relationship of trust 
and confidence’.555  The fiduciary relationship is characterized with ‘discretion, power to 
act and vulnerability’.556  Fiduciary duties are crafted in private law to protect vulnerable 
principals who the fiduciary has power to act for.557  The core of fiduciary duties is loyalty 
to the principal.558  In detail, the ‘loyalty’ duty requires the fiduciary to ‘act in good faith’; 
‘not to profit out of the trust’; ‘not to place himself in a position where his duty and his 
interest may conflict’; ‘not to act for his benefit or the benefit of a third party without 
consent of the principal’.559  In private law, there are two types of fiduciaries; the first 
category is the one already recognized as fiduciary by their nature of the relationship such 
as trustee and beneficiary; agent and principal; director and company.560 The other one is 
open and fact-based, which means that the fiduciary relationship is decided based on the 
facts and circumstances of the relationship.561  Even though a financial advisor is not an 
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already recognized fiduciary like a trustee, agent or director,562 it is ‘commonplace for the 
courts to find that the advisor has placed himself under fiduciary obligations’.563  For 
instance, in JP Morgan Chase Bank v Springwell the court acknowledged widely ranging 
duties of an advisor.564  
In private law, the fiduciary duty arises only when one person agrees to act for or on behalf 
of another person,565 and the extent of the duties can be modified by the agreement 
between the fiduciary and the principal.566  Therefore, financial institutions tend to try to 
avoid or limit the onerous fiduciary duties through contractual terms of standard forms, 
which are generally accepted by the courts unless there is any dishonesty by the 
fiduciary.567  As a result, it is rare to see financial institutions assume a fiduciary obligation 
or duties as an advisor in the transactions of over-the-counter derivatives.568 
5.1.2.2 Conduct of business rule as fiduciary duty 
The discussion above has considered the concept of fiduciary duties in private law and 
explained why it is difficult to see those duties arise in over-the-counter derivatives 
transactions.  The below part is a comparison of the COBS in regulation with fiduciary 
duties in private law.  Actually one of fundamental concepts of COBS came from fiduciary 
duties in private law.  The conduct of business rule of MiFID, from which the COBS was 
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‘intelligently copied’,569 was announced that it adopted fiduciary duties for enhancing 
investor protection.570 
In detail, the COBS demands that financial institutions act in ‘the best interests of its 
client’.571  This is the highest level requirement of integrity expected of financial institutions, 
which is equivalent to ‘good faith’ of fiduciary duties.572  The ‘fair, clear and not misleading 
communication’ rule is also interpreted as one of fiduciary duties.573  This rule requires the 
financial institutions, on behalf of the consumer, to choose the proper information and the 
proper way to deliver it in order not to mislead the consumer.  The obligation of disclosure 
of all necessary facts for the consumer’s informed decision, which this rule requires, is also 
seen as one of fiduciary duties.574    
The COBS demands that financial institutions provide consumers with the information on 
fees charged575 and prohibits financial institutions from receiving any fee or non-monetary 
benefits from third parties related with services carried on for the consumer576.  These rules 
related with fees are similar to ‘not to profit out of the trust’ and ‘not to act for his benefit 
or the benefit of a third party without consent of the principal’ of fiduciary duties.577  The 
suitability rule requires financial institutions first to understand investment objectives and 
circumstances of the consumer and then provide advice which fits with the consumer.  This 
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rule is not inconsistent578 with the concept of fiduciary duties in that it puts a much higher 
obligation on financial institutions than ‘caveat emptor’ in private law, which allows them 
to leave it to consumers to evaluate the characteristics and risks of financial products.579  
In addition, the financial institution should stop providing advisory services to the client if 
it cannot assess the suitability due to insufficient information about the consumer.580  This 
requires the financial institution to place the interests of consumers first to its own profit, 
which is also similar to fiduciary duties. 
While the COBS shares common characteristics with fiduciary duties of private law, there 
are some critical differences.  The previous section already explained that fiduciary duties 
in private law arise only when a person undertakes the role of a fiduciary and the extent 
of the duties can be modified by contracts.581  However, the obligations of the COBS take 
effect without the explicit undertaking of those duties and they cannot be modified or 
limited by contractual terms.  The COBS expressly stipulates that financial institutions 
should not seek to exclude or rely on any exclusion of obligations under the regulatory 
system,582 and the regulator, for instance, announced that the disclaimer of advisory service 
had no effect on its regulatory actions.583  The COBS does not accept any relaxation of 
obligations on financial institutions or reallocation of right and duties based on what the 
contract may represent as being “agreed” between financial institutions and consumers.   
                                                          
578 Cheryl Goss Weiss, ‘Review of the Historic Foundations of Brokre-Dealer Liability for Breach of Fiduciary 
Duty’ (1997) J. Corp. L. 23, 65, 99 
579 Alaistar Hudson, THE LAW OF FINANCE (n 90) para 3.11 
580 FCA Handbook, COBS 9.2.6R 
581 See n565, n566 
582 FCA Handbook, COBS 2.1.2R 
583 See n510 
129 
 
Then, what has led the fiduciary duties which already existed in private law to be written 
in regulation?  Johannes Köndgen suggested two answers: the first is that moving duties 
of contractual origins to public law obligations can ‘ensure that rules of conduct become 
immune against any attempt to contract them out’; the second answer is that the legislator 
was suspicious of consumers’ capability to recognize breach of duties by financial 
institutions and to take private law actions, even after recognizing the breach, due to 
burden of proof or financial risk in their litigation.584       
 
5.1.3 Different approach to causation 
Above section 5.1.1 examined the different duties imposed by private law and regulation 
on transactions of over-the-counter derivatives.  When any breach of duties is found, the 
next stage in both institutions is compensating the damages caused by the breach.  A 
compensation order, whether by the court or the regulator, needs assessment of causation 
between the breach of duties by financial institutions and the loss of consumers, which is 
the reasoning of whether the breach has indeed caused the loss.  This section will compare 
the approaches taken by private law and regulation to causation in cases of the alleged 
“mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives.   
5.1.3.1 “Precise” causation of private law 
A causation test in private law is the process of ‘allocating responsibilities for harm’.585  
Every case in tort law has a sharp bipolar relationship between litigating parties, where a 
compensation for the claimant means a liability for the defendant and so tort law is focused 
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on ‘corrective justice’.586  Therefore, private law tries to find the “precise” answer to the 
question, “Did the financial institution’s breach actually cause the loss of the consumer?”587  
It endeavours to find what exactly happened “due to” the breach.  In order to reach the 
“precise” causation result, a “factual causation” test and a “legal causation” test are applied 
to the case.588     
Rubenstein v HSBC Bank shows the focus of the court on finding a “precise” causation.  
The trial court reasoned, after accepting that the financial institution’s recommendation of 
a fund with a limited risk of loss to the consumer who wanted a product without any risk 
of principal loss was unsuitable, that “but for” the unsuitable advice the consumer would 
not have invested in the fund.589  To reach this conclusion about the factual causation, the 
trial court dived deep into a pile of communication records including telephone 
conversations and e-mails between the two parties before the transaction.590  Through this 
thorough examination of communication records, the court was convinced of the 
consumer’s reliance on the representative of the financial institution and accepted the 
“factual causation”.  Then for the legal causation test, the court heard witnesses of experts 
about relationship between the loss of the fund and the characteristics of the fund and 
the global financial crisis.591  Based on these witnesses and its own analysis of the financial 
market during the crisis, the court denied the “legal causation” in that the loss from the 
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recommended fund was due to the financial crisis in 2008 and was not foreseeable at the 
time of giving advice.592   
However, the appeal court suggested a different opinion as to the causation in this case, 
stating that:  
It is said that a section 150 claim [the predecessor of section 138D of FSMA 
2000, which entitles a statutory right of action for regulatory breach] is 
subject to identical principles relating to causation, foreseeability and/or 
remoteness of damage as may apply in contract or tort, and the judge 
generally made no distinction between any of Mr.Rubenstein’s three causes 
of action for these purposes, or for the purposes of his finding of negligence. 
However, whereas the underlying principles may be the same, they may 
operate in different ways, seeing that the purpose of a statutory rule may be 
more focussed than the general law of tort or contract is likely to be.593 
 
This suggestion that causation test, especially related with breach of regulation, should 
consider the purpose of regulation is quite a new perspective in private law but 
paradoxically shows the fact that the courts have adhered to “precise” causation.  Actually, 
albeit this new suggestion about causation, the appeal court held “legal causation” in a 
very “precise” way: the loss was not remote because the financial institution recommended 
a product with “market risk” which the consumer tried to avoid indeed and so the loss was 
foreseeable.594       
The court can be convinced of causality only when both factual and legal causation 
requirements are satisfied.  If the claimant cannot prove the causation factually and legally, 
the court has to assume that the breach did not cause the loss.  For the court, it is not 
permissible as much to hold that the defendant is liable for the losses which he did not 
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cause indeed.595 “Precise” causation thus does not accept the causality unless the claimant 
proves that he would have acted differently without the breach.  In Green & Rowley v 
Royal Bank of Scotland plc, the consumer entered into a 10 year-maturity interest rate 
swap with the bank to hedge interest rate risk of his 5 year-maturity loan.596  The consumer 
was shocked with the break cost being almost 30% of his hedged loan when he tried to 
exit the swap 4 years after entering into the contract.597  The court said that ‘Had they 
been told that the cost could be substantial…, it is far from clear that they would have 
stopped there…’598  Unless the court is persuaded that the claimant evidently would have 
acted differently in the absence of any breach, the causation is not complete.  
5.1.3.2 “Fair” causation of regulation  
FSMA 2000 enables the regulator to use a ‘power to require restitution’599 or establish 
‘consumer redress scheme’600 with the condition that the loss of consumers is a “result” of 
the contravention of financial institutions.  Therefore, the regulator should assess the 
causation as well when it pursues redress for consumers.   
While the court pursues “precise” causation, the regulator can be said to pursue “fair” 
causation.  This does not mean that the regulator’s approach to causation is more “fair” 
than the court’s one but that the regulator seeks to find a “fair” result from the perspective 
of its core objectives in investigating causation.  In the case of interest rate hedge products, 
the regulator reasoned that if there was no breach by financial institutions in the 
transactions of the products, the “average” consumer would have selected a simpler IRHP 
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product such as a cap or a plain swap with the break cost less than 7.5% of nominal 
amount of IRHP.601  The difference in the causation test employed by the regulator from 
the one used by the court is that the regulator assumed its own prospective result (7.5% 
break cost and a simple product) even when circumstances led to the conclusion that the 
consumer would still have bought an IRHP even without the bank’s breach of regulatory 
requirements.  In fact, the answer to the question of “how would the consumer have acted 
if the financial institution had not breached the duties?” is probabilistic in that no one can 
answer with in certainty.602  The regulator pursues a “fair” answer to this challenging 
question, within the range of reasonableness.603 
5.2 Origins of the dissonance 
Above section 5.1 has looked at the dissonance of principles and rules between private 
law and regulation in dealing with the claim of “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives.  
As the next stage, this section will try to find the reasons why there are contrasting 
dissonance in the two institutions.  The first reason is that the functions the society expects 
the two institutions to undertake are different.  The second reason is that even with their 
different functions, the roles of the two institutions are overlapping more and more and 
this results the collision of the different rules of the two institutions.  The next sections will 
examine these reasons.   
5.2.1 Different functions of the two institutions 
5.2.1.1 The function of private law 
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Before starting to discuss the function of private law, it is necessary think about transactions 
and contracts in general.  Since human beings started having production surplus, 
transactions between individuals have existed.604  In an economic perspective, a transaction 
tends to cultivate mutual benefit to the participants.605  If it were not beneficial to both 
parties, the transaction would not be concluded because the party who would suffer loss 
from the transaction would decline to enter into the deal.  Let’s say that a house which 
has £9,500 utility to the current owner has £10,500 utility to someone else.  If they agree 
to transact the house at a price of £10,000, each party gets a £500 utility increase.  Social 
welfare, the aggregate of the utility, can be said to increase by £1,000.  As the resource 
(house) is being used in society by one who can use it with higher utility, the transaction 
results in a more efficient allocation of resource.  Therefore, it can be deduced that, without 
transaction costs, economic resources will be transacted eventually to reach the person for 
whom the value of the resource is the largest in society and so, it is argued, an overall 
increase of transactional activity means improvement of social welfare.606  
Transactions are usually carried out by contracts in the modern market economy,607 and 
contracting incurs transaction costs in negotiating, formulating and enforcing contracts.  
Private law plays a facilitative role for contracting by enabling transactions to happen with 
minimal costs and by enforcing contracts.608  Contract law is said to have functions of 
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rendering “doing transactions” efficient by reducing contracting costs609 in negotiating and 
formulating contracts by providing implied terms 610  and common vocabularies 611  for 
contracting, without which contracting parties should spend quite large amount of time 
and energy in defining “vocabularies” and negotiating terms for all contingencies.612   
Contract law is also the last resort for enforcing contracts.  Enforcement is a critical factor 
in facilitating contracting because it convinces parties to enter into contracts by ensuring 
that the obligations in the contracts be completed.613  Incentives of maintaining reputation 
aids self-policing and enforcement by contracting parties but the extent of this is limited 
because reputational capital is finite.614  One commentator called this enforcement function 
of private law as ‘containing opportunism in non-simultaneous exchanges’.615   
Without a compulsory mechanism to enforce contracts and institutions to reduce 
transaction costs in contracting, contracting will be deterred and levels of welfare could 
stagnate at individual and social level.  Private law is needed to provide an institutional 
supportive role for facilitating transactions and to minimize the intervention on 
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contracting.616  Posner explained this aspect of private law by saying that private law is 
concerned with “efficiency”.617 
In law of contract, freedom of contract is a fundamental principle for its facilitative role for 
contracting.618  Freedom of contract is the ‘freedom of choice’ with respect to both 
contracting counterparties and contracting terms.619  This principle is based not only on 
the philosophical value of ‘individual autonomy’ but also the belief that each individual 
would act in his best interest and always seek to increase his welfare.620  In the previous 
house transaction example, the seller and buyer can maximize their utility by freely 
agreeing on any terms such as guarantee for fixing defects, apportioning costs and 
payments, etc.  That is the reason why private law allows individuals freedom to contract 
what they need and ensures, once agreements are concluded, that they are to be kept 
(‘pacta sunt servanda’).621 
It is also argued that caveat emptor is a principle whereby efficiency is enhanced through 
encouraging production of information in society.  In its nature, information is expensive 
to make but cheap to deliver.  If contracting parties are not allowed to make a profit by 
keeping to themselves information they make or have, they are not motivated to make 
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information.622  And this can result in information production below the optimal level for 
a society.623 
When looking back at the cases of over-the-counter derivatives, one of the most important 
things to the court was the contractual terms.624  As an enforcer of contracts, the court 
should enforce the contractual terms, in general.  In consequence, the court has to uphold 
the contractual terms which deny provision of any advice or representation about over-
the-counter derivatives regardless of the pre-contractual negotiations, because the 
contractual terms are the “efficient” result of negotiation about risk allocation between 
independent parties.  Under the principle of “caveat emptor”, the liability of financial 
institutions from omitting to explain facts or features of over-the-counter derivatives is not 
upheld.     
Here, it is necessary to point out one of the features of private law, the ‘generality’, which 
allows private law to encompass most transactions in a vast array of areas. 625  This 
generality permits the court to deal with most transactions in its system.626  The generality 
also provides contracting parties with the freedom of contract because they can adjust 
their contracts to their specific needs rather than adapt their transactions to the legal 
framework.627    While generality empowers private law with expandability, it restrains, on 
the other hand, private law from differentiating itself in market failures described below.628  
The court is bound to sustain the consistency in its adjudications through time and across 
                                                          
622 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (n 609) 111 
623 Ibid 
624 See n375 
625 Hugh Collins, REGULATING CONTRACTS (Oxford, 1999) 46 
626 Ibid 
627 Ibid 47 
628 Ibid 
138 
 
jurisdictions to maintain doctrinal stability.629  Private law cannot make special provision 
other than its generally applicable principles just for a certain area such as financial 
products transactions.   
There are some prerequisites in order to be able to say that transactions enhance welfare 
of individuals and whole society.  The first one is adequate information.630   This means 
that individuals should hold or be able to obtain necessary information to understand what 
the best choice is for him.  If he does not have enough information about a transaction, 
he can do a transaction which decreases his welfare.  The second prerequisite is that the 
contracting party should be rational, which means he acts in his best interest.631  Even 
though the contracting party has sufficient information, he can do a contract or transaction 
that can decrease his welfare as well if he has bounded rationality in processing the 
information. 632  This issue will be discussed in the next section. 
5.2.1.2 The function of regulation 
(1) Market failures 
The previous section shows that private law facilitates transactions, which enable 
individuals to seek their best interest and welfare and as a result improve the overall level 
of social welfare.  But the proposition that individual and social welfare is improved by 
transactions is based on the assumption that participants in the market have enough 
information about the transactions and are rational enough to act in their best interests.  
If these conditions are not fulfilled, freedom of contract cannot guarantee welfare 
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improvement through transactions but can sometimes rather deteriorate welfare.633  With 
respect to the previous example of a house transaction, if the purchaser is not aware of 
defects of the house such as ground subsidence (information defects) or if he buys the 
house with an unrealistic expectation of price increase in near future like some US subprime 
mortgagors prior to the market meltdown (bounded rationality), the transaction of the 
house would decrease the purchaser’s welfare.  The following parts will examine market 
failures such as information defects and bounded rationality in the financial services market. 
Information defects 
When consumers undertake financial transactions, they need ‘multi-dimensional’ 
information and knowledge about the products and the related market.634  For example, 
when entering into an interest rate hedge contract, the consumer needs to decide the 
various conditions such as the product type, maturity, right of early exit, etc.  This decision 
process requires him to synthetize and take account of his financial situation, the product 
features and the future market expectation.635   Then there has to be a consideration about 
whether the characteristics of the product fit well with the expected future market 
movement and his financial situation.  In sum, the decision of whether to execute a financial 
transaction, especially complex ones, requires substantial level of expertise, knowledge and 
the ability to integrate many different kinds of information.    
Obtaining necessary information and knowledge is not usually impossible but costly.636  
The information searching process costs consumers plenty of time and effort.  For instance, 
consumers may find it very difficult to quote contract conditions for currency over-the-
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counter derivatives from a bank without previous relationship.637  The high search cost may 
make customers give up looking for alternative information providers or products.  
Empirical research on retail consumers in the EU member states showed that only 33% of 
investors who made investment in financial products compared with products of other 
providers or different products of the same provider.638  This shows that consumers are 
likely to be dependent on the financial institution.639  In addition, a consumer’s dependency 
on the financial institution impose a high cost on him when provider-switching happens 
because he has to abandon the cost that has been invested to build up relationship with 
the previous provider.640  Oral or written explanations by representatives of financial 
institutions would be the main source of information for product features.641  Consumers’ 
expectation about market movement can be heavily influenced by the opinions of the 
representatives of financial institutions.642  In transactions of over-the-counter derivatives, 
even large corporate clients would substantially rely on the explanation by the financial 
institution about the product features because over-the-counter derivatives are designed 
by the financial institution.643  Information asymmetry and the consumer’s reliance on the 
financial institution for necessary information serve as practical barriers for consumers to 
find the best products satisfying their needs.  
Bounded rationality    
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It is now broadly accepted that people do not always make rational decisions.644  Since 
behavioural economics research emerged, much theoretical and empirical research has 
been conducted which supports this.  In essence, behavioural economics posits that human 
beings have two thinking systems, intuition and reasoning, and that people use intuition 
for the questions requiring reasoning.645  This lies at the heart of what economists term 
‘bounded rationality’. 
Research has also found investors’ bounded rationality in their decisions on financial 
transactions.646  Bounded rationality of consumers can affect their decision on financial 
transactions in the following ways: many financial products are inherently complex for 
ordinary people, which make them simplify their investment decisions with errors; while 
decisions of buying financial products need assessment of risk and uncertainty, people 
tend to use intuition in assessing; many financial products are credence products which 
are products or services whose value and quality cannot be assessed even after its use, 
and so it is difficult to learn from mistakes.647    
Among types of bounded rationality found when consumers make financial transactions, 
at the stage of deciding preferences, they show the ‘presence bias’ which is the attitude 
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of overvaluing the present over the future.648  In the recent interest rate hedging products 
scandal, it was observed that many consumers preferred a swap without an up-front fee 
to a collar with up-front fee without assessing the risk profile of each product.649  At the 
stage of decision-making, they are vulnerable to influences from advisers or 
salespersons.650  They show a tendency to give trust to the salesperson based on his likable 
traits not on objective information such as historic performance data or economic incentive 
structure.651  They are also biased by over-confidence that their investment will perform 
well without rational reasons.652  In summary, behavioural research in financial services 
industry shows that consumers make errors in the process of making investment decisions 
systematically due to their bounded rationality.  
Summary 
Above parts showed that information defects and bounded rationality undermines the 
preposition that consumers can increase their welfare through financial transactions.  
Private law as a facilitator of transactions, however, has structural weaknesses to adequately 
intervene in market failures.653  Posner pointed out that market failures are also the failures 
of common law.654   
Firstly, the principles for facilitation of private law set limits to ameliorate market failures.655  
For instance, ‘caveat emptor’ which put the responsibility of realizing the risk of the 
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transaction on the consumer cannot solve the information asymmetry.  In terms of 
bounded rationality, private law implicitly, if not explicitly, has the principle of ‘equality and 
equivalence between individuals’ and so cannot give ‘favourable treatment’ to 
consumers. 656   Secondly, the limitations of private law come from high legal costs 
associated with its use.657  High litigation expense coupled with the uncertainty of the 
adjudication has deterred consumers from pursuing compensation by private law.658  For 
instance, a litigation cost of £700K to a SME which suffered a loss of £3.5 million from 
IRHPs would be beyond financial capability of majority SMEs.659  
 
(2) Function of regulation 
 
Regulation is a political response to market failures and to the limited capability of private 
law to address the failures.660  To counter information asymmetry between consumers and 
financial institutions, regulation requires financial institutions to provide all appropriate 
information for consumers to make investment decisions on an informed basis661 and to 
communicate in fair, clear and not misleading way662.   In order to counter consumers’ 
bounded rationality, the suitability rule was adopted.  This rule requires financial advisers 
to know the client and then recommend only suitable products to them.663  Furthermore, 
when providing service on an execution basis without any advice, financial institutions 
should assess whether the consumers’ knowledge and experience is appropriate to 
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understand the risks of products demanded.664  The suitability rule and appropriateness 
rule can be said to protect consumers from their errors caused by their bounded rationality.  
In the end, regulatory duties as onerous as the fiduciary duties in private law are imposed 
on financial institution.665  In summary, the different responses to market failures has made 
the dissonance of standards between the two institutions.  
 (3) Motivation of regulation 
The above section examined the function regulation undertakes for consumer protection 
in the financial services market.  This section will consider what is the motivation of 
promulgating regulation.  Ostensibly, regulation makers justify adoption of a new 
regulatory rule by explaining that it is necessary for public interest.666  This is in line with 
the cost-benefit analysis the FSMA 2000 requires the regulator to undertake when 
introducing a new regulatory rule.667  However, this is the story on the surface.  The debate 
on the motivation of making regulation has continued for decades.  One side has claimed 
that regulation is made for the general good (‘public interest theory’) and the other side 
has claimed that it just comes from the intention of some groups to use the government 
power for their advantage (‘private interest theory’).  The below parts will examine the two 
theories and show implications related with the dissonance between private law and 
regulation.   
Regulation for public interest  
Public interest theory explains that regulation is demanded and promulgated for public 
interest which the market system including private law cannot protect from market 
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failures.668  It asserts that regulatory intervention is necessary to protect public interest 
from market failures.669  This theory explains that regulation increases social welfare by 
correcting market failures and so represents the ‘public interest’.670  Market failures can 
range from monopoly, externalities and information defects including bounded rationality 
in processing information.671  This theory underlies the rationales offered by legislators or 
regulators when they propose and justify introducing new forms of regulation.672   
However, ‘public interest’ theory has a problem in that it offers no explanation about how 
“public interest” is perceived by legislators and moulded into regulation.673  There is no 
link guaranteeing that legislators will pursue the regulation maximizing social welfare; a 
voting system through which individual preference is determined cannot ensure the ‘public 
interest’ is achieved because the policy that majority of voters vote for may put more cost 
on the remaining minority compared with the benefit the majority will gain,674  while 
welfare maximization is possible by individual transactions in the market system.675     
Regulation for private interest  
Private interest theory assumes that individuals or groups pursue regulation as a way for 
maximizing their private interest.676  The basic idea of the theory is that regulation is a 
product made by regulators (politicians or bureaucrats of regulatory agency) for those who 
                                                          
668 Anthony I.Ogus, Regulation: Legal Form and Economic Theory (n 604) 29 
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can benefit from the regulation. 677   Private interest groups such as industries or 
occupations with different voting or financial capability to mobilize political power enter 
into the ‘political market’ to gain benefit from regulation.678  The regulators, suppliers of 
the regulation, demand in exchange for beneficial regulation the political support for them 
to stay in their office.679 
Implication 
The question of whether regulation in the financial services industry is for “public interest” 
or “private interest” is a complex and multi-facet one and is beyond this thesis.  But the 
theories of regulatory motivations give an implication.  According to the two competing 
theories, regulation is produced to provide for the interests of people, whether they are 
the general public or private groups, which cannot be secured without regulation.  This 
means that interests which regulation intends to protect cannot be protected by private 
law and that’s why regulation is promulgated.  Therefore, these theories show that 
regulation cannot help but have a degree of dissonance with private law.   
5.2.2 Overlapping roles of the two institutions 
The above section 5.2.1 examined the different functions of private law and regulation and 
found that regulation intends to provide interests, which cannot be protected by private 
law.  The different functions of the two institutions cause the dissonance in their principles 
and rules, as seen in section 5.1.  However, if the territories of the two institutions are 
completely separate, the dissonance will not be revealed distinctly.  Overlapping roles of 
the two institutions is a recent one caused by financial regulation expanding its roles.  The 
                                                          
677 George J. Stigler, The citizen and the state: Essays on regulation (Vol. 834. Chicago: University of Chicago 
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expanding role of financial regulation can be explained as a part of the great tide of ‘the 
rise of the regulatory state’, which commenced from 1980s when Britain started 
restructuring its economy after economic crises in 1960s and 1970s.680  In terms of financial 
regulation, it transformed self-regulation by elite “clubs” of financial institutions to 
statutory regulation in 1986 by FSA1986 enactment.681  Under self-regulation, regulatory 
action was informal and non-legal such as adverse publicity and exclusion from the 
membership of the “club”.682  Thus, self-regulation did not have many chances to collide 
with private law.  However, as a single statutory authority appeared and financial regulation 
stretched its reach from informal and non-legal controls to formal and legal enforcement 
through FSA 1986, FSMA 2000 and the COBS intelligently copied from MiFID, the 
contradicting aspects between the two institutions have been revealed.   
In addition, the powers conferred on the regulator have also been expanded.  Historically 
in Britain, there have been separate roles between private law and regulation: private law 
focused on compensation and regulation focused on deterrence.683  But in the ‘rise of the 
regulatory state’, regulation has evolved from its original aim of remedying a specific 
market failure to regulating ‘social’ risk which can affect ‘whole populations’.684  This 
ambitious aim created many large bureaucratic regulatory agencies,685 which in turn made 
the government keen to improve the effectiveness of regulation enforcement.  Based on 
the initiatives of the government, many researches were conducted and proposals made 
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to increase the effectiveness of regulation.686  Among them, a report in 2006 by Professor 
Macrory to the government for reforming regulatory sanction included “restoring harm 
caused by regulatory non-compliance” as one of its Six Penalties Principles.687  With this 
report adopted, many regulators other than the financial regulator were given a right to 
request compensation orders to the court,688  even though in financial services industry, 
the boundary of separated roles already had begun to be diluted when the Gower report689 
proposed effective enforcement of regulation that the power to proceed consumer 
compensation of loss resulted from regulatory breach of financial institutions should be 
given to the financial regulator690 and even consumers691, which was adopted by the FSA 
1986.  
As seen above, the commencement of regulatory compensation was for effective 
enforcement of regulation and still the FCA officially states that the main purpose of 
regulatory compensation is ‘credible deterrence’, i.e. effective enforcement.692  However, in 
the real world, compensation is not just a device to improve effectiveness of regulatory 
enforcement but is one of the major independent roles of financial regulator.  The below 
comments the FSA shows well the society’s expectation of its proactive role for 
compensation: 
Our experience is that members of the public and Parliamentarians have been 
of the view that - as a matter of public policy – the breach of the FSA’s rules 
should in all cases entail the consumer receiving 100% redress. However, the 
                                                          
686 See eg Better Regulation Task Force, Principles of good regulation (1998); see Philip Hampton, Reducing 
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FCA’s ability to ensure that consumers receive redress is constrained by the 
general law… If society expects as a matter of public policy that the regulator 
should be in a position to require greater levels of redress to be paid then the 
FCA needs to be given a clear mandate and powers to do so in the new 
legislation. This is a difficult issue that gives rise to real questions as to how far 
the regulator’s powers should extend and we would very much welcome the 
Committee debating this matter, in particular to achieve further clarity as to the 
FCA’s mandate in this area.693  
 
For example, the financial regulator has demanded the financial institutions to make 
compensation to its consumers suffered by their regulatory breach by lowering the 
sanction level in consideration of compensation.694  In the IRHPs scandal, the regulator 
organized a sales practice review of IRHPs, stating that the core purpose of the review was 
to pay ‘fair and reasonable redress to customers where appropriate’.  In the IRHPs scandal, 
what parliament695 and an interest group696 demanded of the regulator the most was fair 
regulatory compensation.  Difficult accessibility to private law system is one cause of this 
demand.697  So a simple dichotomy separating regulation for deterrence and private law 
for compensation is not true anymore.698  Regulation with dissonant standards with private 
law gets involved in “compensation” which has been supposed to be the role of private 
law.699    
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Lastly, another reason for overlapping roles between private law and regulation is the 
European Union’s regulation-oriented policy.  Majone explained that the European 
Commission, with limited bureaucracy and budget, chose regulation as a device for 
pursuing its policy goals efficiently.700  The Commission promulgates general regulatory 
framework and standards and imposes the duty of enforcing the regulation on each 
member state.701 MiFID was also implemented as a regulation, the COBS, in the UK.702  
Regulatory rules for consumer protection of MiFID and the COBS such as suitability rule 
deal with the contractual relationship between financial institutions and consumers and 
allocate rights and obligations in the relationship, all of which traditionally used to be the 
role of private law.703  Regulation resulted in regulating contractual relationship which is 
the major role of private law.704  P.O. Mülbert has described this phenomenon as a ‘partial 
eclipse of contract law’.705   
Regulation, however, does not set out to override rules of private law.706  FSMA 2000 
expresses that contravention of regulatory rules does not make a contract void or 
unenforceable.707  Regulation, while pursuing its objective of consumer protection, tries to 
confine its impact to only what is necessary to achieve its objectives in order not to intrude 
into the territory of private law.  This stance was well illustrated by the opinion HM Treasury 
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and the FSA presented as to the question ‘What is your opinion on introducing a principle 
of civil liability applicable to investment firms’ in the process of MiFID review: 
In  introducing  a  principle  of  civil  liability  we  think  that  it  is  necessary  
to  be  careful  about disturbing existing legal systems.  We think that it would 
be better to require Member States to impose liability on investment firms for 
which they are the Home Member State than to attempt to impose a 
harmonised standard of liability.  It would be difficult to achieve agreement 
on the latter and the end result could work awkwardly in some jurisdictions.  
We  also  believe  that  careful  consideration  needs  to  be  given  to  scope  
of  a  principle  of  civil liability.  In  the  UK the principle has  more  or  less  
been  restricted  to  investment  firms’ dealings with natural persons.  This 
has reflected an effort to strike a balance between investor protection and 
the legal risk of providing investment services.708 
 
In other words, the government tries to enhance consumer protection in the financial 
services market failures by regulation but intends to refrain it from expanding too much 
into the sphere of private law.  Confining regulation in the public sphere is one of the 
reasons why the dissonance of requirements between private law and regulation continues.  
Conclusion 
This chapter has compared principles and rules applied by private law and regulation in 
transactions of over-the-counter derivatives between financial institutions and consumers 
and found clear cases of dissonance between private law and regulation.  It is found that 
regulation requires a higher level of loyalty and care of financial institutions with regards 
to consumers than private law.  The requirements of regulation are similar to fiduciary 
duties in private law.  Financial institutions tend to avoid a fiduciary relationship with their 
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consumers in private law, due to the onerous obligation and so prepare the standard forms 
of contract to contract the obligations out.  However, obligations of regulation, which have 
originality from fiduciary duties of private law, cannot be modified by contract.  Therefore, 
one of the reasons for the dissonance in requirements between the two institutions is 
fiduciary duties of financial institutions, which are imposed mandatorily in regulation but 
are excluded by contractual terms in private law. 
In causation test for deciding compensation, there was also dissonance found between the 
two institutions.  Private law focuses on finding the “precise” factor that caused the loss.  
It tries to rule out other factors such as policy goals in deciding causation.  On the contrary, 
regulation pursues a “fair” result in causation in the boundary of the reasonableness 
allowed.  In essence, through causation test, private law pursues “corrective justice” while 
regulation does “distributive justice”.709  
The reasons of the dissonance in principles and rules of the two institutions can be found 
in their different functions undertaken.  Their different functions can be explained based 
on the market system.  The market system is based on the assumption that transactions 
will improve the welfare of both transacting parties.  The overarching function of private 
law is to facilitate contracting which is a major type of transaction in modern society.  As 
a facilitator of the market system, private law’s role is to reduce transaction costs such as 
costs of negotiating, formulating and enforcing contracts.  Many principles in private law 
such as “contract of freedom”, “pacta sunt servanda “ and “caveat emptor” originated from 
the contract-facilitating function.  
                                                          
709 Ernest J. Weinrib, Corrective justice (OUP Oxford 2012) para 15-16 
153 
 
However, market failures undermine the assumption that a transaction improves welfare 
of transacting parties.  Among market failures, information defects and bounded rationality 
of consumers are found in financial products transactions.  The function of regulation is 
correcting the market failures and private law failures710 of remedying market failures.  For 
protection of consumers with information defect and bounded rationality, which are not 
addressed by private law, conduct of business rules in regulation adopted fiduciary duties 
of financial institutions, the extent of which cannot be modified by contracts.   
The dissonance is revealed more clearly as the roles of the two institutions overlap.  In the 
huge flow of the “rise of regulatory state”, regulation has become official and legal and 
expanded its roles into compensation which is a major role of private law.  Thus, different 
principles and rules of private law and regulation are applied to the same issue and create 
different results. 
With the understanding of dissonance and its reasons, the next Chapter will discuss what 
should be done about the dissonance. 
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VI. COMPLEMENTARY INTERPLAY BETWEEN PRIVATE LAW AND 
REGULATION 
 
Introduction 
 
The previous Chapter has showed that there is dissonance in standards between private 
law and regulation and has examined the origins of this dissonance.  In this Chapter, 
consideration will be given to the manner in which the two institutions operate: are they 
complements or alternatives?  It has already been explained that the traditional perspective 
of separating regulation’s role as a deterrence mechanism and private law’s as primarily a 
compensatory mechanism is no longer appropriate and the roles of deterrence and 
compensation belong to both institutions.711  
What can be implied from the fact that both institutions have similar functions is that there 
is potential to complement each other to improve the effectiveness of their functions. 712  
However, similar functions do not guarantee complementarity; it can rather be counter-
effective.  So this Chapter, firstly, will examine whether there is complementarity between 
the functions of the two institutions. 
Secondly, the Chapter will discuss the current situation of how private law and regulation 
interact with each other within the financial services sector.  It will consider the effectiveness 
of legislative attempts to reinforce complementary interplay between the two institutions.  
Then it will identify the causes hindering harmonized interplay between the two institutions 
and finally, will explore and suggest remedies for addressing those causes.   
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6.1 Complementarity between private law and regulation 
This section will examine whether there is complementarity between private law and 
regulation.  As having complementarity means that the weaknesses of one institution is 
supplemented by the other, this section will consider the strengths and weaknesses of 
each institution to understand whether complementarity exists.     
For a thorough comparison of the strengths and weaknesses of the two institutions, it can 
be said that any ‘regulatory system’ including private law and statutory regulation consists 
of three sub-processes: standard-setting, monitoring and enforcement and intervention.713  
The following discussion provides a comparative analysis of the strengths and weaknesses 
of private law and regulation with respect to these three sub-processes. 
6.1.1 Standard setting 
Legal standards can generally be classified into three types: specification standards, 
performance standards and target standards. 714   Specification standards specify the 
conduct that the regulated entities should follow, performance standards describe the 
outcome of the regulated activities and target standards state the regulatory goal.715  The 
type of standards provides a starting point for comparing private law and regulation in 
relation to standard setting.   
The standards in private law are most comparable to target standards.716  Private law does 
not express pre-defined standards.717 Instead, its principles are demonstrated through  
cases in the courts,718  where a set of general principles are applied to the different, specific 
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circumstances of each case by judges.719  The generality of private law allows a more 
innovative legal framework for transactions to be developed at the discretion of the 
contracting parties.720   
However, as Collins argues, this generality can be a weakness as well because it inevitably 
creates ambiguity.721  Nobody can anticipate exactly how the court will apply the general 
principles to specific cases.722   Such characteristics render it difficult for parties to be 
certain about the requirements of private law in advance.  Indeterminacy of its 
requirements creates, to some extent, undesirable uncertainty.723  
Another weakness in relation to the standard setting of private law is that it is not based 
on risk-benefit analysis.724  When an activity is regulated, it is necessary to analyse the risks 
and benefits of that activity and the trade-offs resulting from the standard.725 However, 
private law is not structured to be able to do this726; it does not consider, in litigation, the 
interests of affected third parties;727 it lacks capability to gather necessary information 
about the effect of the standard and to incorporate the information into its reasoning 
process;728 and the judges have less specialized expertise to evaluate the externalities of 
the standard.729   
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Thirdly, when there is considerable inequality of arms between litigants, the standards of 
private law can be ineffective in “regulating” bad behaviours.730  The financial market is a 
key example where an aggrieved consumer will meet in court a financial institution, which 
has enormous financial capability and is thus likely to be better represented.731  The 
standard contract forms for most financial products and services for consumers are good 
examples that represent the inequality of arms.  While financial institutions have legal 
experts to design standard forms through which to transact business to exclude possible 
legal liabilities, consumers are not only incapable of examining the risks of the terms and 
of negotiating change of terms732 but also show the tendency to not even read the contract 
terms in detail by term while trusting733 representatives of financial institution.734    
The final weakness of private law to highlight is that the standard of private law is slow to 
respond to changes in the environment.735  Its slow response to the changing environment 
is closely related to its generality or insufficient particularity.  Differentiation of private law 
for particular areas with fast changing environments may harm private law’s legitimacy.736  
In one aspect, generality can be a strength of private law in that it allows private law to 
embrace vast areas of transactions and even those that are enormously complex and 
innovative. 737   However, in areas where the speed of institutional and technological 
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changes are very fast, generality becomes a distinct shortcoming because the general 
standards of private law have difficulty in keeping in pace with the changes in the specific 
area.738  Financial market is an area where there are rapid developments in services, 
products and processes.739 
Compared to standard setting in private law, regulation has differences.  First of all, 
regulation involves all three types of standards.740  For instance, the COBS has a target 
standard stating that financial institutions should act ‘in accordance with the best interests 
of their clients’741 (a goal), a performance standard requiring that a communication with a 
client should be fair, clear and not misleading742 (an outcome) and a specification standard 
specifying the steps to be taken to assess the suitability of recommendations743 (a way).  
Therefore, regulation is much more descriptive about its intentions and requirements.744 
Secondly, regulation as standards can pursue any wider social good.745  While the standard 
of private law cannot take into account interest of third parties affected, the regulator is 
able and obliged to perform a social cost-benefit analysis and have regard to opinions of 
stakeholders when promulgating a new regulatory requirement.746   The assessment of 
social impact resulting from a new requirement is possible because the regulator is 
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equipped with extensive bureaucratic structures with technical expertise747 to gather and 
process market information related with the standard.748   
However, standard setting in regulation is not free from weaknesses.  Standards can be 
used by regulated entities as a device to gain competitive advantage against other 
competitors or new entrants.749  Standards can also be distorted from the optimal form 
due to the influences of politicians and interest groups.750   
The comparison above highlights complementarities in standard-setting between the two 
institutions.  Uncertainty of private law can be complemented by the specific and clear 
requirements of regulation.  Regulation’s capability of assessing externality can make up 
for the lack of the risk-benefit analysis function of private law.  Private law’s inability to 
take into consideration the inequality of power between parties can be remedied by 
regulation’s proactive role in defining the contractual relationship in a particular sector.751    
6.1.2 Monitoring 
Monitoring is the activity of detecting non-compliance with standards by or on behalf of 
the standard-setter.752  Regulators conduct inspection and audit as typical techniques of 
monitoring.753   They can also monitor through information received from alternative 
dispute resolution bodies, such as the Financial Ombudsman Service.754   
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What the regulator monitors is not limited to misbehaviours from which a detriment has 
already occurred.  It can detect and sanction misbehaviours which have the potential to 
result in detriments.  For instance, the FSA sanctioned financial institutions for failures in 
internal controls without any detriments occurring to consumers. 755   Pre-emptive 
monitoring is an advantage of regulation in that it can correct misbehaviours before 
detriments occur.  Such a proactive approach to monitoring is possible because the 
regulator can monitor, investigate and sanction on its own initiatives without waiting for a 
victim to raise an action.756  
However, there is risk that the monitoring is focused on the areas where the regulator has 
an incentive to monitor based on its own internal or political agenda.757  The problem of 
selective monitoring can be exacerbated by the regulator’s limited resources.758  Hence, 
socially desirable monitoring cannot be conducted if the area which needs monitoring 
does not align with the regulator’s agenda.  For instance, according to the FSA’s self-
evaluation, socially optimal level of regulatory monitoring and intervention, as the FSA 
evaluated itself, was not conducted before the global crisis, when the so-called ‘light touch’ 
approach of the regulator made it reluctant with rigorous oversight on market players.759   
In private law, monitoring is not conducted by an agency (the court) but by those affected 
by the breach of the law.760  The court’s remedy incentivizes them to monitor breaches 
and bring them to the court.  This aspect gives private law an informational advantage in 
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two ways.  Firstly, the person affected by breach is better positioned to detect 
contraventions than the regulator because he is directly affected by the wrongdoing.761  
Secondly, the absence of a central agency’s involvement leaves no room for selective 
monitoring by the agency.762 
However, the cost of litigation hinders effective monitoring because legal costs can be an 
obstacle for party harmed bringing the breach to the court. 763   In such cases, the 
monitoring system of private law does not function.764  Also, monitoring in private law is 
only backward-looking, which means contravention of law can be detected only after the 
harm has taken place.765  
Based on the above, it can be seen that there is also complementarity in monitoring 
between the two institutions.  The limitations of private law monitoring due to its 
backward-looking nature and burdensome costs involved can be supplemented by the ex-
ante and proactive monitoring of regulation.  On the other hand, inadequate monitoring 
in some areas due to the regulator’s selective monitoring and insufficient resources can 
be improved by the wider scope of individual private actors’ monitoring in private law.766      
6.1.3 Enforcement and intervention 
Enforcement and intervention encompass a range of actions in the face of non-compliance 
with standards or emergence of potential risks.767  The regulator has various coercive tools 
for enforcement: public censure, financial penalties, suspending permission, restitution 
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order or cancelling a permission.768  The clearest advantage of regulatory enforcement is 
its proactivity.769  There is no reliance on requests for enforcement from those directed 
affected by regulatory breach or other third parties in order to launch an investigation and 
initiate enforcement or intervention action – this is done at the regulator’s discretion.770  
In deciding whether to take enforcement and intervention action, the regulator will weigh 
the cost against the merit of the action.771  This is made possible by the regulator’s 
sufficient expertise to understand the impact of enforcement or non-enforcement on the 
market.772  Proactivity and the ability to take enforcement and intervention action at its 
discretion enable the regulator to use its resources efficiently in pursuing its objectives. 
The key disadvantage of regulation with respect to enforcement and intervention is that 
the regulator can be vulnerable to external influences.773  External influence can come from 
the regulated entities, political parties and other interest groups.774  The regulator can be 
persuaded consciously or unconsciously by regulated entities to conduct under-
enforcement. 775   Politicians may put pressure on the regulator, regarding politically 
important issues, to achieve the enforcement that they desire.776  As the regulator is 
answerable to parliament, it cannot be free from the pressures of political parties.   
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In private law, the court orders the wrongdoers to compensate those affected by the 
wrongdoing, which functions as the tool of enforcement.777  The biggest advantage of 
private law enforcement is that the court’s decision is more insulated from the influence 
of political parties and interest groups compared to the regulator.778  This advantage is 
substantial in that actions against standard violators tend to involve political risks and so 
enforcers without the capability or willingness to bear the risks cannot take necessary 
actions.779  Landes and Posner explained that even though there were many tools that 
‘political branches’ could use to put pressure on the judiciary such as ‘budget harassment’, 
‘tinkering with the court’s jurisdiction’ and ‘altering the composition of the judiciary’, those 
tools were not exercised frequently because it could damage the perceived independence 
of the judiciary, which would result in the costs to beneficiaries of legislation.780  In addition, 
the sharply contrasting interests between the plaintiff and the defendant781 does not leave 
any space for another third party to intrude in the decision process of the court.782     
However, the enforcement of private law has its disadvantages.  First of all, the access to 
private law is restricted.  In addition to the legal expenses involved,783 the burden of 
proving in court that there was a violation of law and that there is a causal relationship 
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between the violation and the detriment is also an obstacle which makes private law 
difficult to access.784 
Enforcement and intervention is not an exception to the complementarities between the 
two institutions.  The regulator’s vulnerability to external influence can be supplemented 
by the court’s comparatively strong insulation from outside pressure.785  Myopic focus on 
individual cases without considering the externality of its ruling, which is a shortcoming in 
standard setting, is a strength of private law for independent enforcement.  On the other 
hand, the difficulty of accessing private law enforcement can be supplemented by the 
proactive enforcement of regulation.    
6.1.4 Implication 
Private law and regulation are different institutions for controlling activities that have the 
risks of harming in society.786  The strengths and weaknesses of the two institutions as a 
device of “deterrence” and “compensation” have been examined.  As seen in the analysis 
of strengths and weaknesses above, one institution does not dominate and offer innate 
superiority over other in the achievement of their three sub-processes, i.e. standard setting, 
monitoring and enforcement and intervention.  Each institution has its own disadvantages 
which can be complemented by the other.787  This means that, structurally, there could be 
complementary interplay between private law and regulation to achieve social good more 
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effectively. 788   From the perspective of an ‘instrumentalist’, who believes that social 
institutions including private law should exist and be used as an ‘instrument’ for enhancing 
social welfare, the two institutions are well positioned to achieve this together. 789  
Complementary interplay can be an efficient ‘division of labour’ between the two 
institutions, which enables the regulator to focus its limited resources on its comparatively 
advantageous areas.790   
The attempt to coordinate private law and regulation in financial services law has continued 
from firstly the Section 62 of the FSA 1986 to recent Section 138D of the FSMA 2000, 
which provided a statutory “right of action” to some consumers for detriments arising from 
contravention of regulatory rules.791  The next section will examine the current situation of 
the two institutions’ interplay in financial product transactions.  
6.2. Current situation 
6.2.1 Standard setting 
Both private law and regulation have the function of standard setting and they have their 
own standards applied in the cases of “mis-selling” of financial products including over-
the-counter derivatives.  But as it was seen in Chapter V, the standards of the two 
institutions diverge and sometimes conflict with each other.  The dissonance associated 
with standards between the two institutions was mainly due to the difference in the 
functions that they undertake, which have resulted in different standards: private law’s 
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function of facilitating transactions in the market and regulation’s function of remediating 
market failures.792  Even though each institution standards have their own rationale, the 
divergence of the standards causes substantial legal uncertainty: a transaction of over-the-
counter derivatives can be seen as a “mis-selling” under regulation but is not seen as a 
wrongdoing to be compensated under private law.793   
Besides the uncertainty, the dissonance can prevent the market from creating a moral 
norm in the area of financial products transactions, by blurring “the right” and “the wrong”.  
Moral norms are internalized in market participants’ decision process and so are a very 
efficient way to maintain a desirable order with low costs.794  More importantly, any social 
institution cannot successfully achieve its goals ‘without being internalized by the citizens 
and without robust backing of social norms.’795  The dissonance not only hinders the 
creation of a norm but can also create opportunistic attitude in market participants:  
financial institutions focusing on technical approaches to avoid legal or regulatory liability 
rather than making cultural or procedural improvements in its sales practice for better 
consumer protection796 ; consumers looking to more protective regulation when their 
financial products turn sour rather than taking responsibility for their investment 
decisions797. 
6.2.2 Monitoring 
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6.2.2.1 Regulatory monitoring 
The monitoring by regulation takes place both before and after the occurrence of breach 
and this is one of the advantages of regulation over private law.798  The FCA, the current 
financial regulator, engages in both pre-emptive and reactive monitoring and intervention.  
The ‘three pillars’ of supervision that the FCA has announced to achieve its consumer 
protection objectives demonstrates well its approach to monitoring.799  The three pillars 
which consist of ‘firm systematic framework’, ‘event supervision’ and ‘issues and product 
supervision’, involve both pre-emptive and reactive monitoring and intervention, and this 
section will examine the three pillars with a focus on monitoring activities.800   
As a means of pre-emptive monitoring, the FCA periodically examines culture, governance, 
business processes and internal controls of financial institutions to ensure that they run 
their business in the interest of consumers (‘firm systematic framework’), and conducts 
thematic reviews which analyse emerging risks in multiple firms or sectors (‘issues and 
product supervision’).801  The ‘firm systematic framework’ involves a general assessment of 
financial institutions, covering areas such as business strategy, growth rate and profitability, 
and can lead to in-depth examination, if a risk is identified.802  The ‘firm systematic 
framework’ is applied only to a small number of financial institutions selected based on 
the importance of their presence in the market.803  If the risk identified through ‘firm 
systematic framework’ or other intelligence sources has the potential to be widespread in 
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other firms or sectors, the ‘issues and product supervision’ can commence thematic reviews 
over multiple firms or sectors.804   
Periodic on-site review805 is another example of ‘firm systematic framework’, and reviews806 
of a specific product and mystery shopping 807  are examples of ‘issues and product 
supervision’.  The objectives of ‘firm systematic framework’ and ‘issues and product 
supervision’ are pre-emptive monitoring focused on identifying risk factors before 
consumer detriments happen. 
The FCA puts great emphasis on pre-emptive monitoring in that the regulator can detect 
potential risk in advance and can prevent consumer detriments.808  However, pre-emptive 
monitoring cannot capture all the potential risks of consumer detriment809 because the 
FCA just has too many financial institutions (about 26,000) to monitor810  and doesn’t have 
an omniscient ability to anticipate all possible detriment in the future811.  This is why the 
FCA also employs what it describes as ‘event supervision’ as an ex-post or reactive 
monitoring method.812  ‘Event supervision’ is a regulatory action after consumer detriment 
occurs and is focused on ‘the most important issues’ to the regulator’s objectives of 
consumer protection.813  The regulator’s approach to event supervision is proportionate to 
the seriousness and significance of the issue.814  The monitoring system of the FCA is 
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designed not to address any individual complaints which are not “important” individually.  
Instead, it guides consumers to make complaints only to the sellers or the Financial 
Ombudsman Service.815  For instance, in the case of interest rate hedge products which 
had significant social impact, many complaints reached the regulator through consumers’ 
MPs and the media.816  
In summary, the monitoring strategy of the FCA aims to identify the risks of consumer 
detriments as early as possible while using its regulatory resources efficiently.  The balanced 
deployment of ex-ante and ex-post monitoring can be understood as an attempt to 
improve the efficiency of monitoring because the approach of trying to identify all risks 
beforehand is very costly.  Its strategic focus of monitoring on ‘big issues’ is also for 
efficiency.817  As described previously in the section 5.1.2, monitoring by a regulator is 
selective.818  The FCA explains that the importance of the issue depends on the ‘nature 
and size’ of the problem.819  Prioritizing the issues to focus on based on the nature and 
size is aligned with one of its regulatory principles, ‘use its resources in the most efficient 
and economic way’, which is stipulated by FSMA 2000.820   
Another reason can be because the FCA is answerable to the parliament and so will 
naturally concentrate on the big issues which can make a political windstorm.  The history 
of regulatory sanctions against the “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives, which had 
large-scaled consumer detriments (or risks) related with up to hundreds of thousands of 
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consumers, illustrates the regulator’s strategy of focusing on big issues.821  However, this 
efficient allocation of monitoring resources inevitably creates blind spots that regulatory 
monitoring does not reach.  Consumer detriments where the ‘nature and size’ is not 
significant based on the criteria of the regulator can continuously be left outside of the 
regulator’s monitoring radar.     
However, suffered consumers who are undetected by the regulator’s monitoring are not 
necessarily outside of the notice of the regulatory monitoring system.  Eligible consumers 
can make complaints to the FOS for compensation for their detriments.822  The FOS 
determines their claims based on ‘fairness and reasonableness’ and can order the financial 
institution concerned to compensate the consumer for the loss.823  Regulatory rules are 
one of the most important criteria for the FOS to determine ‘fairness and 
reasonableness’.824  So, the FOS can be said to function as a part of the regulatory 
monitoring system.  The FOS is a robust monitoring system for detecting consumer 
detriments in that the FOS is easily accessible by consumers because it is free of charge 
and its adjudication process is much quicker and less formal than the court.825   
The limit of the FOS as a monitoring system is its narrow eligibility for complainants; natural 
persons or micro enterprises826 with less than 10 employees and less than €2 million of 
turnover or balance sheet are the eligible complainants.827  Another limit is that the amount 
of compensation awarded by the FOS cannot exceed £150,000.828  Due to the limitation in 
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eligibility and the amount of reward, the FOS cannot address all the consumer detriments 
not captured by the regulator.   
The FCA acknowledged that businesses ineligible for bringing complaints to the FOS may 
represent a large portion of the SME sector’s users of financial services829; 61% of SME 
bank loans outstanding at the end of 2014 was to businesses with turnover of over £2 
million830, which is outside the remit of the FOS.  In particular, the IRHPs scandal brought 
to light the limited remit of the FOS.  The Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards 
(“PCBS”) pointed out that many SMEs who suffered loss from IRHPs were found to be 
outside the remit of the FOS;831 the PCBS referred to a report832 which stated that, among 
the SMEs with the turnover size over the remit of the FOS, one third didn’t have dedicated 
staff for financial management.  The PCBS acknowledged that many SMEs excluded from 
the remit of the FOS didn’t have the capability to proceed civil actions against banks even 
with valid cases and thus recommended the FCA to consider expanding the remit of the 
ombudsman.833   
However, extending the remit of the FOS cannot entirely solve the problem of blind spots 
of regulatory monitoring.  It is not possible to totally remove the limit of the remit of the 
FOS because it would lead to the disturbance of the entire legal system in financial services 
sector.  In addition, as the PCBS acknowledged, too wider remit of the FOS would put 
much burden on the FOS.834 Even with an extended remit of the FOS, there will inevitably 
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be a group of individuals and SMEs which remain outside of the regulator’s monitoring 
radar. 
To sum up, the current system of regulatory monitoring of financial product transactions 
has significant loopholes in that some consumer detriments may go undetected both by 
the regulator due to its selective monitoring and by the FOS due to its limited eligibility.   
6.2.2.2 Monitoring by private law  
Now, does monitoring by private law complement the regulatory “failures” in its monitoring?  
In the cases of “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives, the answer to this question is 
negative.  In principle, any consumer who failed to receive compensation from regulation 
can bring his case to the court and monitoring of private law takes place through litigation 
raised by the consumers.  But they will do it only when they expect that they are able to 
succeed in the litigation.  As shown in Chapter IV, the prospect of litigation by those 
affected consumers is not attractive for them, considering the fact that only 1 consumer 
out of 13 consumers secured redress order from the court.835   
As shown in Chapter IV, the court confirmed that corporate consumers other than natural 
persons, even micro enterprises, are not entitled to a statutory “right of action” for breach 
of regulatory duty,836 and no consumers have succeeded in getting compensation in the 
litigation of “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives based on common law 
principles.837  Even some consumers who are private persons who have a statutory “right 
of action” by section 138D also failed to receive compensation in litigation due to the 
failure of establishing causal relationship between the breach of regulatory rules and the 
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loss.838  As a result, consumers’ expectation of judiciary redress for their claims of “mis-
selling” of over-the-counter derivatives can but be low, whether based on statutory rules 
or on common law.  Under such legal circumstances, it is difficult to anticipate that 
consumers will bring their claims of “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives to the 
court even with valid cases.839  This means that the monitoring of private law does not 
play a complementary role to cover the blind spots of the regulatory radar.      
6.2.3 Enforcement and intervention 
6.2.3.1 Enforcement and intervention in regulation 
The financial regulator is empowered to perform functions of deterrence and 
compensation to achieve the objective of consumer protection.840  In the cases of “mis-
selling” of over-the-counter derivatives, for the purpose of deterrence, the regulator has 
mainly used fines among many other coercive tools.841  However, as already shown in 
Chapter III, the amount of fines is substantially short of the estimated commission profit 
earned by financial institutions through the penalized “mis-selling” of over-the-counter 
derivatives.842  So it is questionable whether regulatory fines can sufficiently deter potential 
breaches. 
In the domain of regulatory compensation, it is also difficult to say that compensation is 
made to all the deserving consumers.  First of all, as the previous section explained, some 
consumer detriments which are not significant enough for regulator’s intervention and are 
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beyond the remit of the FOS cannot be detected by the regulatory monitoring system.843 
Also even those consumer detriments that have been detected by the regulator are not, it 
can be argued, all compensated fairly and transparently as the case below reflects. 
The FCA has, in principle, a policy to allow financial institutions to voluntarily compensate 
for consumer detriments when there is a contravention of regulatory rules, instead of 
getting involved to ‘carry out extensive follow-up work’.844  In all sanctioned “mis-selling” 
cases of over-the-counter derivatives where losses occurred to consumers, the financial 
institutions awarded redress on a voluntary basis.845  The regulator, in most cases, did not 
oversee the criteria and the process of determining eligibility for voluntary compensation 
employed by the financial institutions. 846   In addition, the criteria of voluntary 
compensation was not publicized.  Only in the “mis-selling” case of IRHPs which was a big 
issue to the regulator, was it exceptionally involved directly in extensive follow-up work of 
checking and creating compensation criteria.847   
As a result, the consumers who suffered loss could not judge or monitor whether they 
were compensated fairly.  So it cannot be guaranteed that the voluntary redress by the 
violator provides all the aggrieved consumers with fair compensation.  Of course, 
consumers who are not compensated or not satisfied with the voluntary compensation can 
make complaints to the FOS.848  But again, such compensation is still only available to 
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eligible consumers.  The consumers who are not provided with voluntary compensation 
nor the FOS compensation are only left with the option to go to the court to seek 
redress.849 
Another gap in regulatory compensation is its narrow scope.  The compensation criteria 
for IRHPs, which the regulator co-created 850  with financial institutions, revealed the 
regulator’s intended coverage of regulatory redress.  The criteria allowed for the review of 
the sales process only for ‘non-sophisticated’ consumers and not for the ‘sophisticated’ 
consumers.851  As a result, 10,596(34.3%) consumers could not qualify the ‘sophistication 
test’852 out of 30,804 consumers in IRHP’s review.853   
The scope of non-sophisticated consumers are much narrower than the scope of ‘retail 
client’854 which is the class of consumers under the most expansive protection by the COBS.  
This means that even if they are retail clients for the purposes of the COBS, if they could 
not meet the conditions of the sophistication test, they had no accessibility to regulatory 
compensation and had to rely on private law for redress because as non-sophisticated 
consumers they cannot qualify for eligibility of the FOS in that the sophistication test has 
tighter criteria than the FOS eligibility test855.  For instance, a SME with £7 million of turn-
over and £4 million of balance sheet is classified into a retail client in the COBS but not 
into a non-sophisticated consumer in IRHPs review process nor into an eligible consumer 
for the FOS.  It can also be assumed that the regulator’s intention to cover only non-
                                                          
849 See  n878 
850 House of Commons Treasury Committee, ‘Conduct and competition in SME lending’ (2015) 40 
851 Financial Services Authority, ‘Interest Rate Hedging Products: Pilot Findings’ (2013) 13 
852 See n330 
853 Financial Conduct Authority, ‘Aggregate position chart’ (2015)   
<http://www.fca.org.uk/static/documents/aggregate-progress.pdf> accessed May 2016 
854 See n265 
855 See n330 and n337 
176 
 
sophisticated consumers for regulatory redress may be applied to financial institutions’ 
voluntary compensation schemes in other cases as well because financial institutions would 
follow the regulator’s intention if there is no specific reason.  
The final aspect of the problem of regulatory compensation is the external influence on 
the regulator.  As mentioned before, regulation in its enforcement may be vulnerable to 
external influence. 856   The IRHPs’ compensation process well illustrated the financial 
regulator’s exposure to pressure from politics and other interests groups.  The Treasury 
Committee of the House of Commons collected consumers’ complaints about regulatory 
compensation for loss from IRHPs, and publicly criticised the regulator’s compensation 
criteria and process in detail including the sophistication test, the complainant’s access to 
review information and the appeal process.857  Consumers of IRHPs also formed an interest 
group for themselves, put pressure on politicians to take action for their interest and 
directly attacked the FCA’s approach to IRHPs.858  From the direction in favour for financial 
institutions, there was also suspicion in the media that the government dismissed the 
former CEO of the FCA due to his tough position against financial institutions in dealing 
with various issues including the IRHPs scandal.859  With no exact explanation from the 
government about the reason of the former FCA CEO’s sudden departure, it is not possible 
to verify the true cause but the fact that the Conservative, the ruling party at the time, 
received over 50% of its fund from the City in 2014 makes the above suspicion structurally 
                                                          
856 See n773 
857 House of Commons Treasury Committee, ‘Conduct and competition in SME lending’ (2015) 34-65 
858 See http://bully-banks.co.uk/site/ accessed 15 May 2015 
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“probable” 860, if not true.  The fact that the regulator suddenly abandoned, just after the 
dismissal of the former CEO, its ambitious on-going project of reviewing the culture of the 
banking industry, which had been initiated under his leadership, gives more weight to the 
suspicion.861  If the suspicion is true, this is a prime example of ‘private interest theory’ of 
regulation in the real world; the CEO could not secure his position because he didn’t 
protect the interest of the politically powerful group.862  
Through the discussion above, it can be seen that the level of sanctions by the regulator 
may not be enough for deterrence and that some suffered consumers are left outside of 
the safety net of regulatory compensation due to the voluntary and opaque compensation 
scheme and the regulator’s narrow scope for redress.  There was also an actual case that 
exposed the vulnerability of the regulator to pressure from outside.  The following section 
will examine if private law complements such shortcomings and loopholes of regulation in 
its enforcement and intervention.    
6.2.3.2 Private enforcement 
Private law has two standards in dealing with claims of “mis-selling” of financial products: 
1) common law standards that apply to consumers who are non-private persons such as 
corporates and 2) regulatory rules that apply to consumers who are private persons.  This 
                                                          
860 See Nicholas Watt and Jill Treanor, ‘Revealed: 50% of Tory funds come from City’, the guardian (8 February 
2011) <http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2011/feb/08/tory-funds-half-city-banks-financial-sector> 
accessed 21th May 2016 
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dichotomous application of standards is the result of the FSMA 2000 which entitles only 
the ‘private person’863 with a “right of action” for breach of statutory duty.864 
Firstly, it will be examine how consumers that are non-private persons, i.e. corporate 
consumers, who are not compensated by regulation are dealt with under private law in 
the claims of “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives.   
Corporate consumers which cannot pass the ‘sophistication test’ are excluded from 
regulatory compensation, as seen in the previous section.865  Their cases, when brought to 
the court, are subject to common law and not bound by the regulatory rules.  Chapter V 
evidenced that in the court rulings, rosy market forecast, failure to explain risk and failure 
to disclose fess, all of which are contraventions of ‘fair, clear and not misleading’ rule of 
the COBS, are not misrepresentations. 866  The court rulings also showed that financial 
institutions are not seen to have a duty of care as an advisor if the contractual terms 
disclaim provision of any advice and so what regulation would see as unsuitable advice 
based on a “de facto” advisory relationship is not a breach of a duty of care in common 
law867.    
The Nextia Properties Limited v National Westminster Bank plc and The Royal Bank of 
Scotland plc is one example of this.868  The plaintiff, a limited company in real estate 
development business, bought IRHP from the bank and suffered a huge loss from it.  There 
is no information available about why the plaintiff brought the case to the court while 
regulatory compensation was in process, but it can be assumed that it was not eligible for 
                                                          
863 See n429 
864 FSMA 2000, s138D 
865 See n851 
866 See Chapter V 5.1.1.2 
867 See n523 
868 [2013] EWHC 3167; see n419 
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the compensation scheme.  Although it seems that its loss from IRHP could have been 
compensated under the regulatory ‘compensation criteria’869, the court did not accept any 
claims of the claimant based on common law; the court ruled that the non-disclosure of 
the commission by the bank, which was seen as a breach of ‘fair, clear and not misleading’ 
rule of the COBS870, was not a misrepresentation because it was an arm’s length transaction 
and that the mismatching terms between the hedged loan and the hedging IRHP, which 
was seen as contravention of regulatory rules871, was not breach of duty because the 
contract stated that assessing the risk of the IRHP was the responsibility of the claimant.872   
Secondly, consumers who are private persons can still be excluded from regulatory 
compensation due to reasons such as large sized873 investments and other unpublicized 
reasons, or can be unsatisfied with the result of “voluntary” compensation.  Then they can 
bring their cases to the court and the regulatory rules are applicable to these cases in the 
court under the Section 138D of the FSMA 2000.  However, the likelihood of securing 
redress for this category of consumers in the court is not so promising.  The biggest 
obstacle for this category of consumers is to prove, in the court, the causal relationship 
between the financial institution’s contravention of regulatory duties and their losses.874  
The regulatory compensation criteria also requires causation between contravention and 
loss but the requirements of causation in common law is much more “precise”.875  And 
                                                          
869 See n553 
870 See n553 
871 See n413 
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Financial Services Authority, ‘Interest Rate Hedging Products Pilot Findings’ (2013) 10 
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Financial Services Authority’ (2011) 8, <www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/pls.pdf> accessed 16 January 2016 
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common law imposes the burden of proving causation on the claimant. 876  For individual 
consumers, it is really difficult to prove that he would have acted differently “but for” the 
financial institutions’ breach.877  
The Zaki & others v Credit Suisse (UK) Limited 878 offers an example showing the limitation 
of the private law’s role in defending the loophole of regulatory compensation for 
consumers who are private persons.  The plaintiff, a wealthy businessman, suffered a huge 
loss from a structured capital at risk product (“SCARP”) which was recommended by the 
bank and brought his case to the court.  Coincidently, the regulator, on its periodic onsite 
review, found some regulatory breaches in the bank’s SCARP business and sanctioned it.879  
The bank agreed with the regulator to voluntarily compensate consumers’ losses caused 
by its breach.880  The fact that the plaintiff continued the litigation, even after the voluntary 
compensation, showed that the plaintiff was not redressed by the bank’s compensation 
scheme or not satisfied (again, detailed information is not available).  Even though the 
court accepted the bank’s breach of suitability rules of the COBS in transactions with the 
plaintiff, it denied the existence of a causal relationship between the breaches of regulation 
and the loss of the plaintiff, and so ruled no compensation.881        
The discussion above reveals that private law did not succeed in providing redress, whether 
based on common law or regulatory rules, for aggrieved consumers who were not 
compensated by regulation due to reasons such as financial institutions’ voluntary 
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compensation scheme, opaqueness of the compensation criteria and the narrow scope of 
consumers for the compensation.  This also shows that private law cannot supplement the 
insufficient deterrence function of regulation.  In essence, private law fails to make up for 
the loopholes of regulation in its enforcement and intervention to effectively achieve both 
deterrence and compensation to protect the interests of consumers to whom over-the-
counter derivatives have been sold in circumstances of “mis-selling”.   
6.2.4. Summary 
The previous sections has illustrated that the complementary interplay between private law 
and regulation has not been effective in dealing with “mis-selling” of over-the-counter 
derivatives.  Julia Black described this lack of interplay in the financial services law as 
‘separate rooms’ where the two institutions rarely interacted and lived ‘in an uneasy 
coexistence’.882  
The key causes of such ineffective complementarity are first, the difference in the standards 
of the two institutions883  and second, the difficulty of proving causation,884 in private law, 
between breach of regulatory duty and the consumer detriment.  Recommendations of 
reform in order to address those causes and enable a more complete complementary 
interplay between the two institutions will be discussed in the following sections. 
6.3 Recommendation 
6.3.1 Harmonisation of standards of the two institutions 
6.3.1.1 General direction 
                                                          
882 Julia Black, ‘Law and Regulation: The Case of Finance in Regulating Law’ in Christine Parker, Regulating Law  
(OXFORD 2005) 43-49 
883 Ibid p45 
884 See n881; see also George Walker, Robert Purves, and Michael Blair QC (n 116)  para 12.06 
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Harmonisation is not substituting private law with regulation or vice versa.  The sources of 
the dissonance between regulation and private law as explained in the previous section 
were that both institutions have their own history of standard developments to achieve 
different functions and goals. 885   Complementary interplay should be pursued while 
preserving the framework of each institution.886   
In order to ensure complementary interplay while acknowledging the merits of each 
institution, positioning regulation as the minimum requirement in private law is 
recommended.  ‘Regulation as the minimum requirement’ means that private law will see 
a breach of regulatory duty as negligence per se but can also impose more requirements 
on financial institutions than what regulation requires.887  However, it is noteworthy that 
even if a breach of regulatory rules is seen as negligence, it gives rise to a liability only 
when it satisfies the causation888 between the negligence and the detriment.  For instance, 
the breach of the statutory rule of maintaining promotion records,889 which does not have 
any causal effects in terms of consumer detriments, should not result in imposing civil 
liability on the financial institution, apart from a regulatory sanction.   
If set as the minimum requirement, regulation would become the ‘baseline’ of private 
law890 but ‘regulatory compliance defence’,891 which means that compliance with regulation 
will preclude any liability in private law, would not be admitted.892  Positioning regulation 
as the minimum requirement in private law is persuasive in that the reason that regulation 
                                                          
885 See section 5.2.1 
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was devised in the first place was to alleviate the market failures which could not be solved 
by private law.893   
Making regulation the minimum requirement in private law has substantial advantages.  
Firstly, private law can develop its own knowledge and experience incrementally on top of 
regulation and will be capable of solving regulatory failures due to obsolete regulation.894  
Even though the swiftness of response is one of regulation’s strengths, some time lag is 
inevitable and sometimes rule makers are not even able to recognize the gaps that it 
leaves. 895  In this regulatory vacuum, private law can prevent unfair outcomes in disputes 
over “mis-selling” of financial products by adding its own requirements because it is more 
apt to make subtle changes in its ruling.896  Private law also can solve not only the 
obsoleteness of regulation but also the limit of rigid ex-ant regulatory requirements.  
Regulation cannot expect all the possible wrongdoing beforehand, so unconditional 
application of regulatory rules might sometimes reach an unfair result.897  For instance, by 
the information disclosure rule of the COBS898, a financial institution which does not 
provide any personal risk warning to exceptionally vulnerable consumers such as very old 
retired people is not liable for any breach of regulatory requirements only if it gives a risk 
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warning in a tiny-printed standard form.899  Private law can ameliorate the regulatory failure 
from the rigidity and homogeneity of regulatory requirements.        
Secondly, it promotes interaction between the two institutions.  It will lead the court to 
take a close look at how the regulator interprets and enforces regulatory rules900 and to 
develop its own ways of integrating regulatory rules with traditional private law.901  On the 
other hand, the regulator which concentrates on widespread detriment to a large group 
of consumers can learn from how the court takes into account ‘idiosyncratic factors’ and 
better apply regulatory rules to individual cases of low homogeneity.902   
The key question is, then, how to ensure the positioning of regulation as the minimum 
requirement in private law.  The court can refer to regulation when it deems appropriate 
when deciding liability, but leaving this to judicial discretion cannot ensure that the 
harmonized integration happens.903  In practice, the court seems, in disputes of “mis-selling” 
of over-the-counter derivatives, to be reluctant to consider regulation in deciding 
liability.904  For legal certainty and consistent complementary interplay, an express statutory 
provision stipulating regulation as the minimum requirement in private law is necessary.905   
6.3.1.2 Implementation 
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The general direction for ensuring more complementary interplay between private law and 
regulation is proposed in the previous section: an express legislative provision stipulating 
regulation as the minimum requirement in private law for the court to take it into account 
in its decisions.  Section 138D of FSMA 2000 is an important statutory tool through which 
to realize this general direction.  The following section will examine the origin, meaning 
and drawbacks of section 138D and then suggest a plan for its improvement. 
Brief history of legislative framework for private enforcement of regulation 
Section 138D of the FSMA 2000 is the current express provision which gives some 
consumers a “right of action” for breach of regulatory duty by financial institutions.906  This 
provision has a long history starting from Section 62 of the FS Act 1986.  Section 62 of FS 
Act was the first legislative attempt in financial services law to confer a “right of action” on 
consumers who suffered loss from contravention of regulatory rules.907  It is noteworthy 
that Section 62 provided a “right of action” for all persons including companies if they 
suffered losses as a result of regulatory contraventions.908  However, it was never put into 
force.909  After six months of suspension, it was overridden by Section 62A which restricted 
the range of persons conferred on the “right of action” to the ‘private investor’ 910, a term 
defined by secondary legislation911.  Section 62A of the FS Act descended to Section 150 
and to the current Section 138D of FSMA 2000 without substantial modifications (‘private 
investor’ was changed to ‘private person’).    
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911 The Financial Services Act 1986 (Restriction of Right of Action) Regulations 1991, SI 1991 No 486  
186 
 
The reasons that the government (Department of Trade and Industry) revised Section 62 
with Section 62A were twofold.  First, it was concerned that Section 62 would entail 
vexatious law suits in the financial services sector.912  Especially, it sympathized with large 
financial institutions who were concerned913 that Section 62 would be misused to initiate 
‘strategic’ lawsuits by competitors.914  Secondly, it alleged that Section 62 would lead the 
rule-makers, who were statutory regulator and self-regulatory organizations at that time, 
to making the rulebooks too descriptive and detailed for making it precise for lawsuits, 
which would result in rulebooks too complex to understand, too costly to comply with and 
too rigid and descriptive to improve the actual level of consumer protection.915    
In spite of the drastic reduction of its ambit, Section 62A has some important meanings.  
It was the first provision in force, which tried to utilize private enforcement for public 
regulation in financial services law.  This was a progressive step towards better interplay 
between private law and regulation.  It created the legislative foundation to enable 
regulation to function as the minimum requirement in private law, because the claimant 
could receive compensation at least based on breach of regulation and the court could 
add additional requirements beyond regulatory rules916.   
Also, it secured the flexibility917 of the ambit of its application by delegating the power of 
defining the range of persons entitled to employ this “right of action” to secondary 
legislation to be promulgated by the government918; so thereafter, the government has 
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been able to modify the range of consumers conferred on a “right of action” in line with 
the changes in financial environments.   
On the other hand, Section 62A has set its limits by providing a “right of action” to only a 
section of consumers.  Because of this, it has not only constrained complementary interplay 
but also entrenched the dissonance between private law and regulation.  Grant Estates 
Limited v The Royal Bank of Scotland919 shows the “side” effect of the provision restricting 
a “right of action” to only some consumers:  
More widely, I do not think that GEL [Grant Estates Ltd.] can rely on the COBS 
rules to create a common law duty of care in relation to the provision of advice. 
A common law duty can arise from the existence of a statutory duty as part of 
the background circumstances; and the existence of a statutory duty may show 
that a particular risk should have been foreseen. When the court assesses the 
effect of the statutory duty on the question whether it is just and equitable to 
impose a duty of care the primary consideration is, in my view, the policy of the 
statute. Looking to the policy of the FSMA one discovers that it provides 
protection to consumers of financial services through a self-contained regulatory 
code and statutory remedies for breach of its rules. As I have said, it needs no 
fortification by the parallel creation of common law duties and remedies. Further, 
the existence of a duty in negligence for failure to comply with the COBS rules 
would circumvent the statutory restriction on the direct right of action which I 
discussed in paragraphs [31]-[60] above… To my mind that approach is 
applicable also where Parliament imposes statutory duties on private bodies and 
individuals.920 [emphasis added] 
The provision giving a “right of action” only to private persons is interpreted by the court 
that regulatory rules should not be applied to non-private persons in private law, but this 
was not the intention of Section 62A.  Department of Trade and Industry stated that ‘Breach 
of statutory provisions always raises possibility of a “right of action”, and s62 did not 
                                                          
919 [2012] CSOH 133; see also Crestsign Ltd v National Westminster Bank plc and Royal Bank of Scotland plc 
[2014] EWHC 3043 (Ch) [146] 
920 [2012] CSOH 133 [79] 
188 
 
therefore necessarily create a new right’.921  Section 62A intended to express clearly that 
some consumers had a “right of action” but not to disclaim the general right of action for 
regulatory breach that the other consumers held in private law.922  However, the legislative 
provision with the purpose of confirming a “right of action” of private persons prevents 
private law from adopting the concepts of regulatory duty as one of its standards in other 
groups of consumers.   
Expanding the ambit of s138D of FSMA 
For complete harmonization of private law and regulation, the key component needed is 
to expand the entitlement of the “right of action” in Section 138D.  During the period of 
over two decades since the promulgation of Section 62A (later s150 and s138D), the “right 
of action” has been rarely used by the eligible persons.923  This is because the “right of 
action” was granted only to a small group of consumers who are the least likely to bring 
claims to the court.  ‘Private persons’ who usually have limited resources to proceed with 
litigation are entitled with the “right of action” by section 138D.924  In addition, because 
individuals are able to get compensation through the FOS without litigation, if their reward 
is not beyond the limit of the FOS, the “right of action” is not much meaningful for them.   
On the other hand, companies which are relatively better resourced for litigation and are 
excluded from the protection of the FOS925 cannot avail themselves of the “right of action” 
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for breach of regulatory duty.  This limitation of section 138D was shown in the recent 
IRHPs scandals; SMEs and micro-businesses, which were excluded from regulatory 
compensation including FOS rewards and so pursued lawsuits for loss from IRHPs, could 
not use the “right of action” by Section 138D in the court but had to depend only on 
private law principles such as misrepresentation.926 
In fact, at the time of promulgation of Section 62A, many commentators were against the 
restriction.927  The rationale for the restricted entitlement of the statutory “right of action” 
is not persuasive at least for now.  It is argued that the concerns expressed about the risk 
of vexatious law suits was groundless in that conferring on the “right of action” from 
regulatory breach would not increase the risk of excessive litigation because, as the 
Department of Trade and Industry acknowledged, breach of statutory rules always ‘had the 
possibilities to raise a “right of action”’ in private law; 928 this means anybody without the 
statutory “right of action” can still bring the “vexatious” law suits to the court.   
Actually, the cases where ‘private persons’ (or ‘private investors’) used the “right of action” 
are very rare929 and limited only to very wealthy individuals.  In the area of over-the-
counter derivatives, only 3 consumers out of 15 consumers930, whose investment size was 
                                                          
926 See Table 2 at 107 
927 Joanna Gray, ‘Financial Services Act 1986 reforms: Part2’ (1991) 9(9) Int.Bank.L 412; Eva Z. Lomnicka, 
‘Curtailing section 62 actionability’ [1991] J.B.L. 353; Iain G. Macneil, ‘FSA 1986: does s.62 provide an effective 
remedy for breaches of Conduct of Business Rules?’ (1994) 15(6) Comp.Law. 172; Julian Pritchard, ‘Investor 
protection sacrificed: the new settlement and s.62: part2’ (1992) 13(11) Comp.Law. 210 
928 Department of Trade Industry, Defining the Private Investor (1990) 3 
929 Iain G. Macneil, ‘FSA 1986: does s.62 provide an effective remedy for breaches of Conduct of Business 
Rules?’ (1994) 15(6) Comp.Law. 172, n2 
930 See Table 2 at 107 
190 
 
beyond dozens of million pounds, used the “right of action” as private persons.931  This 
shows empirically that the range of the “right of action” is set too narrowly to be employed.   
It was especially disproportionate to exclude all kinds of companies from the statutory 
“right of action” just for the purpose of preventing strategic lawsuits by competitors in the 
financial services sector.932  The worries933 voiced at the time about an overly descriptive 
rulebook is also not relevant anymore because rule books are made at the EU level under 
‘maximum harmonization’934 or the single rulebook model.        
Now there appears to be no definite reasons to hesitate to entitle all consumers with the 
“right of action” from contravention of regulatory rules.  To prevent ‘strategic’935 lawsuits 
between competitors in financial services industry, it is enough to exclude financial 
institutions from the “right of action”.  This modification does not need the consent of 
parliament because the power of defining the ‘private person’ who has the “right of action” 
is delegated to the government.936  Swift modification of the ambit of a “right of action” 
in line with the change of the financial environment follows the purpose for which the 
statute delegated such power.937   
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As an added point, the COBS, which was created after a long period of consultation and 
research at EU and the national level,938 already categorized consumers into three groups 
based on their experience and knowledge, and it differentiated the applicability of its rules 
for each group of consumers.939  So the FSMA 2000 does not need to make another 
consumer classification criteria different from the one of the COBS.  This makes, as the 
Department of Trade and Industry acknowledged, 940 ‘unnecessary variations’ in client 
classifications.  Expanding the ambit of the “right of action” to all consumer types except 
for financial institutions can remove the confusion in consumer categorization in financial 
law, and promote complementary interplay between the two institutions.   
6.3.2 Relaxed causation test 
Section 138D of the FSMA 2000 stipulates that a private person has a “right of action” 
when he suffers loss ‘as a result of’ contravention of regulatory rules.941  The phrase of ‘as 
a result’ requires the claimant to prove the causality between financial institutions’ breach 
of regulatory rules and his loss.942  The court confirmed that the ordinary causation test in 
common law, which requires the claimant to prove that his loss would not have occurred 
“but for” the breach (factual causation) and that his loss was not “remote” from the breach 
(legal causation),943 should be applied in interpreting the phrase of ‘as a result’.944   
                                                          
938 Hugh Collins, ‘The hybrid quality of European private law’ (n 258) 457 
939 FCA Handbook, COBS 3.4, 3.5, 3.6; Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council of 21 April 2004 
on markets in financial instruments amending Council Directives 85/611/EEC, Article 4 
940 Department of Trade Industry, Defining the Private Investor (1990) 8 
941 FSMA 2000, s138D 
942 Sandy Steel (n 451) 1; Kirsty Horsey and Erika Rackley (n 401) 222 
943 McMeel, Gerard, and John Virgo (n 399)  para 23.177 and 23.188 
944 Adrian Rubenstein v HSBC [2012] EWCA Civ 1184; George Walker, Robert Purves and Michael Blair (n 116) 
para 7-30 
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However, it is difficult for consumers to prove causation.  In terms of factual causation, the 
consumer should prove that he would have acted differently if the financial institution had 
not contravened regulatory rules.945  For instance, for the ordinary causation test, a 
consumer should show that he would not have entered into the over-the-counter 
derivatives contracts if the financial institution had provided suitable advice or fair 
communication.  This is quite difficult for consumers; the difficulty comes from the fact 
that much of the advice and information regarding investment is mainly delivered orally 
by representatives of financial institutions and so there is lack of hard evidence.946  Also, 
behavioural science shows that consumers cannot tell why they behaved in a particular 
way because there were so many factors affecting their behaviour.947   
In regard to legal causation, the affected consumer should establish that the regulatory 
breach by the financial institution is the “real” cause of his detriment among possible plural 
causes.948  The cases of “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives usually show that 
unexpected market turmoil reveals regulatory breach such as unsuitable advice or unfair 
communication.949  Without the market turmoil, the detriment of the consumer might not 
have occurred and the regulatory breach might not have been known by anybody 
including the consumer.  It is difficult even for the judge to decide on the real cause of 
the consumer detriment between market turmoil and regulatory breach.950  The multiplicity 
                                                          
945 Norbert Reich, ‘The interrelationship between rights and duties in EU law’ [2010] Yearbook of European 
Law 112, 158; Olha O Cherednychenko ‘Financial Consumer Protection in the EU: Towards a Self-Sufficient 
European Contract Law for Consumer Financial Services?’ (n 876) 492 
946 Niamh Moloney, How to Protect Investors: Lessons from the EC and the UK (n 81) 292 
947 R Incardona and C Poncibò, ‘The average consumer, the unfair commercial practices Directive, and the 
cognitive revolution’ (2007) 30(1) Journal of Consumer Policy 21, 21; The Law Commission and the Scottish Law 
Commission (n 395) 137   
948 See n454 
949 See p105 
950 See n461 
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of possible causes makes the proving of causation more difficult for consumers because 
the burden of proof of causation is on the claimant.951   
In fact, pursuing “precise” causation might be the same as chasing a mirage because, as  
Laleng contended, the conclusion of causation must be ‘interpretative’ and ‘probabilistic’ 
intrinsically.952  He, thus, argued that ‘there is no such thing as objective causation in law’.953  
Practically, the FSA pointed out that it was constrained in its capability to compensate 
consumers due to the strict causation test of general law.954  Porta and others also showed 
in their empirical research that a burden of proof of causation on consumers in civil law 
had a strong negative correlation with the development of the capital market.955 
For the reasons discussed above, some commentators contend that the burden of proof 
of causation in the financial services sector should shift to the defendant once the claimant 
proves the defendant’s regulatory contravention.956  But caution is necessary in reversing 
the burden of proof of causation on to the defendant because it isn’t consistent with the 
‘compensatory aim of private rights’.957 
The ‘Consumer Protection (Amendment) Regulations 2014’ (“CPR 2014”)958 provides a good 
model of how the strict causation test can be modified when a “right of action” for 
                                                          
951 Ibid 
952 P Laleng (n 585) n5; see also Donal Nolan, ‘Causation and the goals of tort law’ in Robertson, Andrew, and 
Hang Wu Tang (eds) The goals of private law (Bloomsbury Publishing 2009) 167; The Law Commission and the 
Scottish Law Commission (n 395) para 8.4-8.5 
953 Ibid 
954 Financial Services Authority, ‘Written evidence in Joint Committee on the Draft Financial Services Bill 
Evidence’ (2011) 583 <http://www.parliament.uk/documents/joint-committees/Draft-Financial-Services-
Bill/WEBWRITTENEVIDENCE.pdf> accessed 2 July 2016 
955 Porta, Rafael, Florencio Lopez‐de‐Silanes, and Andrei Shleifer, ‘What works in securities laws?’ (2006) 61.1 
The Journal of Finance 1, 19 
956 See eg Norbert Reich (n 945) 158 
957 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Consumer Redress for Misleading and Aggressive 
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regulatory breach brings a case to the court.  CPR 2014 confers on consumers a “right of 
action”959 from regulatory breach and requires consumers to prove that the regulatory 
breach is ‘a significant factor’ 960 for their purchase of the products or services.  It statutorily 
relaxes causation test from the “but for” to the “significance” test.   
The relaxed causation test was recommended by the Law Commission in its report 
‘Consumer Redress for Misleading and Aggressive Practices’ in 2012.961  It concluded that 
it was unrealistic to require consumers to prove that they would not have entered into the 
contracts “but for” the sellers’ breach,962 but at the same time, it also objected to reversing 
burden of proof for causation to the sellers because this was against fair allocation of 
duties and rights963.  As a solution, it suggested the ‘significance’ test which required 
consumers to prove that the sellers’ breach affected their purchase decision 
“significantly”.964  
However, the Law Commission excluded financial services from the ambit of CPR 2014, 
explaining that the financial services sector already had sophisticated regulation and a 
generous compensation system of the FOS.965  Its explanation of the financial services 
industry having an elaborate regulatory system is right but this cannot be the rationale for 
the financial services sector being subject to a different causation test from that of the 
other consumer industries.  The financial services sector, as shown in the section 6.2966, 
                                                          
959 Ibid s27A.(1) 
960 Ibid s27A.(6) which stipulates ‘The third condition is that the prohibited practice is a significant factor in the 
consumer’s decision to enter into the contract or make the payment.’ 
961 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Consumer Redress for Misleading and Aggressive 
Practice (n 957) para 7.116 
962 Ibid para 7.108 
963 Ibid 
964 Ibid para 7.116 
965 Ibid para 6.107-118 
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also has the same problem of insufficient regulatory enforcement as the Commission 
identified as the case in other consumer industries967.  Protection provided by the FOS is 
also limited in terms of the subject and the amount of the reward and so a substantial 
number of consumers, especially SMEs, should rely only on private law to be 
compensated.968  Therefore there seems to be no coherent reasons to treat the financial 
services industry differently from the other consumer industries in terms of the causation 
test. 
Some may express concerns that the eased causation test in the financial services sector, 
where unexpected market movements incurring losses to consumers, will entice them to 
bring meritless litigation for compensation of their losses.  However, it should be 
remembered that the burden of proof of regulatory breach is still on the consumer and 
evidencing the regulatory breach of financial institutions during pre-contractual 
communication which usually is done orally is not easy for consumers.  Zaki & others v 
Credit Suisse (UK) Limited969 illustrates well how difficult it is for a consumer to establish 
regulatory breach of financial institutions.  The claimant needed considerable forensic 
efforts to be able to demonstrate regulatory breach of the financial institution during the 
sales process, which was possible because he was a very affluent businessman,970 but even 
in his case, most of his claims about regulatory breach such as provision of unsuitable 
advice were rejected by the court971.  Considering the difficulty of evidencing regulatory 
                                                          
967 The Law Commission and the Scottish Law Commission, Consumer Redress for Misleading and Aggressive 
Practice (n 957) para 1.7 
968 See n826, n827 and n828 
969 Zaki & others v Credit Suisse (UK) Limited [2011] EWHC 2422 (COMM) 
970 Ibid [2], [103] 
971 See p98 
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breach of financial institution in the court, it appears an unreasonable concern that relaxed 
causation test will increase meritless litigation by consumers.   
In summary, relaxed causation test is needed to better enable the complementary role of 
private enforcement of regulation.  For consistent implementation, the relaxed causation 
test of “significance” should be clearly expressed by amending section 138D of FSMA 2000. 
Conclusion 
This Chapter analysed the strengths and weaknesses of private law and regulation as a 
“regulatory system” about each process of standard setting, monitoring and enforcement 
and intervention, and in doing so, found that the two institutions have a potential to 
complement each other by making up for the weaknesses of the other.  Regulation can 
supplement such weaknesses of private law as uncertainty of requirements, lack of risk-
benefit analysis, back-ward looking and passive monitoring and heavy burdens on 
consumers for enforcement.  At the same time, private law can cover such shortcomings 
of regulation as insufficient “monitoring and enforcement” and regulator’s vulnerability to 
external influence. 
This Chapter, then, examined how the two institutions with the potential for a 
complementary relationship interact with in the financial services sector.  However, the 
result demonstrated that the two institutions do not have such interplay.  They focus on 
“regulating” their own territory without interacting each other.  The attitude of regulation 
towards private law seems to be “avoidance”.  The regulator has tried to use “voluntary” 
compensation schemes rather than official and legal apparatus such as restitution request 
or order.  For the regulator, the solution through the court is the last option.  The comment 
by the chairman of the FCA shows this attitude:  
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Either we go through the law courts, which takes a very great length of 
time and costs a very great deal of money, or, as a proactive regulator, we 
go out on the front foot and say, “This is how we are going to do it”, and 
the necessary part of “this is how we are going to do it” is coming to an 
arrangement with the banks that is “voluntary”, or at least contractually 
voluntary, to do it that way. If they refuse, we end up in the law court…972   
Julia Black described this attitude of regulation as recognizing ‘law as risk’.973  She explained 
that the perception of ‘law as risk’ illustrates that for market participants, including the 
regulator, ‘law is uncertain, unpredictable and external’ and this is because the market 
practice ‘have outpaced the common law’.974  
On the other side, the attitude of private law towards regulation can be summarized as 
“ignorance”.  The court sticks to the general principles of common law rather than adopting 
regulatory concepts as one of its standards.  Cases in private law show that regulatory 
rules cannot override established principles of private law.  The statute which provides 
partial entitlement of a “right of action” from breach of regulatory duty contributes to the 
court’s “ignorance” of regulation.  The “right of action” conferred on a small section of 
consumers hinders the regulatory standards to be absorbed by private law.  The partial 
entitlement of the “right of action” is hampering the court’s ability to apply regulatory 
standards to other consumer groups, which private law could have otherwise done to 
integrate regulatory requirements with its own principles.  As a result, the statutory 
provision made with the purpose of using private enforcement of regulation paradoxically 
actually hinders it. 
                                                          
972 House of Commons Treasury Committee (n 358) 37 
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This Chapter also pointed out the causation test of private law as one of the reasons 
preventing the interplay between the two institutions.  Under the causation test of private 
law, successful private enforcement of regulation cannot be expected even when regulation 
is adopted as the one of standards of private law.   
This Chapter recommended two specific legal reforms to enhance complementary interplay 
in order to address the recognized problems, i.e. dissonance of standards between the two 
institutions and over-burdening causation test of private law.  The Chapter recommended 
the expansion of the “right of action” provided by the Section 138D of FSMA 2000 to all 
consumers except for financial institutions.  The second recommendation was to relax the 
causation test in the case brought by the statutory “right of action” into a “significance” 
test in financial services law. 
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VII. CONCLUSION 
7.1 Discussion of the thesis 
The thesis has explored three research questions in relation to regulating “mis-selling” of 
over-the-counter derivatives.  The first question was why transactions of over-the-counter 
derivatives, in particular, are prone to “mis-selling” practices.  To answer this question, the 
thesis has analysed the products, participants and sales practice in over-the-counter 
derivatives markets.  It has also shown that over-the-counter markets for derivatives are 
essential for fully utilizing the benefits of derivatives because of their inherent flexibility 
and capacity to meet specific needs of consumers.975   
The results of the above analysis showed that over-the-counter derivatives markets are 
characterized by dependence of consumers on financial institutions during both the pre-
contractual and contractual stages of transactions. 976   Asymmetric information and 
knowledge between consumers and sellers is the main cause of this dependence.977  
Consumers who are not familiar with derivatives products have no other choice but to rely 
on financial institutions to obtain the necessary information and knowledge about the 
over-the-counter derivatives products entered into which are usually designed by the 
financial institutions themselves.   
The second characteristics of over-the-counter derivatives markets is the high profitability 
for sellers of over-the-counter derivatives.978  Financial institutions can earn lucrative profits 
while avoiding market risks from transactions in over-the-counter derivatives thanks to 
                                                          
975 See n37 
976 See p17 
977 See Chapter II 2.2.3.1 
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sophisticated risk management techniques.  The attractive financial incentives for sales 
representatives of financial institutions can lead them to sell over-the-counter derivatives 
to consumers regardless of the needs of consumers.  The over-the-counter derivatives 
market can be said to be vulnerable to “mis-selling” because of consumers’ dependence 
on sellers and the substantial conflicts of interest between consumers and sellers. 
Use of over-the-counter derivatives is no longer the sole preserve of financial institutions 
or large corporations.979  As observed in the recent interest rate hedging products scandal 
and other sanctioned cases in relation to structured capital at risk products, many SMEs 
and individual persons have entered into over-the-counter derivatives contracts.980  On the 
supply side, advancing risk management techniques of financial institutions and handsome 
profit from over-the-counter derivatives transactions and on the demand side, more 
demand for tailored hedging and investment strategies, are resulting in the introduction 
of new products and new consumers into the over-the-counter derivatives market and 
driving its expansion.   
Such characteristics of the over-the-counter derivatives market make it prone to “mis-
selling” and as the market expands, this risk has assumed greater significance.  Recognising 
this is the first step to addressing such risk and illustrates the need for research about how 
to better regulate “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives. 
The second research question was how financial regulation and private law have dealt with 
“mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives.  A close look at standards and enforcement 
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980 Financial Services Authority, ‘Interest Rate Hedging Products Pilot Findings’ (2013); see Table1 at 68 
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cases of each social institution has revealed the dissonance in their approach to “mis-
selling” of over-the-counter derivatives.   
Financial regulation has evolved in the modern era, from the Prevention of Fraud 
Investment Act to the Financial Services Act 1986 to the Financial Services and Markets 
Act 2000, in its response to changing financial environments and regulatory failures.981  
This evolutionary process has taken place through regulation moving from “duty to 
disclosure” to “duty to protect consumers from their own behaviour”.982  Behavioural 
science has also provided theoretical back-up to the development of regulation towards 
paternalistic protection for consumers.983  As a result, the current conduct of business rules 
require financial institutions to have fiduciary duties that include fully understanding their 
consumers’ financial objectives and capabilities and recommending only suitable products, 
and communicating fairly in a not mis-leading way with consumers.984  So in over-the-
counter derivatives transactions, financial institutions should recommend products suitable 
for the consumer’s objectives, capability and knowledge and experience and should inform 
the consumers of features of the over-the-counter derivatives including material risks and 
related commission. 
The thesis has analysed how private law has dealt with claims of “mis-selling” of over-the-
counter derivatives by taking a look at relevant litigation.  It showed that contractually 
defined rights and duties between contracting parties of over-the-counter derivatives 
transactions constitute the main criteria in resolving “mis-selling” disputes in litigation.985  
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202 
 
As standard forms that financial institutions commonly use for over-the-counter derivatives 
transactions contain such clauses disclaiming that no advisory service is provided and that 
no representation is made, financial institutions can avoid the onerous obligation of an 
advisor and assume the duties of an equal counterparty in an arm’s length contract.986  In 
the cases of claiming “mis-selling” of over-the-counter derivatives, none of the consumers’ 
claims of negligent advice and misrepresentation by financial institutions were accepted.987 
Analysis of standards of financial regulation and of private law in the context of “mis-
selling” of over-the-counter derivatives has revealed that the two institutions have different 
requirements on the same activities performed by financial institutions.  Financial 
regulation demands that financial institutions assume fiduciary duties which cannot be 
denied or modified by contracts while private law sees an over-the-counter derivative 
transaction between a consumer and a financial institution as just another commercial 
contract between equal counterparties and so enforces the contractual terms which 
commonly include clauses disclaiming liabilities of financial institutions. 988  For instance, 
regulation imposes on financial institutions the duties to make suitable recommendations 
and to have clear and fair communication of information with consumers regardless of 
contractual terms, whereas private law usually does not acknowledge that financial 
institutions have duties as an advisor based on contractual relationship and only require 
they not state false facts in communication.989   
Another dissonance between the two institutions in dealing with “mis-selling” of over-the-
counter derivatives is the causation test.  When ordering compensation, the two institutions, 
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both consider causal connection between wrongdoing and detriment as a necessary 
condition for compensation order.  However, the approaches to causation taken by the 
two institutions are quite different.990  The court makes substantial efforts to investigate 
the causation in the specific circumstances of each individual case.  The court does not 
acknowledge causality without being doubtlessly convinced by the claimant that breach of 
duties by the financial institution is the real cause of the detriment of the consumers.991  
The court can be said to pursue “precise” causality.  On the other hand, the regulator does 
not require a precise causal relationship between breach of financial institutions and 
detriment of consumers for compensation order.992  The regulator does not demand the 
consumer to prove causation but considers its own reasoning about causality while 
pursuing a “fair” result. 
The thesis then explained that the dissonance of standards between the two institutions 
on over-the-counter derivatives transactions originates from different functions undertaken 
by them.  The major role of private law is to facilitate contracting activities between parties 
under the belief that transactions between individuals will increase their welfare and thus 
social welfare as well.993  For this facilitative function, private law’s main concern is to 
reduce transaction costs for negotiating, formulating and enforcing contracts while 
minimizing the law’s intervention in contracting.994  Overarching principles in private law 
such as freedom of contract and caveat emptor can be explained as enhancing efficiency 
of contracting.995 
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In the real world, however, the market system which is constituted largely through 
contracting of activities has shown some failures which cannot be solved on its own.  
Asymmetric information between consumers and financial institutions and consumers’ 
bounded rationality are failures identified in the financial services sector, which the market 
system on its own cannot solve.996  Financial regulation for consumer protection has 
emerged to correct those market failures.  Therefore, financial regulation does not put 
much weight on private law’s principles such as freedom of contract and caveat emptor 
because those principles cannot correct market failures such as informational asymmetry 
and bounded rationality.997  In order to correct those market failures, conduct of business 
rules has evolved to impose fiduciary duties on financial institutions regardless of 
contractual relationship.998  The dissonance between the two institutions is being made 
more and more clear as the role of regulation has expanded into the ‘law jobs’999 to such 
a level where it defines the rights and duties between contracting parties, resolves disputes 
and even order compensation.1000  As a result, in the financial services sector, there are 
two different standards applied to regulating the same activities with the same purpose of 
deterrence and redress.   
The third research question that the thesis has addressed is how to achieve harmonized 
interplay between the two institutions with different standards in regulating “mis-selling” 
of over-the-counter derivatives.  Before answering this question, it was shown that the two 
institutions have the potential for complementarity and can supplement the weaknesses 
                                                          
996 See Chapter V 5.2.1.2 (1) 
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of each other.  Regulation can make up for the shortcomings of standards of private law, 
which has uncertainties, lacks the assessment of externalities, and other characteristics such 
as ex-post and passive monitoring and onerous accessibility. 1001   Private law can 
supplement regulation in its selective monitoring and enforcement and its vulnerability to 
outer influence.1002 
However, the reality in the financial services sector in the UK does not show harmonized 
interplay between the two institutions.   The regulator sees private law as risk to avoid and 
tries to solve problems it faces within its ambit without cooperation with the process of 
private law.1003  The court prioritizes coherence within its own internal logic, modes of 
reasoning and principles and tends to ignore regulatory standards which, if adopted, might 
disturb its equilibrium.1004  The statute, which had aimed for enforcement of statutory 
regulation by private law, has rather functioned to preserve the dissonance between 
them.1005  The recent IRHPs scandal has well exemplified the lack of interplay; the court 
adjudicated the cases only based on its principles1006; the regulator in an opaque way 
arranged for compensation excluding the court1007; so different results came out between 
in the two institutions for the same disputes.        
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The dissonance of standards and the lack of interplay between the two institutions create 
legal uncertainty in the financial services sector,1008  as the same type of behaviour is seen 
as wrongdoing under financial regulation but is not a breach of private law.  More 
importantly, this prevents the financial market from setting up moral norms in regards to 
transactions of financial products between financial institutions and consumers and hence 
can incite opportunistic behaviours of market participants such as avoiding their 
responsibilities and liabilities by selectively turning to more favourable standards.1009 
It has been argued that, in order to enhance harmonized interplay between the two 
institutions, compliance with regulation should be positioned as the minimum requirement 
in private law and causation test in private law should be relaxed.  Regulation as the 
minimum requirement in private law means that breach of regulatory obligation will be 
acknowledged as breach of a duty of care in private law, but compliance with regulatory 
obligation cannot guarantee immunization from liability by private law.  For this, the 
statutory “right of action” for breach of regulatory rules, which is now entitled only to 
private persons, should be extended to all consumers except for financial institutions.  
Regulatory rules such as the COBS already differentiates the level of protection by different 
consumer groups and so the statutory “right of action” should be granted to all consumers. 
1010  By this statutory “right of action” all consumers can ask the court to enforce regulatory 
rules while the court will still be able to impose more duties, when it is necessary, on 
financial institutions than regulatory requirements.  The extended “right of action” will 
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make regulation the minimum requirements of private law and allow private law to have 
more room for developing its own principles.      
In relation to relaxing the causation test in private law, for cases brought by the “right of 
action” for regulatory breach, as Law Commission pointed out,1011 the current test of 
causation including factual and legal causation in private law is very difficult for consumers 
to prove and this also hinders private enforcement of regulation.  The current strict 
causation test does not allow regulation to be enforced as the minimum requirement of 
private law in the court.  Therefore, it was recommended that for cases brought by the 
statutory right of action, the causation test in private law should be changed to the 
‘significance’ test.1012   
However, more research should be extended to investment transactions and other financial 
services sectors such as banking and insurance because the legal reforms that this thesis 
has proposed is mainly based on the over-the-counter derivatives transactions.  Each 
financial services sector has sector-specialized statutory rules such as BCOBS (Banking: 
Conduct of Business Sourcebook), MCOB (Mortgage: Conduct of Business) and ICOBS 
(Insurance: Conduct of Business Sourcebook), which contains each sector’s own attributes, 
and in those sectors, “mis-selling” of financial products can occur anytime.  As each 
financial services sector has its own specialized statutory regulation, the dissonance 
between the regulation and private law might have different aspects from each other.1013 
7.2 Implication of the thesis 
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The thesis has revealed, through the example of “mis-selling” of over-the-counter 
derivatives, the contemporary trend of the expansion of the role of regulation and the 
shrinking role of private law in both standard-setting and enforcing standards.  However, 
considering the weaknesses of regulation and the complementarity it can have with private 
law,1014 the crowding out of private law is not desirable.1015         
To enhance harmonized interplay between private law and regulation in the financial 
services sector, the thesis has proposed to the extension of the statutory right of action 
for breach of regulatory duties to a broader range of consumers and a relaxation of the 
burden of proof of causation.  It is argued that these proposals should not be seen as 
instrumentalizing private law for regulatory purposes but as a way to help the evolution 
process of private law.  Private law can be characterized by the steady adaptation of its 
standards to the changing social environments,1016 and regulation can be the trigger of 
private law’s evolution process.1017  As shown before, however, the partially given statutory 
“right of action” hampers private law from absorbing regulatory standards in its system.1018  
Strict pursuit of precise causation of private law works as an impetus for financial market 
participants, including the regulator and consumers, to avoid private law as a resolution 
system for disputes and hence deprives private law of opportunities to deal with the 
disputes and so to develop its standards in line with changing environments.1019 
However, the legal reforms this thesis has suggested are not a complete measure to 
achieve harmonized interplay between private law and regulation.  The extended statutory 
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right of action for regulatory breach and relaxed causation test can just be an institutional 
foundation but not a sufficient condition to enable harmonization of the two institutions.  
For full harmonized interplay, more research is needed to find what roles private law should 
play under the environment of the ambit of regulation being expanded.   
For instance, in its formulation of principle, private law should find a way to integrate 
regulatory requirements with its own standards even when regulation constitutes the 
minimum requirement of private law.  From this perspective, the establishment of a 
financial court dedicated to the financial industry, even though claims of only more than 
£50 million can be brought to this court, is a good step for private law in developing its 
advanced standards in the financial sector and in keeping in pace with fast changing 
financial industry. 1020   In the enforcement of standards, the difficult accessibility of 
consumers to private law is to be solved.  As Lord Thomas acknowledged that there are 
few people except for very wealthy individuals, who can take advantage of private law 
redress for resolving their claims,1021 Efforts should continue to make private law redress 
and enforcement of regulatory norms more accessible to consumers in financial services. 
  
                                                          
1020 Civil Procedure (Amendment No. 4) Rules 2015, SI 2015/1569, Part 63A; Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, 
‘Speech at the Dinner for Her Majesty’s Judges’ (Mansion House, London, 8 July 2015), 
www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/lcj-speech-mansion-house-dinner-for-hm-judges.pdf, 4 
1021 Owen Bowcott, ‘New financial court to hear UK and international market cases’, The guardian (London 10 
July 2015) <http://www.theguardian.com/law/2015/jul/10/new-financial-court-to-hear-uk-and-international-
market-cases> accessed on 28th June 2016 
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